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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Windsor, that
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is unconstitutional.1 DOMA
defined marriage as solely between one man and one woman for every purpose
under federal law.2 Consequently, it required that same-sex couples who are
legally married under state law be denied both federal recognition of their
marriages and a host of federal benefits (and burdens) that apply to
heterosexual married couples. DOMA had been challenged in federal courts
across the country as a violation of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs claimed,
inter alia, that it violated the Spending Clause, Equal Protection under the
Fifth Amendment, and federalism under the Tenth Amendment.3 The First and
Second U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal, had previously concluded that DOMA
violates Equal Protection, affirming district court grants of summary
judgment.4 Windsor was decided as this article went to press. In a five to four
decision, the Supreme Court determined that in passing DOMA and banning
same-sex couples married under state law from receiving any federal marriage
benefits, Congress had interfered with the rights of states to define marriage
and thereby, had violated the rights of Windsor and other couples to Equal
Protection. At press time, the Court still had not yet formally determined the
fate of several other certiorari petitions seeking review of DOMA-related

1. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013); Jeremy W. Peters,
Cold, Wet Wait for Tickets to Supreme Court’s Same-sex Marriage Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Late Edition, Mar. 26, 2013, at 14; see also The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No.
104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
2. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining marriage for purposes of federal law); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2006) (providing that no state is required to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in another state).
3. See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376-77 (D. Mass.
2010) (contending an Equal Protection challenge against DOMA, as embodied in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Mass.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 235-36 (D. Mass. 2010)
(challenging DOMA under the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment), aff’d, 682
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (asserting DOMA violates Equal Protection), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 2012), aff’d, 12-307, 2013 WL 3196928 (June 26, 2013).
4. See Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
2012), cert. denied, No. 12-97 (June 27, 2013); Windsor, 699 F.3d at 188.
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issues, although some might argue that Windsor is practically determinative.5
And on the same day that it decided Windsor, the Supreme Court also decided
a case challenging a state’s right to limit the term “marriage” to heterosexual
couples.6
This article focuses on the issues raised by DOMA and the federal
recognition of state-approved same-sex marriages. While the Supreme Court
invalidated DOMA, its decision in Windsor reserved judgment on some key
questions that DOMA raised. For example, the Court stated that “by history
and tradition” the states controlled marriage, but it did not define that control
itself as a constitutional restriction. The Court also expressly acknowledged
that the federal government can sometimes deviate from the states on marriage
when federal policy is as at issue. While indicating the instances were limited,
the Court did not identify the line between state and federal power. In support
of its claim that DOMA made same-sex couples second-class citizens in
violation of Equal Protection, the majority did list several benefits that samesex couples were denied. But it did no serious examination of the purposes of
these underlying statutes to find what the federal policy vindicated by those
statutes was, nor did counsel for either side. The Court also did not settle the

5. See United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013). The Windsor
plaintiff argued that the denial of a federal marital estate tax deduction (allowing one to
give an unlimited amount to a spouse free from estate and gift taxes) on the ground that
she was married to a person of the same-sex, violated her Equal Protection rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 175-76; see also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Mass., No. 1215 (July 3, 2012) [hereinafter HHS v. Mass. Cert. Pet.], available at
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/2pet/7pet/2012-0015.pet.aa.pdf
(filing
for
certiorari with Gill); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp.
of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill, No. 12-13 (U.S. June 29, 2012),
[hereinafter
BLAG
v.
Gill
Cert.
Pet.]
available
at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/06-292012-gill-v-opm-blag-certiorari-petition.pdf (challenging the finding of an Equal
Protection violation in Gill); Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1,
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Golinsky, No. 12-16 (U.S. July 3, 2012) [hereinafter OPM v.
Golinsky
Cert.
Pet.]
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/2pet/7pet/2012-0016.pet.aa.pdf (seeking to
bypass the Court of Appeals); Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1,
Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 12-231 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2012) [hereinafter
Pedersen
v.
OPM
Cert.
Pet.],
available
at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/pedersen-v-opm/pedersen-plaintiffs-certpetition-08-21-12.pdf; Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1, Office of
Pers. Mgmt. v. Pedersen, No. 12-302 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012) [hereinafter OPM v.
Pedersen
Cert.
Pet.],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/2pet/7pet/2012-0302.pet.aa.pdf.
6. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 12-144 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (holding that given the
state official’s refusal to defend the statute before the Supreme Court, the Court has no
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the California revision of the state constitution to ban
same-sex marriage, and the lower federal court decision invalidating the revision
stands).
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debate over the purpose of marriage in the United States—whether it is
primarily to support procreation as DOMA defenders argued or whether
government support of marriage is to facilitate the formation of consensual
family relationships irrespective of procreation as the DOMA challengers
claimed. Indeed, the word “procreation” did not even appear in the majority
opinion, probably because it relied solely upon DOMA’s scope to invalidate
the statute. And finally, and relatedly, the Court expressly declined to say
whether the federal government was required to grant uniform benefits to
same-sex couples and heterosexual couples as a matter of Equal Protection if
states recognizing such marriages did not distinguish the two groups of
couples. Thus, we are left to ask whether procreation is a legitimate basis for
the distribution of some federal benefits? Is biological difference a legitimate
basis for distinguishing funding among the married? If so, can heterosexuality
alone be a marker for procreation or biological difference? Would a regime for
same-sex couples that does not use the term “marriage,” but provides federal
benefits satisfy Equal Protection? Do the benefits provided have to be exactly
equal? Do same-sex couples have a constitutional right to have their
marriages called “marriage” at the federal level if their respective state uses
that term? And if some differentiation in the treatment of marriage is allowed
either on the basis of procreational status or otherwise, what standard of review
applies to denials of marriage-related benefits to same-sex couples?7
While all litigation is partisan, the political battle over same-sex marriage
has made the legal cases quite so. While the Department of Justice once
defended DOMA, President Barack Obama has now ordered them to cease
doing so, asserting that he believes that DOMA is unconstitutional.8 Before
that, the Obama Administration abandoned one of the key reasons that
Congress put forth for passing DOMA: that it is related to a federal interest in
7. See United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 slip op. at 14-15 (U.S. June 26,
2013) (stating that states control marriage under history and tradition but that the
federal government can effect federal policy through marriage rules); id. at 22-25
(mentioning benefits denied to same-sex couples as evidence of second-class marital
status under DOMA); id. at 16 (referring again to "history and tradition"); id. at 17
(declaring that it is unnecessary to decide whether federal benefits must be uniform as
state benefits are for same-sex couples and heterosexual couples); id. at 20 (noting that
DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York state seeks to protect); see id. at 17-18
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for conveniently ignoring the question
of the standard of scrutiny or any discussion of substantive due process); id. at 8-10
(Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court should not decide whether or not
procreation or consent is the basis of marriage).
8. However, the Administration has said it will still enforce DOMA. See Letter
from Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives
(Feb.
23,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
The Republican
members of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives
(“BLAG”) then intervened. Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 12-14, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at
786 (2012) [hereinafter “BLAG Windsor Merits Brief”].
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responsible procreation.9 Although Congress passed DOMA by a wide
margin, members are now backpedaling wildly from the legislation.10
Commentators on all sides have imposed pressure to achieve their desired
outcomes.11 Law professors, historians, and advocacy groups, have all chimed
in with amicus briefs for their favored sides.12 There is a pressing need for a
sound historical record on past federal inroads into marriage and for proposals
that recognize both the long history of discrimination against gay and lesbian
Americans and Congress’ right to set priorities in public funding decisions,
including those related to marriage.
This article seeks to contribute to those ends. Part II considers the historical
origins of American notions that some matters are “local” issues, including
marriage. It argues that the notions arise out of (1) the American colonial
experience, (2) the notion that “the people” (not merely states) rule in a

9. In 2010, in a reply brief in Smelt v. County of Orange, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") first indicated the retreat. It stated, “[T]he government does not
contend that there are legitimate government interests in creating a legal structure that
promotes the raising of children by both of their biological parents or that the
government’s interest in 'responsible procreation' justifies Congress’s decision to define
marriage as a union between one man and one woman.” It said further,a “[T]he United
States does not believe that DOMA is rationally related to any legitimate government
interests in procreation and child-rearing and is therefore not relying upon any such
interests to defend DOMA’s constitutionality.” Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendant United States of America Motion to Dismiss at 6-7, Smelt v. Cnty of
Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 959 (2006). The
brief was filed on August 17, 2009. This abandonment of the procreation support
position was continued in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388
(discussing the government’s abandonment of Congress’s justifications for DOMA),
aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
Notably, Justice Kagan was Solicitor General at the time that the government filed its
brief in Smelt. Compare Obama Said to Pick Solicitor General for the Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2010, at 1, with Lyle Denniston, Kagan, DOMA and Recusal,
SCOTUSblog, (Nov. 2, 2012, 4:59 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2012/11/kagan-domaand-recusal/ (suggesting that the Solicitor General must have been involved in the
decision to abandon argument that procreation is not key to marriage policy).
10. See Mass. v. HHS, 682 F.3d at 6 (noting the “strong majorities” in both houses
when DOMA was passed and that President Clinton signed it); Brief of 172 Members
of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging Affirmance on the Merits, Windsor, 133
S. Ct. at 786; Peter Baker, Now in Defense of Gay Marriage, Bill Clinton, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2013, at 1.
11. The Obama Administration’s initial defense of DOMA upset same-sex
marriage advocates; the abandonment of the procreation argument angered
conservatives. Compare Frank Rich, 40 Years Later, Still Second-Class Americans,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at 8, with Ed Whelan, The Massachusetts DOMA Rulings—
Some Commentary on Gill v. OPM, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 9, 2010, 12:10 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/230892/massachusetts-doma-rulingssome-commentary-i-gill-v-opm-i/ed-whelan.
12. For a listing of briefs filed in the key cases see website of the Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders (“GLAD”) at http://www.glad.org/doma/documents/.
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democracy, and (3) conflict of laws theory. I point out that conflict of laws
theory has historically differentiated between the law governing the validity of
a marriage and that governing the incidents that flowed from that marriage.
Part III offers five cases in which the federal government has deviated from
state or local laws on the validity of a marriage: (1) the recognition of
marriages according to slave custom for purposes of providing military
pensions to the families of black soldiers during the Civil War; (2) the federal
government’s authorization and oversight of marriages among ex-slaves during
and after the Civil War; (3) the treatment of polygamy in Utah Territory; (4)
the treatment of polygamy and fraudulent marriages in immigration; and (5)
the treatment of American Indian marriages. Items 1 and 2—the federal
recognition of slave marriages and federal oversight of the marrying of exslaves—have either been not mentioned or mischaracterized in DOMA
litigation. They are extremely important to understanding the extent and limits
of federal power. The government’s efforts to end polygamy in Utah are often
couched as tale of moral judgment or religious intolerance. I will demonstrate
that the Supremacy Clause played a significant role in the government’s
actions, although other factors also contributed. Part III then discusses cases in
which Congress recognized the validity of the marriage, but applied different
incidents than state or local law would have advised. I offer but two of many
examples: (1) the decision to give married women a legal share of land in
Oregon Territory, separate from their husbands under the Oregon Donation
Law of 1850 and (2) Congress’ decision to abandon deference to state marital
property rules in the income tax controversy over community property states
versus separate property states in the 1930s and 1940s. To this writer’s
knowledge, the Oregon Donation law has not been discussed in DOMA cases
and the income tax history that I discuss has been referenced peripherally and
for other points.
Part IV summarizes the findings with respect to what history says about the
federal law of marriage. I argue that federal conflict of law rules are likely a
key source of the history and tradition of deference to local (not merely state)
law on marriage that the Supreme Court identified in Windsor. These rules
join with limited federal constitutional powers to produce the pattern of
deference. Traditionally, under those conflict of law rules, the validity of a
marriage has been governed by local law (not merely state law), subject to
serious public policy concerns. However, the incidents that a government
chooses to attach to a marriage have not been consistently subject to such a
rule of deference.Federal deviations from state and local determinations of
validity or with respect to what incidents should flow from a marriage have
historically fallen into three categories. Congress has deviated (1) to vindicate
Constitutional interests; (2) to vindicate statutory, rule, or treaty interests; and
(3) to vindicate non-constitutional, non-statutory interests. In these decisions,
Congress has also considered the role of the majority of the states and the
common law’s traditional approach. The central question for courts is, then,
what is the purpose of Congress’ deviation.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

7

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

712

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:4

Part V recognizes that there are really three DOMAs. One DOMA bundled
all of marriages’ benefits making them impervious to same-sex couples
married under state law. That DOMA is now dead. Another DOMA collapsed
into the underlying statutes that it defined. That DOMA may very well still
live, at least in part. And the third DOMA was merely an exercise of the right
of the federal government to define its own terms. This DOMA as a restrictive
definition applicable to all marriage benefits is effectively dead, but it may
survive in effect in individual instances in which the second DOMA also
survives. Then, focusing on the second “unbundled” DOMA, Part V argues
that if there is legitimate authority for the approach of DOMA as a substantive
statute, that authority must be found in the underlying statutes; there too one
must look for evidence of purpose. Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower
courts did this analysis in DOMA litigation nor did the parties signal in any
serious way that such an analysis was necessary. The section makes its point
by examples, discussing four groups of statutes and their relationship to
procreation: the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), the
Social Security statutes, income tax treatment of marital income, and the estate
and gift tax marital deduction at issue in Windsor. This section provides
evidence that some federal statutes seek to respond to the unique biological
imbalance in the heterosexual couple and a unique history of discrimination
through marriage policy. It concludes that the first three of these sets of
statutes do indeed evidence a defensible federal interest in procreation support.
The marital deduction at issue in Windsor, however, cannot be justified on any
ground reasonably related to procreation.
Part VI then proposes a framework for analyzing DOMA. I suggest that the
Supreme Court should borrow from the division in conflict of law rules
between the validity of a marriage and its incidents. Under the proposal,
federal benefits that directly affect the right to be a marital family (e.g.,
“family rights”) should be assessed by looking to state law designations of who
is married. Denials of this class of federal benefits should be subject to
intermediate scrutiny for purposes of federal Equal Protection review. On the
other hand, I propose that benefits that do not directly affect the family
relationship that is marriage, should be guided by spending priorities set in
federal law. These benefits are akin to the “incidents” of a marriage in conflict
of laws theory. I also call these rights “branch” rights. Denials of these rights
should be subject to a rational basis test, not merely because they are incidents,
but also because, as I will show, although they have suffered rank family
discrimination by way of the denial of marriage, same-sex couples have not
historically suffered by way of the denial of marriage rank economic
discrimination of the type that has traditionally been covered by Equal
Protection. Of course, in cases of plenary power, federal law must control
even when family rights are affected and a rational basis test should apply.
I argue that the federal government is not required to use the term
“marriage” for same-sex couples or any couples simply because a state does.
Indeed, employing the broader principle of looking to state law for
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designations of “family,” the federal government could reasonably base the
extension of federal benefits beyond same-sex marriages to other forms of state
and local recognition of committed same-sex families such as civil unions,
domestic partnerships and possibly in some cases, unique contracts designed to
replicate the legal relationships that follow from marriage.
In Part VII, I return to the three DOMAs. The first DOMA, the one that
bundled all federal statutes together would, under the proposal, be subjected to
intermediate scrutiny and should be seen as violating Equal Protection because
it prevented same-sex couples from having family rights that their state
intended to confer through marriage. The second “unbundled DOMA,” the
one that collapses into the statutes that it defines, may violate Equal Protection
in some cases but not in others. The applicable level of scrutiny for Equal
Protection purposes should depend upon the nature of the rights affected in the
statute at issue, that is whether the denial of the right burdens the stateconferred right to be a marital family. The third “definitional DOMA” mimics
the other two. If applicable to all marital rights, it is too broad but it might be
defended in individual cases of benefits.
In Part VIII, I apply these notions to the Windsor case. I conclude that the
Court correctly held that she should receive the marital deduction and a tax
refund. However, I argue that if state embrace of the marriage is the basis of
the federal recognition, it is reasonable for the federal government to require
that a state clearly signal its intention to grant a comparable tax refund in all
such cases when the case involves, as Windsor’s does, retroactive recognition
of a marriage that was entered into at a time when the state had not embraced
it.13
And finally in Part IX, I conclude that Congress has the right to create
“lanes of interest” with respect to federal marriage policy, given that families
and groups of families and individuals have varying interests and compete for
a limited purse of federal benefits. Such an approach allows Congress
appropriate freedom to differentiate a wide range of interests and allows it to
specifically consider these interests in deciding how federal dollars will
support families. Because the heterosexual couple is unique both in its
biological imbalance and in the long history of gender discrimination against
women through heterosexual marriage, Congress should be free to decide,
independent of the states, whether natural procreation should guide federal
spending to support families or should otherwise be treated uniquely. Indeed, a
procreation-based policy can likely only survive if such lanes exist. I do not
say whether such a procreation-based policy is wise or unwise, but rather that
it is permissible. The question for the courts is whether the distinction
Congress draws is based upon procreation, a permissible aim, or whether it is
really merely a means of sexual orientation discrimination. If Congress can
exclude unmarried couples based on procreational status then it seems
permissible but not necessary that “heterosexual marriage” be a lane. Congress
13. For a discussion of the “standing” concern, see infra note 351.
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could also adopt other designations and sub designations for different types of
families. I believe that Congress also has the right to differentiate among
different types of procreation in its spending. The job of the Court is to
recognize and require remedies for the long history of family discrimination
against same-sex couples, but also to recognize that it is Congress that has the
constitutional right to set the priorities for expenditures from the public purse.
II. AMERICAN NOTIONS OF “LOCAL” MATTERS
This Part investigates how notions that some matters are to be locally
determined may have emerged. I explain that local deference was afforded not
only to states, but also to U.S. Territories, a fact that indicates that conflict of
laws played a major role.
A. Origins
Three ideas likely shaped the early nation’s notions of what matters should
be “local.” First is the experience of the states as English colonies. Second is
the notion that the people should have some input on the laws that most
directly affected them. Third is the body of conflict of law rules that
determined when the law of a foreign jurisdiction would apply in a forum state.
1. The Colonial Experience
When the Framers were drafting the Constitution, they had in mind their
experiences as English subjects and later as English and British colonists.14
They would have known that, though a monarchy, England certainly
recognized the need for some local governance.15 In the feudal age, English
kings had a system of feudal councils. These councils ultimately evolved into
the English and later British Parliament.16 The Magna Carta reflected notions
that the people should have some rights to decide issues affecting them.17 In
his discussion of English approaches, Blackstone also spoke of subordinate
magistrates who act in “an inferior secondary sphere” regarding matters

14. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the
difference between British crown and Presidency), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 45
(James Madison) (referencing the feudal system).
15. See generally ROBERT C. RITCHIE, THE DUKE’S PROVINCE: A STUDY OF NEW
YORK POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 1664-1691, 34-36 (1977) (discussing the basic structure
of the local government).
16. See J.R. MADICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924-1327,
158-59 (2010); see also Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1432, 1436 (1987) (noting that colonists understood English/British law to reveal
sovereignty rights in “people” that superseded the King).
17. See J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 23-24 (2d ed. 1992) (describing the power
struggle between the English Monarchy and the people that developed their rights);
A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 4 (rev. ed. 1998)
(explaining that the Magna Carta was a source of inspiration for American colonists).
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affecting only defined issues and groups of persons.18 He referenced local
issues as “depending entirely upon the domestic Constitution of their
respective franchises.”19
With the American colonies, the Crown gave the colonists authority to
establish rules relating to education, criminal and civil laws, marriage, probate
and inheritance, local courts, and other matters.20 Such freedom may have
been a practical necessity both because of distance and because of the need to
give incentive to adventurism in a faraway land. Still, the royal charters had
one key proviso. Any laws adopted had to be consistent with the laws and
interests of the Crown.21
As the colonies began to pass local laws, they also began to develop unique

18. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *327-28.
On Subordinate
Magistrates, he refers to “mayors and aldermen, or other magistrates of particular
corporations” as having mere private jurisdiction affecting “strictly municipal rights,
depending entirely upon the domestic constitution of their respective franchises” and
also speaking of a view that “the people should choose their own magistrates,”
although all rules had to be consistent with the crown’s dictates. Id.
19. Cf. id. at *337.
20. For example, the 1629 Charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company expressly
provided for a council of Governor and other local officials to be chosen from among
free men on the plantation. This “assembly” had the authority to establish local laws.
PROJECT,
The
Charter
of
Massachusetts
Bay:
1629,
AVALON
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/mass03.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
Minutes of the Massachusetts Bay Company reflect such rules related to matters we
now deem typically local: criminal and civil law, local courts, probate and intestate
succession, and rules for marriage. See id. (granting authority to govern). The Charter
of Carolina (Charles II) granted “full and absolute power . . . for the good and happy
government of the said province . . . according to their best discretion, of and with the
advice, assent and approbation of the freemen of the said province . . . .” It allowed for
the creation of “penalties, imprisonment or any other punishment;” the establishment of
“subordinate officers and judges, justices, magistrates;” the power to amend laws or
pardon offenses, and also to determine the “actions, suits and causes” obtaining in such
courts, civil, criminal or otherwise. Charter of Carolina – March 24, 1663, AVALON
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc01.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
The 1606 Charter of Virginia provided for a local council of thirteen in Virginia but
also a “Council of Virginia” in England. The English council was to “have the superior
Managing and Direction, only of and for all Matters that shall or may concern the
Government, as well of the said several Colonies.” The First Charter of Virginia;
April 10, 1606, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va01.asp
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013). The Charter gave colonists the power to mine precious
metals and keep the profits and to coin money. The second Charter in 1609 created a
local council and the power to “have full and absolute Power and Authority to correct,
punish, pardon, govern, and rule” English subjects who arrived there, to establish
“Orders, Ordinances, Constitutions, Directions, and Instructions,” affecting civil,
criminal, “marine” and other matters. The Second Charter of Virginia; May 23, 1609,
AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va02.asp (last visited Mar.
5, 2013).
21. E.g., Charter of Carolina, supra note 20; The Charter of Massachusetts Bay,
supra note 20; The First Charter of Virginia, supra, note 20.
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personas and a sense of their own sovereignty. Their rules expanded to
regulate admiralty and trade.22 When their leaders gathered to write the
Articles of Confederation in 1777 and to ratify it in 1781, they styled
themselves the “United States of America,” a clear hint to the notion that those
joined together were independent “states,” not mere subjects of a king.23
2. The Notion That the People Rule
Notions that all governmental power derived from the people likely also
would have affected American views of what issues were “local.” Again, for
colonists the Magna Carta would have stood as a prime early example of the
notion.24 The writings of many early political thinkers, including John Locke
and Rousseau, propounded notions that people should have some say over
matters directly affecting their lives.25 And the notion that the people, not a
monarch, control was central to the very core of the American enterprise.26
These principles ultimately made their way into the American Constitution.
Article IV, Section 4 ensured each state a republican form of government.27
The Tenth Amendment expressly reserves powers not granted to the federal
government to the states “or to the people.”28 Indeed, the Constitution’s
Preamble began, “We the People.”29
The Framers also left hints of the types of matters that might usually be
considered “local.” These too reflect the notion of the people having control of
that which immediately affects them. In addressing the concern that the people
under the new government might owe more allegiance to the federal
government than to the states, Hamilton made specific reference to “the
ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice” as a state role. Hamilton
also dismissed fears of a transfer of primary allegiance from state to federal
arguing that the state would regulate “those personal interests and familiar

22. See Amar, supra note 16, at 1447-48 (noting states negotiated with foreign
nations long before the Constitution); see generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 11
(Alexander Hamilton) (urging common Navy and admiralty jurisdiction for the new
nation).
23. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. I, para. 1.
24. See HOWARD, supra note 17.
25. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (1690), available at
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81s/complete.html (explaining that political
rights emerged from the natural law that gives men the right to “order their actions”);
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 21-22 (G.D.H. Cole trans. 1913)
(1762),
available
at
http://mongolianmind.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/11/Rousseau_contrat-social-1221.pdf (declaring that nature gives
man absolute power over himself). See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Karl
Schuhmann et al. ed., Bristol 2003) (1651).
26. Accord BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 9 (1998).
27. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
29. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake.”30
James Madison described the constitutional design as allocating “the great and
aggregate interests . . . to the national, the local and particular to the State
legislatures.”31 Hamilton also stated that “the variety of more minute interests,
which [would] necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local
administrations . . . cannot be particularized, without [delving into tedium not
worth the time of instruction].”32 This dichotomy of “particular and limited”
versus “general and broad” is also reflected in the fact that the early founders
commonly referred to the federal government as the “general government.”33
3. Conflict of Laws Theory
The theory of conflict of laws also must have informed early American
notions of what matters were “local.” Rules of “comity”—or voluntary
recognition of a foreign jurisdiction’s laws as a sign of respect for that
jurisdiction’s sovereignty—have long been a part of the law of nations. In his
famous article, The Comity Doctrine, Hessel Ytema traced the doctrine back to
Dutch jurists in the latter part of the Seventeenth Century and specifically,
theorist Ulrik Huber.34 According to Professor Kurt Nadelman, the English
courts formally embraced of the notion of conflict of laws in Lord Mansfield’s
opinion in Robinson v. Bland.35
The early American bar would certainly have known of Mansfield’s opinion

30.
31.
32.
33.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 14, 41, 43, 45 (James Madison). Madison used the term
“general government” in the debates of the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g.,
PROJECT,
Madison
Debates
–
August
18,
1787,
AVALON
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_818.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013)
(discussing enumerated powers of the general government). Hamilton used it as well.
E.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 17, 27, 28 (Alexander Hamilton); Variant Texts of the Plan
Presented by Alexander Hamilton to the Federal Convention – Text. B, AVALON
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtextb.asp (last visited Mar. 5,
2013). The Supreme Court has also used the term. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886); McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435
(1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Chisolm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2512 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using the term as reference to federal government).
34. Hessel Ytema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH L. REV. 9-32 (1966). See also
Kurt H. Nadelman, The Comity Doctrine: An Introduction, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1961)
(noting at the introduction to Michigan Law Review the memorial reprinting of
Ytema’s article and discussing the importance of Ytema’s work).
35. See Nadelman, supra note 34, at 2; Robinson v. Bland, 6 Eng. Rep. 129 (King’s
Bench 1760). In Robinson, a plaintiff sued an intestate’s estate on alleged contracts
entered into in England to repay funds advanced for gambling in France. The Court
found that the agreements were governed by English, not French law and were
unenforceable.
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and of the doctrine.36 Nadelman notes that at least by 1788, the domestic
doctrine of international comity was referenced by a Pennsylvania state court
considering whether to enforce a debt.37 He adds that in 1797 the preface to
the United States Supreme Court opinion in Emory v. Grenough quoted Huber
extensively, although the court dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff to
plead diversity of jurisdiction.38 The doctrine was solidified in American
Jurisprudence by Justice Joseph Story’s famous 1834 treatise on Conflict of
Laws.39
Rules of comity were subject to one major exception. Such rules were
suspended when following the foreign rule would violate a sovereign’s public
policy.40
Under the common law, marriage was considered a contract, but it had
special rules.41 While the place where the marriage was celebrated generally
controlled the validity of the marriage, rules applying “the incidents of
marriage” were subject to more variations. Often the domicile –or the
jurisdiction with the closest contact—controlled these “incidents.”42 The

36. Accord Nadelman, supra note 34, at 2.
37. Camp v. Lockwood, 1 Dall. 393, 401 (Phila. Co. 1788) (distinguishing case

from the law of nations, and declining to enforce a Connecticut debt that Connecticut
deemed plaintiff had forfeited as an enemy of the United States, citing the states'
unique relationship and their common interest in the War); see also Nadelman, supra
note 34, at 2.
38. Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 368, 369 n.(a) (1797); Nadelman, supra
note 34, at 2. Nadelman also notes that Samuel Livermore launched an attack on the
general American acceptance of the doctrine in 1829. See id. at 3-4.
39. JOSEPH STORY & MELVIN MADISON BIGELOW, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES (1834). See e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Joseph Story’s Contributions to
American Conflicts Law, A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230, 230-32 (1961).
40. See STORY, supra note 39, at 8 (showing that nations apply foreign laws
pursuant to own public policy); see also id. at 207.
41. E.g., Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, Consistory Court of London (1811) reprinted in
Beale at 41-43 (referring to marriage as a contract); JOSEPH STORY & MELVIN MADISON
BIGELOW, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (Bigelow, ed. 1884). The Bigelow
edition is a reprint of the Third Edition of Story’s work. Id. at iii.
42. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, n. 10 (1933) (applying Georgia
law to refuse to require a father to provide maintenance to child and noting, “Without
denying the validity of marriage in another state, the privileges flowing from the
marriage may be subject to the local law”); Headen v. Pope, 252 F.2d 739, 742-43 (3d
Cir. 1958). Despite fact that marriage occurred in Maryland, Pennsylvania was the
domicile and the state primarily concerned with the legal incidents of this union,
including the support of wife after husband died. See also discussion of Lutwak v.
United States, infra at p. 146. Compare Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260 (Sup. Ct. Mass.
1813) (upholding Vermont divorce as entitled to full faith and credit and determining
that in considering the relationship of the parties to each other and their conduct
including divorce, one looks to the law of the domicile which was Vermont, not the law
where the marriage was originally contracted which was Massachusetts).
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distinction between “validity” and “incidents” of marriage was significant
enough that Joseph Story devoted separate chapters to “validity” on the one
hand and “incidents” on the other.43 Story did not live in a time of broad
governmental programs providing economic support to marriage. Instead, in
his day, government supported marriages by placing its power on the side of
the husband as against the wife and children and on the side of preferred races
and classes. Thus, he described the “incidents” of marriage as the (1) rights and
disabilities of a wife and (2) the obligations of a husband.44 Under the
common law the domicile of a wife was considered that of her husband
irrespective of her travels or the law of the place of celebration.45 Sometimes
states used public policy grounds to balk at recognizing foreign law on issues
such as capacity to be married (in particular, age limits) and divorce.46
On the other hand, there is little evidence that the subject matter of marriage
was understood at the time to be so uniquely local that federal power could not
touch it to the same degree as it could other local issues.47
The federal government’s approach to slavery, often shuttered away in a
closet during historical discussions of domestic relations law, offers quite
important insights into the federal approach to local domestic relations. At the
time of the Constitution’s signing, slavery in America was considered local in
several senses. First, slaves were treated as under the jurisdiction of
households; indeed, each time they were sold, their last names were changed to
that of the new masters as a brand of ownership.48 Second, state laws

43. See STORY, supra note 39, at 184-226 (discussing marriage); see also id. at
227-274 (discussing incidents to marriage, e.g., property rights etc.).
44. See id. at 233 (dividing chapter on incidents into (1) disabilities and powers of
wife and (2) rights of husband).
45. See id.
46. E.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 1961) (finding
that New Jersey did not have to recognize common law marriage because it was against
the state’s public policy); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 67-68 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1957) (stating that recognizing underage marriage in another state would be
against New Jersey public policy); see 15 Johns. 121, 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) (noting
that even if Vermont would recognize a divorce procured by fraud and without notice
to all parties, New York would not); STORY, supra note 39, at 275-314 (discussing
recognition of foreign divorces).
47. See generally Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of
Federal Family Law and the Invention of State’s Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761
(2005) (reviewing prior federal interventions into allegedly traditional state areas and
arguing that state's rights is a recent invention); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the
Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998) (rejecting "localism" theories
that argue family law always as the province of states); Judith Resnik, Categorical
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001)
(demonstrating that areas traditionally seen as local have long been subject to federal
rulemaking).
48. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 527 (1857) (Campbell, J.,
concurring) (insisting that a slave is part of a master’s “family” both “in name and in
fact”), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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determined slave holder/slave rights. Third, unlike other servants, slaves were
not only persons but also legally property. Fourth, as property under the law,
slaves could be made the subject of contract, intestate succession, wills, trusts
or dower. At the same time, because of objections on public policy grounds,
nations and American states that did not endorse slavery often did not afford
comity on that subject to jurisdictions that did.49
According to Story, early Courts saw the full faith and credit clause as a
compliment to conflict of laws doctrine. It did not alter general conflict of law
rules.50
B. The Local Powers of U.S. Territories
In dealing with U.S. Territories, the Americans appear to have adopted the
English approach of allowing local sovereignty so long as federal interests
were not jeopardized. The approach was also consistent with conflict of law
rules.
Usually, Congress would pass an “organic statute” that organized the
territory along republican (representative majority rule) lines. Each territory
was allowed to establish its own laws with respect to marriage and other
traditionally local issues, consistent with the laws of the United States.51 This
restriction seems to parallel England’s requirement of the colonies.52 The
statutes also prohibited the territory from distributing its own land.53
Today, we think it indisputable that Congress has plenary power in the
territories. In fact, however, the notion of whether plenary power extended to
the right to decide traditionally local concerns in the territories was hotly
debated in earlier times, despite modern expressions that downplay the
debate.54

49. See STORY, supra note 39, at 153-54.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to

the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”); STORY, supra note 39, at 802-03
(explaining that the clause is thought not to alter the general principle that in procedural
matters lex loci was to govern); id. at 831-32 (stating that the clause does not alter
jurisdictional rules).
51. E.g., An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of
Colorado, ch. 59, § 6, 12 Stat. 172, 174 (1861); An Act to Establish a Territorial
Government for Utah, ch. 51, § 6, 9 Stat. 453, 454 (1850). Cf. Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S.
682, 684 (1891) (remarking that polygamy aside, Utah territorial legislature has (had)
plenary power as would a state over local issues of inheritance).
52. See discussion supra p. 116.
53. Id.
54. See, for example, the discussion of efforts to affect marriage in Utah territory.
Infra at p. 741, 743 (Congress arguing about whether marriage is a local, territorial, or
federal issue). In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court, held that the
constitutional provision giving Congress’s plenary power over federal territories was
limited to lands ceded by the Crown and did not include such power over territory later
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III. INSTANCES OF FEDERAL DEVIATION FROM LOCAL MARRIAGE LAW
There are only a few instances in which the federal government (1) deviated
from state marriage law to recognize a marriage that the state in which the
marriage took place rejected; or (2) refused to recognize a marriage that a state
or territory accepted. This section considers those early cases.
A. Deviation to Recognize Marriages That a State or Local Government
Rejected as Invalid
Apart from American Indian cases, there are only two instances in which the
federal government ignored the states and recognized marriages that the states
refused to recognize. Both involved the nation’s battle over slavery. First, the
federal government recognized “slavery custom” marriages for the purpose of
dispensing black Civil War military pension claims. Second, the federal
government authorized military officers and others to perform marriages
among ex-slaves during the Civil War and afterward, when rebel states refused
to perform them.
1. The Slave Marriage Statutes: Context
Some background is necessary to understand the authority for and purpose
of these actions. When news of the Civil War spread, slaves escaped and
headed toward Union lines, often offering themselves as scouts and
information brokers. In May of 1861, General Benjamin Butler refused to
return a group of slaves to their owners, adopting the position that slaves of
rebels were “contraband” and could be applied to work for the Union Army.55
On August 6, 1861, Congress passed the first of several Confiscation Acts.
The Act allowed the army to confiscate rebel “property,” expressly including,
slaves.56
obtained through expansion and conquest. The Court also narrowly read the scope of
congressional powers over territories to apply only to the most needful legislation that
had to be executed in acquiring and holding territories for the benefit of the states. 60
U.S. (19 How.) at 393. Excluded from that power were domestic relations matters, like
slavery. Later, cases began to reject the notion that plenary power over the territories is
limited. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890) (“The power of Congress over the Territories of the
United States is general and plenary, arising from and incidental to the right to acquire
the Territory itself.”); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 267-68 (1901).
Downes asserted that Dred Scott’s logic was contrary even to the prevailing
understanding of congressional power at the time. Downes, 182 U.S. at 250. However,
the evidence suggests that there was indeed vigorous debate on the subject.
55. The term was apparently coined and status first designated by Gen. Benjamin
Butler. Slaves Contraband of War, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1861, at 4. By June 12, 1861,
Prof. Theophilus Parsons at Harvard Law School had opined that Butler’s claim had
merit in a state of war. Slaves as Contraband of War: Professor Parsons’ Opinions—
Four Ways of Dealing with the Subject, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1861, at 2.
56. An Act to Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, § 1,
12 Stat. 319, 319 (1861).
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The Confiscation Act was strategically important because slavery was the
economic backbone of the Southern economy. Southern states, facing pressure
to give it up before the War, had demanded compensation.57 Those whites
who owned few or no slaves benefitted from the social status that it
bestowed.58 Indeed, by purchasing a slave or two and using free or cheap land
grants to build a plantation a poor white person could rise. Manufacturing
northern states benefitted too, relying upon products produced from slave
labor.59
By the time of Dred Scott in 1857, slaves were the most valuable form of
personal property in some southern states.60 Land, which often was given for
free under bounty statutes, was useless in the agricultural south without labor
to work it.61 Owners exploited slaves not only for themselves but also rented
their slaves to others.62 A second Confiscation Act followed on July 17, 1862,
establishing the penalty for treason against the United States as jail time and
the freeing of the guilty party’s slaves.63
The number of slaves escaping to Union lines swelled as the War
continued.64 Often, they arrived in families and groups of loved ones.65 Slaves

57. E.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGR. 338 (1789) (statement of Mr. Jackson) (asking who
will compensate Virginia if slavery ended); 2 ANNALS OF CONGR. 1204 (1790)
(statement of Sen. Gerry (Mass.)) (saying he has calculated slavery as worth ten million
dollars); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 38 (1859) (statement of Rep. Moore
(AL)) (noting that ending African slavery would result in an economic loss of property
to the South exceeding in value two billion dollars).
58. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. App. 94 (1856) (statement of Sen. A.G.
Brown (MS)) (opining that non-slaveholding southern whites “may have no pecuniary
interest in slavery but they have a social interest at stake that is worth more to them
than all the wealth that is in the Indies").
59. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 483-84 (1856) (statement of Sen.
Henry Clay (KY)) (discussing how the North is dependent upon slavery too and upon
the Southern agricultural production).
60. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 524 (speaking of value in Louisiana); see
also, Gimon v. Baldwin, 38 Ala. 60, 60 (1861) (valuing a male slave at $1500); Drake
v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382, 383-84 (1857) (estimating $2800 for two Negro men).
61. For more on bounty statutes see, for example, note 237.
62. The value lay not only in the slave itself but in the rental value. Bryan v.
Walton, 33 Ga. Supp. 11, 11 (1864) (valuing Negro female slave Patience, about 28
years old, and her six children, ages fourteen to six at the aggregate value of $9000, and
with a “hire” value of $3000); Evans v. Lipscomb, 31 Ga. 71, 76 (1860) (listing prices
of slaves of various genders and ages).
63. An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treasons and Rebellion, to Seize
and Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, ch. 195, § 2, 12 Stat.
589, 590 (1862).
64. Contraband Statistics, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 1861, at 3 (noting that more than
100 slaves a day escaped Missouri for Kansas, and contrary to the desires of federal
army generals, they were not returned). Letter from Maj. Gen. John Peck to Maj. Gen.
John Dix, Dec. 7, 1862 in THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE
OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XVIII, 474
(1887), available at http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (“To-day an
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were not allowed to marry legally, and since they did not constitute a separate
political entity under law, their customs during slavery were disregarded.
Legal marriage would have given a slave father and husband power over his
wife and children, and that would have been contrary to the slaveholder’s
rights. As abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison noted, by usurping the black
male’s right of patrimony in the prevailing paternalistic society, slave holders
asserted ownership to all slave children and could thereby control slave
families and communities into multiple generations.66 When a husband died,

old contraband came in from a plantation just this side of Franklin to get his liberty.”);
Letter from Brig. Gen. George Crook to Brig. Gen. James Garfield, May 27, 1863, in
THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE UNION
AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XXIII, pt. II, 366 (1890), available at
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (noting large numbers of
contraband women). This Four series multivolume set includes, among other records,
officer reports on the numbers of escaped slaves flowing into union camps. See also,
Negro Slaves as Contraband of War, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1861, at 2.
65. See, e.g., Letter from Maj. Gen. John Dix to E.M. Stanton, Sec. of War, Sept.
12, 1862, in THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XVIII, 391 (1887), available at
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (noting some 2000 men,
women, and children were held at Old Point Comfort in Virginia); Letter from Maj.
Gen. John Dix to E.M. Stanton, Sec. of War, Dec. 13, 1862, in THE WAR OF THE
REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XVIII, 480-81 (1887), available at
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (suggesting soldier abuse and
noting the need to remove “contraband” women and children from camps for their
safety).
66. In 1835 Garrison noted in his newspaper, The Liberator:
The . . . disuse of legal marriage is necessary to sustain the slave holder’s right
of property in the children. The laws give to the owner of a woman a property
in her children, whether the father be bond or free, black or white. The father
may be a slave to the same planter, or to another; he may be a colored or a
white free man of the neighborhood; he may be the owner of the mother
himself or his hopeful son. The law is the same in every case; the children of a
colored female follow the condition of their mother. This claim on children as
property must be legally maintained or slavery could not be perpetuated or
“entailed” on successive generations . . . .
No the code of laws must not contradict itself. It must not take away by one
enactment what it secures by another. But a legal marriage constitutes the
father of the children, the slave holder of these children during their minority.
He has the legal right to command them, to keep them with him, to educate
them, to require their service, and toil for his benefit and their own. No other
man can possess any right or authority over them . . . . If a man slave were the
legal father and slave holder of his own children, he could reject the claims of
the white man who is the owner of their mother. He could prevent his working
them, punishing them, or selling them. He could pronounce his own children
free from all control but his own and that of his mother. She too would have
with her husband a joint legal authority over her children; and in the event of
his decease, the law would still sustain his prerogatives and secure guardians to
her offspring.
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his wife could inherit his slaves and, if she remained single, could also assert
this privilege. With the consent of owners, some slaves could enter into a form
of marriage with other slaves, sometimes referenced by legal authorities as
contubernium.67 But contubernium marriage did not give the rights of legal
marriage.68 Because slaves were property, an owner could break up a slave
family for sale when economic interests or punishment needs so dictated. He
or she could insist that a slave, his wife, daughter, or son perform sexual
services.69 The evidence on plantations was clear from the number of
“mulattos” being born on slave plantations. Slaves had no legal rights of their
own under the law, and slave fathers and husbands had no legal right to defend
their families against harm. Indeed, some posit that so-called contubernium
marriages were supported by some slave holders in part because such
relationships provided a means of controlling of slaves through threats of
family separation or physical harm to a loved one.70 The denial of marriage
rights during slavery, coupled with the economic disadvantages of broad scale
race discrimination and segregation after it, barred black male ex-slaves from a
host of other rights the prevailing patriarchal culture required in order to
protect oneself and one’s family. And such denials rendered black female
slaves breeders for a system that deprived them and the children to whom they
gave birth of the legal and physical protections that marriage provided to white
women and children.71 It is no surprise that the federal government concluded
William Lloyd Garrison, The Liberator, Oct. 31 1835, at 1.
67. The term appears to have been borrowed from Roman slave marriage laws.
E.g., WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO
MODERN LAW 232 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2004) (1938) (discussing Roman
contubernium).
68. E.g., Malinda v. Gardner, 24 Ala. 719, 723-24 (1854) (indicating that slave
marriage called “contubernium” afforded no inheritance rights for children).
69. E.g., discussion infra p. 744 (in polygamy discussion, Congressman claiming
hypocrisy and noting “unlimited concubinage” practices of slaveholders). EUGENE
GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL, 414 (1974) (suggesting that three quarters of blacks in
the U.S. have some white ancestry; the percentage of mulattos in the South was twice
as high as that in the North and that in 1850 an estimated thirty-seven percent of the
Negro population in the South was half white). See also Rachel L. Swarns, Meet Your
Cousin, the First Lady: A Family Story, Long Hidden, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/us/dna-gives-new-insights-into-michelle-obamasroots.html (noting the recent discovery of Michelle Obama’s multiracial DNA, the
prevalence of rape and sexual coercion in slavery); Richard Steckel, Slavery, Marriage
and the Family, 11 J. FAM. HIST. 251_(1980) (using multiple regression analysis to
estimate instances of mulatto children during slavery and patterns); DAVID BERRY
GASPAR & DARLENE CLARK HINE, MORE THAN CHATTLE: BLACK WOMEN AND
SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS (1996). There were certainly interracial couples who
wanted to be married, but allowing legal marriage between whites and blacks, much
less between slave and free, would have threatened a racially based slave system.
70. Accord JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF
NEGRO AMERICANS 154 (4th ed. 1974); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE ENDURING VISION: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 356 (2008).
71. One finds in the reports of the abuse of black women and girls during slavery
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that marriage rights and promises of family stability would be a key means of
recruitment for the U.S. military.
In September 1862, President Lincoln issued the Emancipation
Proclamation in preliminary form. By its terms, it became effective one
hundred days later, on January 1, 1863. Notably, the final version of the
Proclamation stated that the action was compelled by military necessity and
expressly authorized the enlistment of black soldiers. These key items were
not in the Proclamation’s preliminary version.72 The Proclamation only
purported to free those slaves in the states that were still in rebellion.73 It left
slavery in place in the states that stayed loyal or had already submitted to
Union control.74 Those enlistments would be compelled later.75
Some have attempted to distinguish such Civil War statutes relating to
marriage with the suggestion that these actions occurred when or because there
was no state government in place.76 But by no stretch of the imagination were

the same biases against recognizing female injury as one finds in the stories of other
women victimized when rape, sexual abuse, and separation from children were
employed as physical and psychological weapons of terror. Slave narratives offer a
more personal account, but even those sometimes arrive through multiple hearsay
levels. See JEAN FAGAN YELLIN, HARRIET JACOBS, A LIFE (2005) (explaining the story
of a female slave’s life). Adult black men and children were also subjected to sexual
slavery. WILMA KING, STOLEN CHILDHOOD: SLAVE YOUTH IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA,
24, 61, 64-65, 108-110, 199, n.165 (1997); Thomas A. Foster, The Sexual Abuse of
Black Men Under American Slavery, 20 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 445-464 (2011) (discussing
abuse of black men and the forcing of black men to sexually abuse black women).
72. Compare Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Sept. 22, 1862, NAT’L
ARCHIVES
&
RECS.
ADMIN.,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals_iv/sections/transcript_preliminar
y_emancipation.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013), with The Emancipation
Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1863, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN.,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/emancipation_proclamation/tran
script.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
73. The Emancipation Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1863, is available online at Library of
Congress website at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/almgall.html.
In the
intervening time, states in rebellion could indicate surrender by having their
representatives show up in Congress on January 1.
74. Id. Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri, though slaveholding, did not
secede.
75. See discussion infra p. 729.
76. Brief on the Merits of Amici Curiae Historians, American Historical
Association, Peter W. Bardaglio et al. in Support of Respondents Affirmance of the
Judgment Below at 35-36, Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 786 [hereinafter
"Windsor
Historians'
Amici
Brief"]
available
at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/201111-03-gill-v-opm-amici-historians.pdf (describing these slave marriages as occurring
when Confederate governments “collapsed,” arguing there were “no state governments
in the occupied South” and stating that when the state governments were reconstituted
the federal government “ceded its authority” back to them and they “resumed their
jurisdiction over marriage law” subject to the 14th Amendment). See Golinsky v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (federal
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the Union Army and Freedmen’s Bureau just filling in to help out the
exhausted rebelling states while they took a “little breather” from governance.
Indeed, the legislative bodies of the Confederate states met and strategized
during the War, they coined their own money and passed laws on various
subjects.77 Southern leaders were continuing to command soldiers. Whites
continued to marry and the local laws recognized their marriages.78 And the
reason these marriages took place in federal space is because the federal
government had commandeered it in War, not because the states were
hospitable. The federal government was in direct conflict with state
governments when it recognized these marriages and decided what incidents
would flow from them.
2. Recognition of Existing Marriages According to Slave Custom for Black
Civil War Military Pension Purposes When States Would Not Recognize
Them79

government has only legislated in domestic relations when there has been a failure or
absence of state government); Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406
(S.D.N.Y.) (citing Golinsky for both points), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 12307, 2013 WL 3196928 (June 26, 2013).
77. See, e.g., STATUTES OF GEORGIA PASSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1864,
available on Hein Online, 1864 5 1864; ACTS OF THE CALLED SESSION AND OF THE
FOURTH ANNUAL REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF ALABAMA,
available on Hein Online, 1864 4; SC STATUTES AT LARGE (1861), available on Hein
Online, 1864; 1861 1 1861. Slaveholding states refused to recognize the Emancipation
Proclamation as immediate law. E.g., Hall v. Keese (The Emancipation Cases), 31
Tex. 504, 514 (1868) (calling the Emancipation a war measure, although slavery, in
fact, continued undisturbed until Union General Granger entered Texas and ordered
Negros free); Weaver v. Lapsley 42 Ala. 601, 614 (1868) (describing Emancipation as
merely a “war-measure” that was not law until enforced by force of arms). One might
distinguish these cases on the theory that the states had withdrawn from the union and
no longer existed; however, that theory is a stretch as well because the alleged point of
the War from Lincoln’s perspective was to save the union, and so the right to secede
was never conceded by the Northern states. It must be then that War Powers—not the
absence of state government—was the situation that gave rise to the action. It would be
odd indeed to allow the federal government to define state authority as “absent” merely
because it disagreed with the position an acting state government had taken.
78. See J. David Hacker et al., The Effect of the Civil War on Southern Marriage
Patterns, 76 J. S. HIST. 39, 44 (2010). The biggest obstacle to wartime marriages for
whites was finding eligible mates given the large numbers of Southern white males
killed in the Civil War. Id.
79. Counsel for BLAG specifically referenced the slave military pension statute in
oral argument. Windsor Sup. Ct. Trans. at 73 (regarding authority for DOMA, stating
that there was a reason Congress specifically wanted to provide benefits for spouses of
freed
slaves
who
fought
for
the
Union)
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=
12-307. See also supra note 12 (noting that earlier drafts were shared with parties and
amici). The Law Professors brief lists the July 4, 1864 and March 3,1865 Acts with
other statutes as examples that Congress can affect marriage, but it does not discuss
their context. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondent
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One example of Congress’ stepping out to touch domestic relations matters
was its decision to accept slave marriages as valid for military pension
purposes. The approach was adopted to encourage black men to join the
military and to ease the burden of the War on Union soldiers and their families.
Congress had long recognized military pensions as a recruitment tool.
Three days before the second Confiscation Act, on July 14, 1862, but before
the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was signed in September of that
year, Congress passed an act regarding pensions for disabled union soldiers
and the dependents of soldiers dying in battle for the Union.80 The act
expressly denied a pension to any dependent who had aided in the rebellion or
in any way manifested sympathy with its cause.81
To secure the enlistment of blacks, Congress adopted several approaches.
On July 17, 1862 (before the Emancipation Proclamation), Congress provided
that if male slaves from rebelling states escaped and joined the Union Army,
they could gain freedom for their mothers, wives, and children but only if the
slave and those family members to be freed were slaves of rebels.82 Of course,
slaves were not allowed to marry but the law was silent on recognizing
marriages performed according to slave custom. They were allowed monthly
pay and rations but at a lesser rate than non-blacks.83 The Act also expressly
authorized the President to enlist blacks in the military specifically in low-level
service positions.84
The Emancipation Proclamation allowed ex-slaves to enlist without such
slaveholder consent, provided they could reach Union Army lines. On October
26, 1863, the War Department expressly declared that the “exigencies of war”
required that “colored” troops in the slaveholding states—Maryland, Missouri,
and Tennessee—that did not secede, as well as blacks of any status in any
rebelling states, be enlisted into the army. Under the new law, slaves in the
three loyal states could be forcibly enlisted by their slaveholders. To
compensate for property loss, in 1864, Congress authorized up to $300 to be
paid to slave holders in each state that had a representative in Congress (i.e.,
not the rebel states) for the delivery of each age-eligible slave to the Union
army. State commissions were to decide the value of the slave. Although
Congress referred to these black men as “volunteers,” in fact, the slaves in
loyal states had no choice and were only free upon enlistment.85 The families

Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 786 (referencing two acts regarding slaves or ex
slaves as evidence that Congress can touch upon marriage).
80. An Act to Grant Pensions, ch. 166, § 2, 12 Stat. 566, 567 (1862) (providing
pension to surviving spouses, but if there was no spouse, then to the child until the
child reached age sixteen).
81. Id. § 4, 12 Stat. at 568.
82. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 13, 12 Stat. 597, 599. The Act did not affect
slaves held in so-called “loyal” states. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch.13, § 24, 13 Stat. 6, 11. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th
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of these drafted slaves from loyal states were not set free.86 Congress also
specifically provided that black soldiers would be segregated as “Colored
Troops.”87
In July of 1864, Congress decided to recognize marriages that slaves had
entered into according to slave custom, if states refused to recognize them or
refused to allow black marriages. It did this solely for the purpose of making
black soldiers’ families eligible for military pensions.88 While abolitionists
cheered these Acts, the coalition that made them possible included those war
wearied who wanted the government to use more blacks to fight in the Army.89
The first pension law allowed only the free wives of “colored soldiers” (or
their descendants) or children who were also free to apply for pensions based
on living as married couples during slavery.90 In other words, once again,

Cong., 1st Sess. 626-631 (1864). But see id. at 629 (comments of Sen. Cole) (voting
“no” because he could not justify giving compensation to the slave holder but not to the
slave who served). The $300 was a heavily discounted value for a military eligible
black male slave, justifiable, no doubt in light of the uncertainty of what war would
bring. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
86. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. at 629 (comments of Sen. Grinnell)
(reluctantly voting yes, but stating that his support had been contingent upon the entire
family being given freedom, which was not reflected in the final bill).
87. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch.13, § 24, 13 Stat. 6, 11.
88. An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions Approved
July Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two,” ch, 247, § 14, 13 Stat. 387, 389
(1864) (supplementing the 1862 pension act).
89. In 1862, Horace Greeley, Editor of the New York Tribune and a noted
abolitionist, recognized the nation's war weariness and encouraged Lincoln to recruit
blacks for the War. He said “We must have scouts, guides, spies, cooks, teamsters,
diggers and choppers from the Blacks of the South, whether we allow them to fight for
us or not, or we shall be baffled and repelled.” Letter from Horace Greeley to the
President, Aug. 19, 1862. In his famous response to Greeley, Lincoln made it clear that
his goal was to save the Union and that if he could have saved it by continuing slavery
he would have done so. A Letter from President Lincoln; Reply to Horace Greeley.
Slavery and the Union The Restoration of the Union the Paramount Object, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 24, 1862), http://www.nytimes.com/1862/08/24/news/letter-presidentlincoln-reply-horace-greeley-slavery-union-restoration-union.html.
Accord Robert
Fabrikant, Lincoln Legal Acolytes, A Comment On Professor Akhil Reed Amar’s The
American Constitution: A Biography (2005), and Judge Frank J. Williams’ “Doing
Less” and “Doing More”: The President and the Proclamation—Legally, Militarily,
and Politically, in the Emancipation Proclamation, Three Views (2006), 49 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 169, 178 (2007) (explaining Lincoln’s goal to strip the South of key
military assets).
90. The language of the original Military Pension Act provided that the widow and
children of a soldier who died in the line of duty:
shall be entitled to receive the pensions now provided by law, without other
proof of marriage than that the parties had habitually recognized each other as
man and wife, and lived together as such for a definite period next preceding
the soldier’s enlistment, not less than two years, to be shown by the affidavits
of credible witnesses: Provided, however, That such widow and children are
free persons: Provided, further, That if such parties resided in any State in
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Congress did not end the enslavement of families in the so-called “loyal”
states. On March 3, 1865, Congress finally addressed slave families. It
declared that “to encourage enlistments” and military “efficiency,” the “wife
and children, if any he have” of any person mustered on military rolls would be
“forever free, any law, usage, custom, or whatever, to the contrary
notwithstanding.”91 The accepted evidence of the marriage and of children
was that couple had cohabitated together as husband and wife or that they
participated in some sort of ceremony indicating marriage “whether such
marriage was or was not recognized or authorized by law.”92
On June 6, 1866, after the War ended, Congress extended the slave marriage
recognition to black sailors, in addition to soldiers, and extended the
application rights to include “pensions, bounty and back pay” just as white
soldiers already had, but not in equal amounts. Evidence of the marriage
required was that satisfactory to the Commissioner of Pensions that the parties
had habitually lived together as husband and wife. A child’s recognition
depended upon a husband asserting that they were his own.93
On June 15, 1866, it further extended the rights of black soldiers to bounty
and provided additional security to their heirs. It provided that the soldiers
would be presumed free despite the absence of any notation on muster rolls
and once again set forth how their marriages would be proven.94 It recognized
a ceremony “deemed by them to be obligatory” and their living together as
husband and wife, and it extended protections to children “born of any such
marriage.”95 The next day Congress approved the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution for submission to the states for ratification.96
which their marriage may have been legally solemnized, the usual evidence
shall be required.
An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions,” Approved July
Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two, ch. 247, § 14, 13 Stat. 387, 389 (1864)
(emphasis modified). See also In re Minor Children of Joseph Crain, in 4 DECISIONS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR IN CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 358,
362-63 (George Baber ed. 1891). The Crain decision offers an elaborate discussion of
the history of Congress’s Acts with respect to black and slave marriages not recognized
in the Southern states.
91. A Resolution to Encourage Enlistments and to Provide for the Efficiency of the
Military Forces of the United States, 13 Stat. 571 (1865).
92. Id.
93. An Act Supplementary to the Several Acts Relating to Pensions, ch. 106, § 15,
14 Stat. 56, 58 (1866). Given the realities of slave life it is likely that many men
stepped into fatherhood for children who were not biologically theirs and that many
children rebuked for being the children of owners had no fathers through whom they
could claim support. See supra note 70.
94. A Resolution Respecting Bounties to Colored Soldiers and the Pensions,
Bounties and Allowances to Their Heirs, 14 Stat. 357 (1866).
95. Id.
96. Compare Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, 14 Stat 358-59 (1866) (passed June 16, 1866), with A Resolution
Respecting Bounties to Colored Soldiers and the Pensions, Bounties and Allowances to
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Legislation on June 6, 1866 and March 3, 1873 used different language
regarding proof of marriage as a basis of benefits. The proof had to be proof of
cohabitation and a ceremony “satisfactory to the Commissioner of Pensions.”97
The latter act allowed a black soldier’s wife or heirs to file claims for “arrears”
of pensions, bounties and allowances, and declared that the children of the
slave marriages were lawful children and heirs for purposes of federal law.
American Indian soldiers were also included.98
The pension statutes reveal that all support for procreation flowed from the
male’s status and from heterosexual marriage. The earliest slave marriage
pension statute simply used the term “children” in referencing a soldier’s
dependents.99 In the 1865 statute giving freedom to dependents, the language
provided that children “born of that marriage” would be presumed to be those
of the soldier whether or not the parents were still married at the time of
enlistment.100 By 1866, the pension statutes protected only children “born of
the marriage.” This tightening of the language reinforced the government’s
view that marriage should be the primary source of dependent benefits and
adult female support.
At the same time, Congress knew full well that black slave women did not
possess the basic legal right to control of their own bodies and that in many
cases the biological fathers of their children would be white men. Those men
would not or, if they wanted to, could not, legally marry the mothers or openly
claim the children.101 Women’s future and that of their children was, therefore
tied to black men whose earning power was, in turn, crippled by racial
injustice. A widow’s pension ended if she remarried (and presumably gained a
new source of support).102 Similarly, when in 1873 the laws provided for an
additional two dollars per month for a widow with children, they also provided
that additional amount ended when the children became sixteen.103 These
approaches to spousal support are reflected in the structure of Social Security

Their Heirs (passed June 15, 1866).
97. An Act Supplementary to the Several Acts Relating to Pensions, ch. 106, § 14,
14 Stat. 56, 58 (1866) (emphasis added).
98. In re Minor Children of Joseph Crain, supra note 90. See also An Act to
Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Laws Relating to Pensions, ch. 234, § 11, 17 Stat.
566, 570 (1873) (providing benefits and referencing “Colored or Indian soldiers”).
99. An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions Approved
July Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two,” 13 Stat. at 389 (requiring, in
section 14, marriage, but not specifying when or how children must be born to qualify
as a soldier's children for pension purposes).
100. A Resolution to Encourage Enlistments and to Provide for the Efficiency of the
Military Forces of the United States, 13 Stat. at 571.
101. E.g., A Resolution Respecting Bounties to Colored Soldiers and the Pensions,
Bounties and Allowances to Their Heirs, 14 Stat. at 358 (using "born of the marriage").
102. An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions Approved
July Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two,” ch, 247, § 7, 13 Stat. at 388.
103. An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Laws Relating to Pensions, ch.
234, § 9, 17 Stat. at 570.
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spousal benefits today.104
Certainly, the slave marriage pension statutes did not recognize slave
marriages for all purposes, not even for all federal purposes. Congress
followed state law in doling out other federal benefits. It did not grant
pensions in the case of interracial marriages if the relevant states or localities
banned them.105 But the reason may not have been mere deference to
individual state law. The action would not have been popular with the public
since the majority of states in the union banned interracial marriage, and given
the likely disruption that would follow upon such a policy, Congress could not
justify it on military necessity grounds.106 Moreover, race discrimination was
not inconsistent with federal policy as it was made by the very same people
who made up the states. The U.S. continued to racially segregate blacks in the
military for another hundred years.107 In so doing, it greatly restricted
advancement opportunities for black men because they could never command
companies that had white troops, and that race discrimination, in turn, made
them less able to support families financially through marriage.
In one sense, the federal Civil War pension statutes and their supporting
legislation were broad in that they recognized marriages that states did not.
Indeed, it was very clear that if a state allowed blacks to marry, the couple
could not use the standards for marriage set forth in these statutes.108 But the
statutes were also narrow in that they deviated for particular federal purposes,
when following state law did not serve federal interests.
In fact, many years later, the Department of Interior stressed that the federal
statutes were understood to be contrary to state law. The justification was that
they were required to meet “the peculiar conditions of those who, having been
held to “involuntary servitude” were thereby denied marital rights under State
law.”109 But in fact, they were clearly closely tied to military recruitment.
The Department of Interior also rejected any characterization of the slave
pension statutes as statutes establishing new marriage laws.
It is obvious from the language of the section that Congress did not
intend to enact a law of marriage for persons of color—neither to

104. See discussion infra at p. 773.
105. E.g., In re Ann Cahal, in 9 DECISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR IN

CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 127, 127-28 (John W. Bixler ed. 1898) (rejecting
the widow’s claim because her husband was white, although he was claimed to be
black, and expressing that interracial marriage was contrary to Mississippi law).
106. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (declaring state restraints on interracial
marriage unconstitutional).
107. E.g., John W. Finney, Segregated Units Ended By The Services, WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 1954, at M6.
108. E.g., In re Fanny Curtis, in 2 DECISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
IN CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 159, 161 (George Baber ed. 1889) (finding that
the Act was not intended to validate cohabitation of free black couples who had not
been slaves and could be married where they resided).
109. In re Minor Children of Joseph Crain, supra note 90, at 361.
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supply the lack of any State or local statute on the subject, nor to
make a general law affecting marital rights, beyond claims for
pension. An intention to regulate marital rights in general, if
entertained by Congress, might well be held as an encroachment
upon the authority of the State which, having marital laws of its own
might properly assert exclusive jurisdiction over the subject. While
not interfering with local enactments, Congress intended, by section
4805, to establish grounds for title to pension in behalf of certain
persons—the widows and children of colored and Indian soldiers and
sailors for whom no provision had theretofore been made in the
pension system.110
The source of the power to recognize slave marriages as qualifying
marriages for federal pension purposes (and to recognize the children of former
slaves as legitimate dependents) had to lie in Congress’ War Powers under the
Constitution, both directly and under the Necessary and Proper Clause.111 The
Thirteenth Amendment freeing the slaves and the Fourteenth Amendment
declaring them citizens of the United States later added additional
authorization for the federal government to assume the work of transitioning
blacks out of the law of servitude against the will of rebel governments.
3. Secretary of War Marriage Directives During the Civil War and
Reconstruction
The Civil War pension statutes recognized the existing customary slave
marriages. There is yet another example of federal forays into marriage from
the Civil War period. The U.S. Secretary of War authorized military officers,
local clergymen, and others to perform marriages for black soldiers and so
called “contraband.” Of course, military officers were already performing
marriages for white military men.112 The newly authorized marriages occurred
in areas of military occupation, but often within the boundaries of rebel states.
Unlike U.S. bases today, Civil War military encampments were not preexisting
federal properties, but were often established on commandeered lands.
The earliest official record of “contraband” marriages appears to be from
October 11, 1861, in a report of marriages performed by Rev. Lewis C.
Lockwood at Camp Hamilton, Virginia. Lockwood married 32 couples.113 On

110. Id. at 362.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress inter alia, the power “[t]o declare

War,” “[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o
make Rules for the Government of Regulation of the land and naval Forces”).
112. War obligations, it seemed, led military men to want to marry. Military
Matrimony, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1861, at 4.
113. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., MARRIAGE RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF
THE COMMISSIONER, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS OF THE BUREAU OF REFUGEES,
FREEDMEN AND ABANDONED LANDS, 1861-1869, at 3 (2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL
ARCHIVES
FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU
SUMMARY],
available
at
http://www.archives.gov/research/microfilm/m1875.pdf.
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March 28, 1864, John Eaton, then Superintendent of contrabands for
Department of Tennessee and Arkansas, issued Special Order 15 ordering
Union Army clergy to “‘solemnize the rite of marriage among Freedmen.’”114
And again the report notes that “Special Order 176, issued by the Department
of the Gulf (July 4, 1864), ordered clergy in that Department ‘to unite in
marriage, free of charge, such colored soldiers as may be recommended to
them . . . with the women whom such soldiers may select to be their wives.’”115
By the Act of March 3, 1865, weeks before the South’s surrender, Congress
established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (the
“Freedmen’s Bureau”).116 At the time, both houses of Congress had adopted
the Thirteenth Amendment (with rebel states not represented), but it had not
been ratified.117 The Freedmen’s Bureau was another federal foray into
traditionally local activity, one compelled by the expansiveness of the effort to
organize the slaves into communities.118 The original authorization provided
for blacks to have access to forty acres of land for farming at a small rent and
later, if available, for the Bureau to make the land available for purchase.119
As blacks had been excluded from many of the free land grants previously
offered to whites,120 this provision was a comparably modest way to provide a

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, ch.

90, § 1, 13 Stat. 507, 507 (1865) (committing the supervision and management of all
abandoned lands, refugees, and freedman to the newly formed bureau); see also The
Surrender: Full Details of the Great Event From an Eyewitness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
1865, at 1.
117. The Amendment was passed by the Senate on April 8, 1864, by the House on
January 31, 1865, and adopted on December 6, 1865. See 13th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution:
Abolition
of
Slavery
(1865),
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=40 (last visited Mar. 26,
2013).
118. Letter of the Freedmen’s Aid Societies to President Lincoln (Dec. 1, 1863)
(“[T]he question is too large for anything short of government authority.”).
119. An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, § 1, 13
Stat. at 508. In General Order No. 110, President Andrew Johnson ordered lands
abandoned in War to be turned over to the Bureau. The Freedmen’s Bureau: Important
Official Order by the President, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1865, at 1; see also William H.
Burkes, The Freedmen’s Bureau, Politics, and Stability Operations During
Reconstruction in the South 42 (Dec. 6, 2009) (unpublished Slave holder of Military
Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA501927 (noting that access to land
for farming was also granted to loyal white refugees); W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The
Freedmen’s Bureau, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1901, at 354, 357, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/01mar/dubois.htm (stating former male
slaves had the opportunity to lease and eventually own abandoned property).
120. See discussion infra p. 753; see also infra pp. 751-52 (discussing restrictions to
“white men only” or American Indians with white male fathers in Utah and Oregon
land grant laws).
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way for them to start their own farms.121 The promise faltered under protest
when the claimed original owners returned and challenged the Act.122
Nevertheless, the Bureau helped blacks and whites to establish schools and
financial institutions for ex-slaves.123 It had been a felony to teach a slave to
read and write in many slaveholding states.124 The Bureau tried to track
vigilante groups’ terrorism of blacks after the War, including lynchings.125
Bureau officers issued marriage licenses and certificates and registered the
marriages.126 “On June 24, 1865, John W. Sprague, Assistant Commissioner
for Arkansas, whose jurisdiction covered both the States of Arkansas and
Missouri (June 1865 until January 1866), issued Circular Number 3 instructing
his subordinates ‘to keep and preserve a record of marriages of freed people,
and by whom the ceremony was performed.’”127 Sprague sent regular reports
to Washington of the marriages performed.128 In August of 1865, General
Edict No. 8 set up a system for marriages affecting Florida, South Carolina,
and Georgia.129 The edict addressed who was eligible to be married, how
marriages were to be performed, the rights and obligations of husbands and
wives, and the rights of children and divorce. It addressed the difficult topic of
those who had been separated by forced sale during slavery, had married a
second person, but now wanted to be reunited with the first. It even provided
121. See infra p 147-48 (discussing restrictions in the Oregon Land Donation Law).
122. Freedmen’s Affairs, First Official Report of General Howard, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 20, 1865 at 3 (stating some distribution had occurred but most had been
suspended after persons claimed a right to those lands). President Johnson, he began to
back away from the promises and vetoed reauthorization of the bill. His veto was
immediately overridden. Washington News: The President’s Message Vetoing the
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1866, at 1.
123. See Martin Abbott, The Freedmen’s Bureau and Negro Schooling in South
Carolina, 57 S.C. HIST. MAG. 56, 67 (1956) (stating the Bureau performed many vital
tasks including providing resources to schools and funding building repairs); see also
NATIONAL ARCHIVES FREEDMEN’S BUREAU SUMMARY, supra note 113, at 1 (stating
that the Bureau established hospitals, supervised tenements for the homeless, and
operated employment offices).
124. See, e.g., An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Other
Slaves in this Province, 1740, reprinted in 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 397, 413 (David J. McCord ed., 1840), available at
http://archive.org/details/statutesatlargeo07edit (imposing a money penalty for teaching
a slave how to write).
125. See generally Freedmen’s Bureau Records Relating to Murders and Outrages,
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU ONLINE, http://freedmensbureau.com/outrages.htm (last visited
Mar. 5, 2013) (reflecting murders, lynchings, and questionable rape accusations against
black men and young boys).
126. NATIONAL ARCHIVES FREEDMEN’S BUREAU SUMMARY, supra note 113, at 5.
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id.
129. See Marriage Rules: General Order No. 8, August 11, 1865, HIST. ST.
AUGUSTINE, http://www.drbronsontours.com/bronsongeneralrufussaxtongeneralordersn
o8august111865.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (acknowledging the Bureau’s
commitment to protect the “sacred institution of marriage”).
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forms for marriage certificates.130
The Freedmen’s Bureau was reauthorized and its authority expanded by
subsequent Acts. However, criticisms that the job was too costly, complaints
that the now freed blacks should be required to stand on their own and
continuing racism combined to end its work.131 The Bureau finally succumbed
to politics three years after the end of the War in 1868.132 The ex-slaves,
largely illiterate and poverty stricken, surrounded by racial tensions, and with
their families scattered were left to find their own way with the help of what
private philanthropists would and could give and little protection from state
authorities. In this void, the Southern states’ leadership engrained racial
oppression in the notorious “black codes,” laws applicable only to blacks that
attempted to recreate the economically and socially valuable structure that
slavery had once secured for whites.133
It is very clear that when Congress provided for the federal licensing of
marriages for the ex-slaves, it intended for their marital rights to be recognized
in all of the states. Moreover, its actions did not facilitate state action, but
rather operated directly contrary to the will of those in the Confederacy and
others who rejected the notion of affording blacks the right to marry.134 This
extraordinary step flowed from its War Powers and, again, from the
Constitutional Amendments relating to the newly freed slaves.
130. Id.; see also Rules for Marriage in the State of South Carolina, FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU ONLINE, http://freedmensbureau.com/southcarolina/marriagerules.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2013) (stating that each couple shall be issued a marriage certificate by
the minister who marries them).
131. See Du Bois, supra note 119, at 364 (postulating that a permanent Freedmen’s
Bureau might well have solved persistent and perplexing “negro” problems); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1307 (1865) (statement of Mr. Powell) (objecting
to the original bill stating, “this bill will involve an expense of millions upon millions
of dollars”); The Situation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1866, at 4 (stating that an institution
charged with “educat[ing] the negro into fitness for freedom” would inevitably grow
into permanence—a result which should be carefully guarded against); A Word for the
Freedmen and the Freedmen’s Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1866, at 4 (objecting to
those pleading for Bureau’s work to continue, arguing that the scope of its task is too
monumental).
132. See The End of the Freedmen’s Bureau, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1868, at 4
(claiming that the exigency which gave rise to the Bureau ceased to exist and thus the
Bureau became a drain on national resources).
133. See W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860 - 1880, at 325
(The Free Press 1998) (1935) (noting that the South was willing to use “black codes” to
restore the capital it lost with the abolition of slavery); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN,
RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 47 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that enacting “black
codes” was the greatest concern of Southern legislatures in the year following the Civil
War); see also Black Codes, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/black-codes
(last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (listing, for example, a “black code” which required blacks
to sign yearly labor contracts or risk being arrested and forced into labor).
134. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3341-50 (1864) (objecting to Freedmen’s
Bureau Bill on grounds that Jefferson Davis claimed that blacks are inferior and bill
overlooks white man’s rights).
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B. Deviating to Reject a Class of Marriages Deemed Valid Under State or
Local Law
1. Prohibiting Polygamous Marriages in the Territory of Utah
DOMA defenders have often cited the U.S. treatment of polygamy in Utah
as an example of federal inroads into marriage and an example of the federal
government’s use of marriage rules to express moral viewpoints. Those
critical of the comparison have sought to distinguish the Utah case in a variety
of ways: that the case involved a territory and plenary power, that polygamy
affects families differently than same-sex marriage, etc.135 Prior writers on
both sides have failed to grasp the significant role that the Supremacy Clause
played in federal decisions relating to polygamy in Utah. The battle over
supremacy laid the predicate for federal action in Utah, and makes Utah a case
of not simply mere moral reproach (although some actors held this view), but
also a case of a vindication of a federal interest in establishing federal power as
the supreme power in accordance with both the U.S. Constitution and the
organic statute that created the territory.
Utah came into the territory of the U.S. through the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico.136 At the time, members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the “Mormons”) were already living there.
Facing resistance, they had moved from place to place to find territory where
they could peaceably practice their religious tenets, including, but not limited
to, polygamy.137
In 1850, Congress adopted the organic act that established a territorial
legislature, affording Utah all local governance powers consistent with the
federal Constitution, with a few exceptions. One was that locals had no power
to dispose of the land.138 President James Buchanan appointed Brigham
Young as the territory’s first governor. Buchanan had to know that Young was
the head of the Mormon Church and a polygamist but apparently did not attach
135. E.g., Adrienne Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1993-97 (2010) (arguing that
binary same-sex marriage is more consistent with modern trends of equality in family
law than polygamy and that the latter runs contrary to that trend with frequently
changing family structures that heighten vulnerability of family members); see also
Windsor Historians' Amici Brief at 37-39 (Congress' campaign to end polygamy was so
intense because Congress knew it could not affect polygamy once Utah became a
state).
136. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
137. See 1 HISPANIC AMERICAN RELIGIOUS CULTURES 375 (Miguel de la Torre ed.
2009); see also Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban
on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 298 (2010) (discussing the intense
evangelism, and other religious doctrines that prompted the Mormons to seek their own
territory within the United States).
138. An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah, ch. 51, § 1, 9 Stat. 453,
453 (1850).
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significance to the fact.139 According to one source, at the time of that
appointment Young had fourteen wives. 140
The tensions between Mormon local officials and non-Mormon federal
officials began almost immediately. By December 1851, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Territory, one of the two Associate Justices, and the
Secretary for the Territory had resigned and left the territory.141 Upon hearing
of the uproar in Utah, the House of Representatives asked the Executive
Branch to deliver a report. In 1852, President Millard Fillmore relayed to
Congress a report from Secretary of State Daniel Webster. That report was
delivered a full ten years before Congress banned polygamy. The documents
that it contained reveal extensive information of, at least, the U.S.
government’s view of what was happening in Utah.
Essentially, in a lengthy letter, the judges claimed that Utah had become a
theocracy and the Mormon Church had usurped the federal government’s role.
They accused the Church of controlling the opinions, actions, property, and
lives of its members; “usurping and exercising the functions of legislation and
judicial business in the Territory” (including conducting its own trials without
a jury); “organizing and commanding the military; disposing of the public
lands, upon its own terms; coining money, stamped, ‘Holiness to the Lord,’
and forcing its circulation at a standard fifteen or twenty percent above its real
value; openly sanctioning and defending polygamy . . . extracting the tenth
part of everything from members, under the name of tithing, and enormous
taxes, from citizens, not members.”142 Of Brigham Young they said that he
exacted absolute obedience and “[h]is opinions and wishes were [the people’s]
opinions and wishes.”143
They further accused Young of insisting that only Mormons be appointed to
public office in Utah, of insulting the government of the United States and
government officials in his speeches, and of riling up citizens to threaten
federal officials both generally and in particular, with physical harm.144 They
accused him of using federal funds for purposes other than those Congress had
139. James Buchanan, State of the Union Address, Dec. 8, 1857, in STATE OF THE
UNION
ADDRESSES
BY
JAMES
BUCHANAN
3,
25-26
(2003),
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/uspressu/SUaddressJBuchanan.pdf
(discussing the difficulty of Young’s dual roles).
140. Accord CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 1804 (1873) (noting difficulty that
Young had fourteen wives when appointed Governor, and Congress later allowed
polygamy to stand for some ten to twelve years before doing something about it).
141. CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 91 (1852).
142. Id. at 86.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 86-87; see also id. at 87 (articulating that the officials felt endangered,
but also that they felt insulted; one letter relates Young stating in a public speech that
President Zachery Taylor, then dead, was “in hell,” and that “I prophesy in the name of
Jesus Christ, by the power of the Priesthood that’s upon me, that any President of the
United States who lifts his finger against this people shall die an untimely death and go
to hell”).
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authorized, of producing a fraudulent census, and of conducting elections in
which aliens were allowed to vote.145 They claimed that Young refused to
meet with them and claimed that Young told them that federal judges would
never try a single case in Utah territory.146 The judges also pointed out that
while bigamy was a crime under common law, it would, in their view, be
impossible to find anyone who would convict, for all of the local judges and
jurypersons would also be Mormon.147 They ended by stating that the
Mormons were “living upon the soil of the United States and drawing their
sustenance from it free of charge,” and that their officers, including Governor
Young, were paid for with monies provided by the federal government.148 And
yet they added, “[i]t is impossible for any [federal] officer to perform his duty
or execute any law, not in sympathy with their views as the Territory is at
present organized.”149
The federally appointed Secretary of the territory, who had also resigned,
submitted a report as well. It indicated controversy over the handling of
spending and elections. The Secretary accused Young of disregarding Utah’s
Organic Act. He included copies of correspondence that appeared to indicate
that Young had attempted to order the Secretary as to how to handle federal
monies in the territory rather than conceding Utah’s obligation to follow
federal law.150
Utah’s sole Congressional delegate, John Milton Bernhisel, wrote a letter
too. He reported that his community denied that they mistreated federal
officers or insulted the government. Acknowledging that he left the territory
on travel before the events allegedly occurred, he asked for a committee
investigation.151
The sole remaining judge wrote an oddly short letter. He stated that he had
decided to remain and that the others could explain for themselves their
reasons for departure. But he also cryptically pointed out that delegate
Bernhisel (whose letter denied that Utah residents had been discourteous) was
not present in the territory when the events in question occurred.
The report also included a short letter from Governor Brigham Young to
President Fillmore. It simply informed the President that with the resignations,
Young had appointed a new Secretary pro temp and that the territorial
legislature had redistricted the territory into one district and assigned the cases
to the sole remaining judge, all this to fill a void until the President could
act.152 It said nothing about the reasons for the judges’ resignations or

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 87, 88.
Id. at 86-87.
CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 89 (1852).
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 85, 91.
See CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 86 (1852) (describing Young’s
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Young’s reactions.
The leading Utah Newspaper, The Deseret News, was largely a religious
vehicle, dominated by sermons, speeches, and testimonies. It did not then
address the conflicts, perhaps an indication that the Mormons did not want to
provide fuel for a federal fire.153
Despite resignations that indicated clear signs of trouble in Utah, Congress
did not focus in on banning polygamy in this period. Four years later, in 1854,
the matter of Utah came up again. Congress was considering a bill relating to
the appointment of a Surveyor General for Utah and the distribution of
territorial lands.154 Under the proposed bill, “white” married men were to
receive twice the lot of “white” single men (a total of 640 acres versus 320).155
At the last minute, an Ohio Congressman inserted a provision that excluded
polygamists from allotments.156 Utah’s delegate, Bernhisel, moved to strike
the limitation. That motion set off a furious debate over polygamy and more
directly the power of Congress to affect religion, marriage, and domestic issues
in the territories. Some Congressmen expressed surprise at learning of the
extent of polygamy in Utah. But while Utah statutes did not mention it,
polygamy prevailed in Utah and had been an open secret.157
Some of the arguments presented are similar to the arguments in same-sex
marriage cases. Defenders of Utah’s rights to practice polygamy argued that
decision to appoint a new Secretary; it is not clear whether, in doing so, he was filling a
void or taking advantage of an opportunity to arrange affairs more suitable to his
preferences); see also An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah, ch. 51, §§
1-2, 9 Stat. 453, 453 (1850) (appearing to have given Young the authority to redistrict,
though not to appoint federal officials). For other expressed concerns about Young see
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. 31 (1873) (claiming Young had driven from
competition every Gentile company that attempted to build a railroad in Utah).
153. The Deseret News is available digitally online through the University of Utah at
http://digitalnewspapers.org/newspaper/?paper=Deseret+News.
154. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1091-92 (1854) (proposing that the
authority to grant the final disposition of the land rested with the U.S. government).
Compare An Act to Regulate Surveyors and Surveying, 1851-52 Utah Territory Acts
1st Sess. 94, 94-96 (1852) (noting the ability of officials in Utah to appoint surveyors),
with An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah §§ 15-17, 9 Stat. at 457-58
(discussing the boundary of Utah’s territory and emphasizing that the laws of the
Constitution extend over it).
155. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1091-92 (1854) (“[T]he benefits of
this act shall not extend to any person who shall now, or at any time hereafter, be the
husband of more than one wife.”). The statute left ambiguity as to whether Mormon
authorities desired a husband to claim land for each marriage; however, it still appeared
to allow only one lot per male applicant. See also id. at 1092 (noting that when asked
about the damage the restriction would bring, Rep. Bernhisel stated that the more wives
a man has the more land he needs).
156. Id. at 1091-92.
157. See id. at 1091, 1095 (noting that the territorial statutes had no mention of
polygamy or the Mormon Church); see also discussion infra at p. 742 and note 164;
supra note 140 (Congressman arguing that President and Congress had knowledge of
polygamy at time of Utah founding).
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religion and marriage were local matters outside of Congress’ enumerated
powers and consequently, despite Congress’ power over territorial lands, any
marriage-based federal condition on the receipt of the land was void.158 They
asked why, if polygamists were to be excluded, adulterers in other territories
were not excluded as well and why any number of bad acts did not block
eligibility for land grants.159 They argued that the terms for Utah should be the
same as the terms for other territories.160 They argued that Congress had no
power to touch moral issues such as religion and that if “discrimination”
against the Mormons was allowed, other religions would be next.161 They also
made a public safety argument that the Mormons had suffered significant
discrimination in their history, that they would take great offense to this
condition, and that upsetting them would come at a price.162 They argued that
the Mormons were conscientious and hard workers and truly believed that their
faith authorized and encouraged polygamy.163 They argued that Congress
knew about the practice of polygamy when Utah became a territory but did
nothing to prevent it.164 They argued that polygamy was not yet a crime
because it was legal under Utah law, Congress had not outlawed it, and
Congress had no basis for infringing local rights.165 They argued that it was
unfair to exclude Mormons when land grants were given to “‘outcasts from
Europe” and “fugitives from justice.”166
Supporters of the restriction on polygamy had their own arguments: that
Congress had sweeping power to issue any laws deemed necessary with
respect to the territories;167 that marriage between one man and one woman
158. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1093 (1854) (citing Congressman
Phillips when he states that “Congress has nothing whatever to do with this
transaction” as it is “not necessary or proper” to impose the condition); see also id. at
1092 (noting the comments of Mr. Bernhisel when striking to amend the proposal).
159. See id. at 1093 (noting where Congressman Phillips asks why adultery or
murder was not excluded).
160. See id. at 1094 (noting the comments of Congressman Stephens of Georgia,
who argued that Congress cannot treat religions differently in these territories).
161. See id. at 1094 (highlighting the comments of Congressman Stephens of
Georgia, who argued that such unequal treatment was unconstitutional).
162. See id. at 1097 (emphasizing the comments of Mr. Walsh noting that “good
precepts, and persuasion, will do more to remove polygamy . . . than all the laws you
can pass here”).
163. Id. at 1092.
164. Id. at 1097; accord CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 1804 (1873)
(documenting Mr. Carpenter’s comments noting knowledge of polygamy when
Brigham Young appointed and that Congress allowed polygamy to stand for some ten
to twelve years before doing something about it).
165. See id. at 1097 (referencing the comments of Mr. Kerr who argued that the way
to deal with the “crime” was to directly outlaw it, not address it indirectly).
166. See id. (highlighting the comments of Mr. Kerr,); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
338 (1789) (referencing import of prison labor or “white slaves” from Europe).
167. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1101 (1854) (noting the comments of
Mr. Lyon on this issue when he cites the Constitutional authority for Congress’ power).
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was ordained by God;168 that states where polygamy was practiced were
“heathen and have not flourished;”169 that allowing polygamists to have bounty
lands would attract to Utah licentious individuals and advance the degradation
of women as married men legally pursued multiple paramours;170 that
affording land to polygamists would constitute the federal government’s
approval of the practice and by reward lead to its increase in the territories;171
that the role of the federal government was to fit territories to become
republican states and that polygamy was inconsistent with this task;172 that
every state in the union banned polygamy;173 that denying benefits would
encourage Mormons to give up the practice;174 that polygamy broke up the
family circle;175 that the matter was not local at all; that not excluding
polygamists would give them a “bonus” in bounty lands not available to those
who adhered to the dominant common law approach to marriage; that
Congress was giving a federal gift and that it had every right to impose the
terms of that gift consistent with the rules recognized by the states in
common.176
At the time of the 1854 debates, at least one person insisted that the federal
government would have no power to hinder polygamy in this way if Utah
territory were in fact a state.177 Of course, were Utah a state, disposition of
federal land or federal supremacy would not have been an issue—and all the
states had outlawed polygamy.
Representatives from slaveholding states were split on the question of
polygamy. One proposed that polygamists should even be required to forfeit

168. See id. at 1094 (noting the comments of Mr. Smith of Tennessee that this
reference is singular and not plural).
169. Id. at 1101.
170. See id. at 1100 (noting that such an allowance would disrupt the “virtuous quiet
in the unbroken wilderness of the West”).
171. Id. at 1096; see also id. at 1095 (noting the comments of Mr. Simmons on his
concern about western expansion and the potential for the spread of polygamy when
settlers interact with Mormons).
172. Id. at 1095 (referencing the statement Congressman Simmons made when he
articulated that Congress in the past had determined that “religion and morality” were
“the basis of free republication institutions” in schooling).
173. See id. at 1093 (noting the comments of Congressman Campbell when he stated
that in every state polygamy was “a high offense”).
174. See id. at 1098 (referencing the comments of Mr. Goodrich when he stated that
if it was not possible to reach Mormons on this issue through “moral considerations,” it
would become necessary to affect their interests in other ways).
175. See id. at 1095 (noting that Mr. Simmons also stated that it “spoils the domestic
relations”).
176. See id. at 1098 (noting Mr. Campbell and Mr. Taylor’s comments that those
practicing polygamy would receive increased benefits); see also id. at 1101 (identifying
the comments of Mr. Cobb on the power of Congress to condition the grant of federal
lands).
177. Id. at 1092.
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lands that they already held.178 But others saw Congressional intervention to
ban polygamy as a breach of a local jurisdiction’s right to determine its own
domestic relations—a breach that might broaden to lead the federal
government up to the slaveholder’s doorstep. Said Mr. Keitt from South
Carolina:
Now, if Congress has a right to say that no man in the Territories
shall have more than one wife, may it not say that no man shall have
a wife at all? If it can prescribe the number of wives, may it not
altogether abrogate the marital relation?179
Mr. Davis of Rhode Island, referring to the limitation of the land to white
men, responded by posing his own question: “I would ask the gentleman where
Congress gets the power to insert the word ‘white’ in this bill?”180 His
question emphasized that federal racial restrictions on land grants did not
actually have an obvious constitutional basis, especially since citizenship was
not even a requirement. He also cried hypocrisy against slaveholders
challenging polygamy, saying that at least Mormons acknowledge their wives
and children unlike slaveholders who practice “unlimited concubinage” and
“sell their children.”181
It appears the matter was set aside and for a year, Utah continued without a
federal Surveyor General. Settlers (many of whom were polygamists)
effectively squatted on land.182 In February 1855, over the objections of a
vocal minority, Congress finally passed a statute appointing the Surveyor
General, without any restrictions on polygamists.183 But a year later, the
appointed Surveyor General of Utah abandoned his post. He alleged hostilities
from the Mormons.184 Still, Congress did not act to ban polygamy.
The tense environment was made incendiary by frequent, often bloody,
skirmishes between Mormon and non-Mormon settlers moving through Utah
territory. A notable one occurred in September 1857, when a band of armed

178. Id. at 1099.
179. Id. at 1099.
180. See id. at 1100 (referencing Mr. Davis’s responsive question about Congress’

authority). Davis did not ask about the exclusion of women. Although married women
could access land through their husbands, or children through their fathers, marriage
remained the key to women’s access. See also id. at 1092 (mentioning Congressman
Giddings’ of Ohio statement that Southerners have denounced all attempts to interfere
with slavery in the territories as a domestic institution but are now in favor of
interfering with the “domestic institution of marriage in Utah, among the Mormons”);
id. at 1093 (recognizing that Congressman Campbell came to a similar conclusion
regarding the Southerners’ discussions about centralization in this context but not
within the context of slavery).
181. Id. at 1092. Of course, employing the word “concubinage” presents the female
slave experience only from the male point of view.
182. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 14 (1857).
183. An Act to Establish the Office of Surveyor-General of Utah, and to Grant Land
for School and University Purposes, ch. 117, § 1, 10 Stat. 611, 611 (1855).
184. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 14 (1857).
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men murdered more than one hundred Arkansans traveling through Utah. The
incident became known as the “Mountain Meadows Massacre.”185 Later that
same year, a party of travelers was attacked and killed in the “Aiken
Massacre.”186 Prosecutors could not secure convictions of Mormons alleged to
be involved. It was claimed that Mormons would not vote to convict a fellow
Mormon. The first Mountain Meadows trial resulted in a hung jury.187 The
second finally resulted in a conviction twenty years after the massacre, and
after Congress allowed challenges to strike jurors who were polygamists.188
For his part, President James Buchanan replaced Governor Brigham Young
and sent new federal agents there. In his December 1857 State of the Union
address, he explained his actions, essentially alleging that Utah was a
theocracy that did not respect federal rule and stating that the troops were
necessary for protection of federal officers, as so many had resigned in fear of
their personal safety.189 Ironically, Senator Jefferson Davis—who would later
lead the states of the Confederacy that seceded from the Union—commented
that it was “palpably absurd” that the President could not call upon the
predominantly Mormon Utah militia to defend U.S. interests in Utah.190 The

185. See RONALD W. WALKER, ET AL., MASSACRE AT MOUNTAIN MEADOWS, at IX,
191 (2008) (stating the emigrants were en route to California).
186. See The Judiciary vs. the Administration—Mormon Complicity in Recent
Massacres, DAILY EVENING BULL., Sept. 17, 1859 (reporting attempts to collect
evidence regarding Massacres for trials and request for military aid).
187. See The Second Trial of John D. Lee, the Mormon Elder, for the Massacre of
Emigrants, Known as the “Mountain Meadow Massacre,” Has Just Begun at Beaver,
Utah, LOWELL DAILY CITIZEN, Sept. 18 1876, at col. A (stating the three or four
Mormons on the jury refused to return a guilty verdict).
188. See John D. Lee, the Mormon Who Was Found Guilty of Complicity in the
Mountain Meadows Massacre, and Condemned to Be Shot Last Month, Is Still Alive,
with Some Prospect of Escaping Punishment Altogether, Through Technicalities,
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 1877, at 4; Execution of John D. Lee, the Mormon
Leader in the Mountain Meadows Massacre, FRANK LESLIE’S ILLUSTRATED
NEWSPAPER, Apr. 7, 1877, at 79. For trial transcripts and other papers related to the
Massacre see the website at the University of Missouri, Kansas City available at
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mountainmeadows/leetrial.html.
189. Buchanan, supra note 139, at 25-26 (noting Brigham Young was head both of
Church and state and in a conflict, the people of Utah would side with Young and the
Church; stating Young desires the conflict; noting all the federal officers except for two
Indian agents found it necessary to withdraw from the territory to protect their personal
safety; the only government in Utah was the despotism of Brigham Young). See also
Report of the Secretary of War, CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1857)
(reporting to the Joint Session that the people of Utah had established a theocracy and
rejected the laws of United States; discussing alleged incitement of Brigham Young,
blaming Mormons for nearby American Indian unrest against United States; expressing
attempts to negotiate with the Mormons discussing provisions for expedition).
190. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 408 (1858) (Sen. Jefferson Davis (MI))
(calling the notion that the state militia of Utah could not be called upon to enforce
United States law against the Mormons a “palpably absurd” situation).
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U.S. military remained in Utah until 1858.191 Mormon newspapers began to
strike back in their own defense.192
In 1858, President Buchanan also used the Utah turmoil and Mormon
resistance to federal power to call for more funding for a larger Army.193
Congressional debates focused primarily on whether a larger army was needed
and the question of respect for federal power in Utah, not on polygamy.194
Some accused the President of levying war upon the Mormons or using their
situation as an excuse to get money for an Army.195 The debates indicate just
how strongly some Congressmen of that era felt about federal respect for local
powers, even in the territories.
191. End of the Mormon Rebellion, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, May 24, 1858
(reporting the end of the “rebellion” without bloodshed).
192. Mormon reactions in newspapers tended to be encased in larger sermons. See,
e.g., Discourse By Pres. Brigham Young, Oct. 7, 1857, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1857,
at 340 (stating “hell cannot overthrow us, even with the United States to help them,”
and telling U.S. Captain Stewart Van Vliet that Young does not care how many troops
the government has because “before they get through they will want to let the job to
sub-contractors”); Expedition Against Utah, id. at 244-45 (speaking of past religious
discrimination over decades and stating Mormons respect federal government but will
resist attempts to supplant territorial local control or end polygamy); Discourse of
Elder O. Hyde, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1857 at 342-43 (accusing others of inciting
violence against Mormons, accusing the U.S. government and Buchanan of antiMormon behavior and inciting conflicts); Discourse By Elder Geo. A. Smith, Nov. 29,
DESERET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1857, at 343 (arguing that the United States never extended
protection to Mormons); id. at 341 (referring to the “vile and illegal” crusade of
Buchanan and the U.S. against Utah). Some argue that the Mormons failed to
acknowledge any responsibility for tensions or for the Mountain Meadow murders.
Accord Kristine W. Fredrickson, Scholars Discuss Massacre at Mountain Meadows,
DESERET NEWS (June 9, 2010, 3:00 PM), www.deseretnews.com/article
/705384706/Scholars-discuss-Massacre-At-Mountain-Meadows.html
(discussing
scholars who note that Mormons at that time refused to take responsibility and
considered it an individual problem). In 2007, the Mormon Church acknowledged that
some of its former leaders played a role in recruiting Paiute Indians for the massacre
and it publicly apologized. Jessica Ravitz, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Sept, 11, 2007, at
1.
193. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 406-07 (1858) (discussing the request).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 407 (Statement of Mr. Toombs (GA)) (articulating that the President has
no power to make war and some Congressmen “may believe it unnecessary to carry
vast bodies of troops over the Rocky Mountains, in order to murder those people who
are called Mormons”); id. at 407-08 (Statement of Jefferson Davis) (denying the sole
reason for troop request was Mormon War, agreeing no War exists, and saying
President was not levying War upon the Mormons); id. at 412-13 (Statement of Mr.
Seward) (asserting that Congress is not taking threat in Utah seriously enough; “Utah
stands out entirely distinct from the whole line of our past experience;” Mormons
unlike others who have settled territories who are “men trained up under our own
Constitution . . . accustomed to the principles and habits of the American republican
society . . . educated to govern themselves, and maintain their rights and liberties; and
men also accustomed by habit to submit with loyalty to the Federal Government in
exercise of its proper jurisdiction over them . . . .”).
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By the mid-1800s, an invigorated Women’s Movement had provided a new
argument against polygamy: that it was harmful to women and families.196
The debates over slavery also provided fuel for those opposing polygamy.
Even before Utah was formed, abolitionists had tied together toleration of
slavery and polygamy in foreign affiliated churches.197 Hearkening to this
link, the Republican Party, in 1856, branded polygamy and slavery, the “twin
relics of barbarism.”198
Those whose primary concern was the supremacy of federal law began to
lose patience with Utah. They allowed morality objections and anti-Mormon
animus to grow to full bloom. On February 23, 1857, Republican J.S. Morrill
made an extended speech in the House of Representatives attacking the
Mormon Church and polygamy as morally repugnant.199 It did not help that
after leaving the Mormon Church, one of Brigham Young’s ex-wives wrote a
book attacking Young and polygamy.200
The debates over “The Morrill Act” began in 1860. The Act was passed in
1862.201 Although the Act applied to all U.S. territories, the target was known

196. Hamilton Ward (NY) argued the alleged plight of women and noted that
Women’s Rights Activist, Anna Dickenson, visited Utah’s Mormon women. CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2144-45 (1870). Ironically, the Mormons gave women the
vote before the United States did, but Congressmen argued that the action was merely
an attempt to increase Mormon voting power and that the women were controlled by
their men and the Church. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. 31 (1873). Not
surprisingly, women’s groups argued that the vote should be kept secure for Utah’s
women. 2 CONG. REC. 522 (1874) (Memorial from New York Woman Suffrage
Society) (asking Congress not to take away Utah women’s vote).
197. See Polygamy, EMANCIPATOR, July 29, 1846, at col. D (discussing arguments to
justify polygamy similar to those to justify slavery and attacking American Board of
Foreign Missionaries for tolerating polygamy, slavery, and caste systems in churches
abroad); The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions—Polygamy,
LIBERATOR, Nov. 13, 1846, at col. E (criticizing the Board’s tolerant stance on
polygamy and slavery).
198. See Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, Note, Marriage and Redemption: Mormon
Polygamy in the Congressional Imagination, 1862-1887, 95 VA. L. REV. 435, 438
(2009).
199. J.S. Morrill, Address to the House of Representatives: Utah Territory and Its
Laws—Polygamy and Its License (Feb. 23, 1857), reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 34th
Cong., 3d Sess. App. 284, 284-90 (1857).
200. ANN ELIZA YOUNG, WIFE NO. 19, at 574 (1876), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=0ngFAAAAQAAJ. Young also testified before
Congress. See also Martha M. Ertman, The Story of Reynolds v. United States:
Federal “Hell Hounds” Punishing Mormon Treason, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 51, 51
(Carol Sanger ed., 2008).
201. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501; see also
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 9 (1890). For another history on the federal government’s approach to
polygamy see Hasday, supra note 47, at 1357-65; Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peays
Horses: The Federal Response to Polygamy, 1854-1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29
(2001).
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widely to be Utah. The Act dismantled the Territorial legislature of the state of
Utah and revoked a certificate of incorporation that the territorial legislature
had issued to the Mormon Church. Congress seized those lands.202 The Act
stated that it was not intended to prevent anyone from worshipping God
according to conscience, but rather only to “annul all acts and laws which
establish, maintain, protect or countenance the practice of polygamy, evasively
called spiritual marriage, however disguised . . . .”203 The Act made polygamy
a felony in all U.S. territories and other places over which the U.S. has
exclusive jurisdiction. Polygamy was already prohibited in every other state
and territory. The Act also provided that bigamists convicted as felons could
not vote.204
In 1872, Congressman Blair of Missouri unsuccessfully argued for a bill to
legalize all polygamous marriages in Utah and to cease all polygamy
prosecutions. He argued that such legalization was consistent with “principles
of republican government.”205
In 1873, Utah sought admission to the Union.206 Once again, polygamy
became a subject of discussion. Despite the 1862 Act banning it, and even
subsequent Acts, the Mormons, including Utah’s Congressional delegates, had
continued to practice it.207 Challengers to Utah’s admission charged the
Mormons with placing tolls on public roads, charging exorbitant fees to
travelers, and impeding travel.208 They claimed that Governor Young had
driven out of competition all “Gentile” railroad companies hoping to build
there.209
Utah’s delegate, W.H. Hooper, denied that Utah had impeded others’ rights
and said any actions taken were consistent with local rights exercised by other
states and the freedoms exercised by other religions.210 He argued that
Mormons were the victims of bias and misrepresentations.211

202. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862, § 1, 12 Stat. at 501 (“An act to punish
and prevent the Practice of Polygamy in the Territories of the United States and other
Places, and disapproving and annulling certain Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the
Territory of Utah”).
203. Id. § 2, 12 Stat. at 501.
204. Id.
205. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1096-1100 (1872).
206. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 944 (1873).
207. See, e.g., 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 491-500 (1907) (discussing various
challenges over several years to seating Utah House delegates on the grounds, inter
alia, that they practiced polygamy in violation of U.S. laws). These challenges were
usually not successful unless other actions contrary to U.S. interests were also proven.
208. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 947 (1873).
209. Id. at 948.
210. Id. at 945-46; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. at 29-31
(1873) (rebutting various allegations).
211. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. at 945 (1873) (noting bias in
newspapers and comparing Mormon approaches to others that invoke no concern);
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In 1874, Congress passed the Poland Act.212 The Act drew back the
expansive jurisdiction that the Mormons had given to their Probate Courts.213
It also provided rules for women seeking to divorce on the ground that they
were in plural marriages. It appointed the U.S. Marshall of the territory to
attend all court sessions in the territory, the U.S. Attorney to prosecute all
actions, and afforded three juror challenges in criminal trials: adultery, bigamy,
and polygamy.214 The passage of the Poland Act and its predecessors laid the
groundwork for the successful conviction in the Mountain Meadows case.
The early statutes banning polygamy prevented a married person from
marrying a subsequent time without divorce. But technically the language of
the statute still allowed multiple marriages if they occurred all at one time. In
1882, Congress passed the Edmunds Act, amending the earlier statute to close
that loophole.215 It also reached back to legitimize the then living children of
polygamous marriages that with their mothers had been rudely tossed out of
inheritance and support lines. The local laws of the Utah territorial legislature
had protected the children of polygamous marriages, but that body was now
disassembled.
In 1887, the Edmunds-Tucker Act allowed a willing wife to waive the
marital testimonial privilege in bigamy cases to testify against her husband,
except as to marital confidences.216 This privilege alteration was contrary to
the common law, which allowed a spouse to prevent even a willing spouse
from testifying against him.217 It also defined adultery as applicable to both
married women and married men, banned sexual relationships with relatives
within the fourth degree of consanguinity, punished fornication, and required
marriage licenses. 218
Court challenges to restrictions on the Mormons would fall on deaf ears. In
rejecting the claims, federal courts not only relied upon Supremacy, but also
adopted the moralistic view of Mormonism and the “twin relics of barbarism”

CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. at 31 (1873) (calling attacks on Mormons
“slander” and noting that they evoke applause on the floor); id. at 29 (alleging that
those seeking to attack Mormons were forced to go back six to sixteen years and
“grope in the twilight of fable for causes of complaint”).
212. The Poland Act of 1874, ch. 469, 18 Stat 253.
213. Id. § 3, 18 Stat. at 254 (defining probate court jurisdiction as not including civil
chancery or criminal jurisdiction); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 946 (1873)
(noting expensive chancery and common law jurisdiction was given to probate courts).
214. Id. §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. at 253.
215. The Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30.
216. The Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 397, § 2, 24 Stat. 635, 635.
217. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). Trammel subsequently
reversed the common law rule in federal courts allowing a willing spouse to testify
except as to communications covered by the marital communications privilege. By that
time, many other states had already abandoned the common law rule. Id. at 48.
218. The Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882 § 2, 22 Stat. at 30; The EdmundsTucker Act of 1887 § 4, 24 Stat. at 636.
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mantra.219
Utah was ultimately admitted to the union as a state in 1896. As a
condition, it was required to ban the recognition of polygamy “forever” in its
state constitution. Even today, the prohibition can only be changed by the
consent of the United States.220 After Congress suppressed the Mormons,
outlawed polygamy, and disbanded the territorial legislature, the federal
government resumed the approach of looking to the local law of the Utah
Territory, to the extent not inconsistent with U.S. law.221
In banning polygamy, Congress rejected a category of marriages recognized
under local law, a category that it had in fact previously expressly embraced
when it accepted that polygamous marriages could be the basis of land claims
and implicitly embraced when it did not act to eliminate polygamy for more
than a decade.
Utah polygamy cases involved federal territory and plenary power. But
plenary power was not the reason the federal government invaded traditional
provinces of local law there. Instead, the reasons were perceived federal
interests that made some believe that polygamy was incompatible with the
American system.
2. Immigration Based Rejections
Congress has plenary power to prescribe the rules for immigration.222
Numerous marital benefits are attached to immigration.223 While the rejection
of immigration benefits might be seen as the denial of an incident of marriage,
because the rejection essentially means that the individual cannot remain in the
country, the rejection of marriages benefits based on immigration rules is
essentially a rejection of the marriage’s validity overall.
i. Declining to Recognize Polygamous Marriages in Immigration
Congress refused to allow immigration benefits to flow from polygamous
marriages though such marriages were sanctioned in other countries where the

219. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946) (equating polygamy
with barbarism); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890) (to the same effect).
220. UTAH CONST. art. III.
221. Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1891) (finding that the Utah territorial
law allowing child of polygamous marriage to inherit should be followed). In 1890,
the Court held that despite a polygamous marriage, the marital privilege banned a wife
from testifying against her husband in a state polygamy prosecution.
222. Congress has the power to adopt uniform laws on naturalization. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012)
(noting federal government’s broad power over immigration).
223. Claire A. Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in
U.S. Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 382, 382-83 (2009); see, e.g., Kerry
Abrams, Immigration and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007).
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marriages took place.224 The immigration ban differs from the Utah situation
because it lacks the context of an immediate threat to federal authority or antiMormon animus. But there was a different kind of animus present. Polygamy
was often cited as one reason to bar the Chinese as a class from immigrating to
the U.S., whether or not they individually practiced it.225
Still, the ban on polygamy was not a new ban. Bigamy had long been
banned under the common law and repudiated in the states.226 In recognizing
the marriages of ex slaves, Congress and the states insisted that if they had
multiple spouses either due to separation by sales or otherwise, they had to
choose which spouse they desired.227 Arguably, in the polygamy cases
involving immigrants, the moral objection to polygamy was often an excuse
for racism, but racism was not the sole reason for the objection to polygamy.
ii. Rejecting “Fraudulent” Marriages in Immigration
The federal government has refused to acknowledge marriages entered into
solely for the purpose of gaining access to the United States.228 On the other
hand, in a variety of contexts, some states have refused to annul “sham
marriages,” on the theory that to ignore the marriage vows that individuals
enter would do violence to the essence of what it means to be “married.”229
224. Smearman, supra note 223, at 382-83.
225. An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, 22 U.S. Stat

58 (May 6, 1882) (limiting the number of Chinese citizens coming into the country).
The Act stated that the “the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the
good order of certain localities.” The order authorized the suspension of Chinese
immigration for ten years. See also Ertman, supra note 137, at 306; Ming-sung Kuo,
The Duality of Federalist Nation-Building: Two Strains of Chinese Immigration Cases
Revisited, 67 ALB. L. REV. 27, 28 (2003); Smearman, supra note 223, at 391-95.
226. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *56.
227. See supra note 136-37 and accompanying text.
228. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1184, 1186a (1994)); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 99-906, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.
Marriage fraud has been prosecuted, inter alia, under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (prohibiting
marriage fraud) and 18 U.S.C. §1546(a) (outlawing fraud and misuse of visas and other
permanent documents). An “individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the
purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws” faces a penalty of five years
imprisonment and/or a $250,000 fine. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2006).
229. Hanson v. Hanson, 191 N.E. 673, 674 (Mass. 1934); see also Schibi v. Schibi,
69 A.2d 831, 834 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married only to give
a name to a prospective child); De Vries v. De Vries, 195 Ill. App. 4 (Ill. App. Ct.
1915) (denying annulment where parties entered into marriage to prevent nullification
of husband’s employment contract); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998, 998 (Sup.
Ct. 1970); Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944) (holding
similarly to Schibi); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942)
(denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to protect the girl’s name and there
was an understanding that the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v.
Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159, 164 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1942); Campbell v. Moore, 1 S.E.2d
784, 790 (S.C. 1939) (refusing an annulment where parties entered marriage for the
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Congress’ power to prosecute marriages undertaken solely to gain
immigration benefits was recognized in Lutwak v. United States. Congress had
passed the War Brides Act in 1945 in order to allow service members who had
married alien brides to bring their spouses to the U.S. with them.230 Several
persons were prosecuted for entering into marriages solely to obtain, or helping
others to obtain, the benefit of immigration. At the time of the decision there
was no specific federal statute barring marriage fraud. All plaintiffs had
satisfied the technical requirements of the state laws for marriage. Still, the
federal government balked at providing immigration benefits based upon these
marriages. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that to hold otherwise would
undercut the statutory purposes behind the War Brides Act:
Congress intended to make it possible for veterans who had married
aliens to have their families join them in this country without the long
delay involved in qualifying under the proper immigration quota.
Congress did not intend to provide aliens with an easy means of
circumventing the quota system by fake marriages in which neither of
the parties ever intended to enter into the marital relationship[.]231
The Lutwak Court asserted that in making its determination, Congress could
rely upon a “common understanding” of the term “marriage.”232 For the Court,
under federal law, this meant “the two parties have undertaken to establish a
life together and assume certain duties and obligations.”233
The Supreme Court rejected the view that it or Congress was infringing
upon state authority. The Court expressly acknowledged “the general
American rule of conflict of laws that a marriage valid where celebrated is
valid everywhere unless it is incestuous, polygamous, or otherwise declared
void by statute.”234 However, it declared that denying immigration benefits did
not in fact involve the validity of a marriage, but rather involved vindication of
the laws of the United States.
We do not believe that the validity of the marriages is material. No
one is being prosecuted for an offense against the marital relation.
We consider the marriage ceremonies only as a part of the conspiracy
to defraud the United States and to commit offenses against the

purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander, No. 2937-98-4, 1999 WL
1129721, at * 2 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married
husband to get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because husband
knew that was the purpose of the marriage). See generally Kerry Abrams, Marriage
Fraud, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (2012) (discussing when misrepresentations between
parties would lead to annulment).
230. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1953).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. Under current regulations, parties may prove a valid marriage under federal
law by providing proof of integrated finances, shared domicile, intimacy and publicly
holding oneself out to others as married. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5) (2009).
234. Id.
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United States. In the circumstances of this case, the ceremonies were
only a step in the fraudulent scheme and actions taken by the parties
to the conspiracy.235
The Lutwak case is consistent with the conflict of laws notion that a forum
has greater flexibility when the question is affording the “incidents” of a
marriage. However, the practical effect of Congress’ decision not to recognize
a marriage in immigration is to completely bar the marriage from recognition
within the United States. The Court did not cite plenary power as the basis for
its rejection of the marriage. Instead, it relied upon the need to vindicate the
policies of a federal statute.
It is worth noting, however, that these cases likely pose very few problems
by way of federalism concerns. While states might refuse to annul such
marriages based on local policy,236 they are not likely unhappy when the
federal government determines that those who did not take the vows of
marriage seriously should not be allowed into the country as “married”
persons.
C. Deviating From the Incidents of Local Marriage Policy, Though Still
Recognizing the Marriage as Valid Overall
In the overwhelming number of cases, Congress’ deviation from local
marriage law is not complete. That is, Congress recognizes the marriage, but
overlooks some incidents of state law with respect to the marriage. I would
argue that these examples are but differences in degree from broader
deviations, tailored to meet the perceived federal interest at stake.
1. The Oregon Donation Law’s Provision for Separate Property Rights for
Married Women in Oregon Territory
A historical example of this narrower approach is found in Oregon Donation
law.237 Congress and the states regularly used a system of free or very cheap
land grants to encourage white settlers to move beyond the original colonies
and ultimately from sea to shining sea. It was common to limit those who

235. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 611; see also United States v. Yum, 776 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.
1985); Johl v. United States, 370 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1966); Chin Bick Wah v. United
States, 245 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1957). But see United States v. Lozano, 511 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963). Cf. United States v.
Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972). Nor does it matter that the subversion of federal
purposes was unintentional in DOMA cases. Cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)
For income tax purposes, the government would not recognize the couple’s contract to
recharacterize community property as joint property even though it was not done many
years prior because the husband was ill and in the event of death, the couple wanted
property to pass outside of probate.
236. See discussion supra p. 751; supra note 229.
237. Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (Oregon land); see infra
note 344.
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could take such grants to white males.238 Typically, the grants also provided
that if the applicant were married, he would receive an extra portion to support
his family. The “Oregon Donation Law” was unique because it provided that a
wife would receive that extra portion as her own separate legal share, subject,
of course, to her husband’s control.239 The reason for deviating from the
common law seems obvious. Congress wanted to attract female mates for the
men who would settle there (or encourage existing wives to take the trip), thus
encouraging procreation and populating the land with white settlers.240
In Maynard v. Hill,241 the Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether a husband could apply as a married man for a double portion, obtain a
divorce from the local legislature in his wife’s absence, remarry, and then
perfect title through a new bride, thus depriving the first wife of her share
under the statute. David Maynard did just that. Promising his wife he would
later send for their family, he left Ohio for California but ended up in Oregon
where he met a new love and high-powered friends. He used his influence to
obtain a decree of divorce from the territorial legislature and then married his
new girlfriend. His wife was not entitled to be served with notice because,
under the common law, a wife’s domicile was wherever her husband’s was,
but Lydia Maynard found out somehow and sued. The Court followed Oregon
Law to a point, accepting that David Maynard was “divorced” for purposes of
federal law. But that’s where the deference ended. Although he was also
“married” under local law, the Court declined to consider him “married”
within the meaning of the federal statute. For purposes of federal law, the
Maynard was treated as a single, divorced man. By the time of the Court’s
decision, Maynard and his first wife had died. His new wife secured his
portion; his children by his first wife, then adults, got nothing. The short shrift
given to Maynard’s first wife and her descendants establishes that the goal of
the Oregon Donation statute’s spousal provisions was increasing the
population of Oregon through white families, not recognizing women’s rights
or protecting all children.242

238. Regardless of parentage, those considered black were expressly excluded from
the Oregon land grants discussed herein, as were American Indians unless they had
white fathers. Oregon passed its own married women’s property act in 1866. See
BLUE
BOOK,
Oregon
History:
Minorities,
OR.
http://bluebook.state.or.us/cultural/history/history18.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
See also note 344.
239. Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496.
240. Id.
241. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
242. See Fields v. Squires, 9 F. Cas. 29, 33 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 4,776) (“The
evident policy of the law was to give to husband and wife an equal quantity of
land . . . . The settlement of a married man is intended for the benefit of his wife as
well as himself—to enable her to obtain her equal share of the bounty of the grantor.”).
For an article considering the logic of this provision, see Steven H. Hobbs, Love on the
Oregon Trail: What the Story of Maynard v. Hill Teaches Us About Marriage and
Democratic Self-Governance, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 117 (2003) (providing more of
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2. Adoption of a Unique Marital Property Characterization for Fair Income
Tax Treatment of Community Property and Separate Property States
Another example of deviation as to incidents appears in Congress’ efforts to
settle differences in income tax treatment between citizens in community
property states compared with those in separate property states.243 Before
1947, taxpayer couples in community property states with only one spouse
working outside of the home had a financial advantage over married couples in
separate property states. Couples in the community property states were able
to split the income between the paycheck and stay-at-home spouses in filing
their taxes. Consequently, under a progressive tax system, the community
property state couple ended up in a lower tax bracket than a similarly situated
couple in a separate property state. The latter was forced to attribute all
income to only the spouse who received a paycheck. This result occurred
because federal law followed state law on the definition of marital property.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Poe v. Seaborn that community property
couples could seize their advantage in the absence of contrary federal law.244
This issue was more complex than merely “good” community property
states that respected women versus “bad” separate property states that didn’t.
Despite celebrating the “fairness” and wisdom of their system to women,245
most community property states had divested the wife of a key aspect of
ownership by placing control of the community property with the husband.
And while claiming that the community property system was a sham to avoid
taxes, men in separate property states were using the Married Women’s
Property Acts to shift property to their spouses, thus claiming lower taxes on
the theory that the property or income earned from that property was not and
never was theirs.246 Whatever rule Congress came up with, states were

the backstory for Maynard v. Hill and surmising that population growth was the intent
of the statute).
243. Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 786 (grant of petition for writ of
certiorari) (In creating the marital deduction, Congress assumed a couple made up of a
man and a woman.); Brief On The Merits Of Amici Curiae United States Senators
Orrin G. Hatch, et al, at 14-15.
244. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930).
245. See Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm.
of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 37 (1934) (statement of Sen. Henry
F. Ashurst) (praising his state of Arizona’s system as “chivalry” and “gentlemanly”).
246. See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110 (dismissing the idea
that control undercut community property rule); Community Property Income:
Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd
Cong. 61, 64 (1934) (statement of Helen Carloss, Department of Justice); Community
Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 73rd Cong., 184-92 (1934) (statement of Sen. Tom Connally); see
also Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 38-40 (1934) (statement of Benjamin H.
Bartholow, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter Bartholow
Statement] (noting that in some states, a husband could alienate property without the
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adjusting their laws to try to ensure that their citizens received at least as much
advantage as citizens in other states.247
Around 1934, Rep. Allen Treadway of Massachusetts, a separate property
state, proposed a bill to attribute the income to the spouse who controlled it
under state law. The 1934 congressional hearings on the subject turned into a
debate about the federal government’s power to affect marriage laws.248 The
Chief of Staff to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation noted that
among lawyers everywhere there was a “great deal of controversy” over the
question of whether the federal government could ignore state definitions and
tax community property income.249
The concern that federal officials expressed was the need for uniform
treatment among similarly situated groups. General Counsel for the IRS, E.
Barrett Prettyman, wrote a letter underscoring the role that marriage laws
played in this outcome. Looking to who controlled the property was fair, he
said, because the local laws “make it possible for the taxpayer to surrender title
to another and to keep dominion for himself, or if not technical dominion, at
least the substance of enjoyment.”250 Of course, Prettyman’s view depended
upon a rejection of the “marital partnership” theory of the community property
system. Treasury’s Bartholow stated, “[a]s time went on, it was felt that the
right of husband and wife in these community-property states to divide, the
income which, in the usual case, is earned by the husband as the breadwinner,
ran counter to the principle of imposing graduated rates on large incomes.”251
Eventually, Congress decided that it was impractical to force what was in
effect a common law rule upon community property states, but it did not adopt
a partnership theory of marriage nor did it continue to allow each state to go its
own way. Instead, to accomplish the goal of uniform treatment, Congress
adopted language that allowed any couple the option of income splitting,
essentially affording to all the choice of treating property as community
property for income taxation purposes.252 This new rule deviated from the past
practice of looking to state law.
There are numerous other examples of partial deviation involving marital

wife’s consent although he had to use the income for her benefit).
247. See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahan, To Save State Residents: States’
Use of Community Property for Federal Tax Reduction, 1939-1947, 27 LAW & HIST.
REV. 585 (2009).
248. See generally Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. (1934).
249. Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 10-11 (1934) (statement of Lovell H.
Parker, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation).
250. Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 24 (1934) (letter from E. Barrett
Prettyman, General Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue).
251. Bartholow Statement, supra note 246, at 31.
252. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 303, 62 Stat. 110, 111-14 (1948).
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property rules. In 1979, in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court held
that benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 were not subject to
community property rules.253 In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, the Court determined
that Congress had preempted state community property rules to define
retirement rights under ERISA.254
D. The Unique Case of American Indian Tribal Marriages
The final case of federal intervention into local marriage laws that this
article considers is the federal handling of American Indian tribal marriages.
The relationship between the Indians and the federal government was and is far
different than the relationship between the federal government and its states or
territories. First, Indians were not parties to the Constitutional compact;
instead they were objects of it for the Constitution gave Congress plenary
power over matters concerning Indian tribes.255 Second, in earlier history,
tribal members were not deemed American citizens.256 Third, Indian
sovereignty, though asserted, was not consistently respected. As early as 1830
the Supreme Court rejected the Indians’ claims that they should be treated like
“foreign nations” vis a vis the states. 257 Instead, the Court said they were “in a
state of pupilage,” and “their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian.”258 And, while Congress’ oversight of U.S. territories
often involved fitting these territories to become states, Congress’ early
intentions were far less clear with respect to how the American Indian peoples’
would fit into the populace. Congress eventually allowed individual
citizenship but only after the Indians had been forced to cede a great deal of
their lands and culture.259
253. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979).
254. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151-52 (2001); see also Boggs v. Boggs,

520 U.S. 833, 853 (1997) (stating that preemption of state law is required to avoid
diversion of retirement benefits).
255. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (the “Commerce
Clause”).
256. Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253, Pub. L. No. 175 codified as amended as 8
USC § 1401(b) (1982) (authorizing Indians to become citizens). Some Indians became
citizens pursuant to other laws. For example, the Act of 1890, which applied Arkansas
to Indian Territory, allowed tribal members to apply to become American citizens but
retain their Indian citizenship. See Act of May 9, 1890, (Oklahoma Organic Act), ch.
182, §§ 1, 29, 26 Stat. 81, 93 (1890).
257. E.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,17-18 (1831). Indians could not
sue in federal court under diversity statute because they were neither citizens of the
United States nor foreign states despite their claims of the latter.
258. Id. For a thorough discussion of federal treatment of their status see Judith
Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 671 (1989).
259. The government made numerous attempts to force assimilation of the Indian
tribes into American western culture. These efforts, which were primarily a response
to desires of white settlers for more lands then occupied by Indians, tended to have
disastrous consequences. See e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 706-09 (1987)
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Still, despite the fact that the Indians were not treated as full sovereigns,
courts did see the Indians as distinct political communities entitled to local
governance under traditional conflict of law rules.260 Congress generally
treated tribal marriage as a local issue, unless a federal interest compelled a
contrary result.261
States also sometimes had occasion to interpret tribal marriage issues. They
too applied conflict of law principles to their decisions.262 Polygamy was one
notable exception.263 However, sometimes even in polygamous marriages,

(discussing disastrous federal policies intended to force American Indians to adopt
farming and private land ownership approaches of whites in order to speed assimilation
and to free land for white use). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
officials also encouraged Indians to send their children away from reservations and to
educate them in government sponsored boarding schools that stressed white and
Eurocentric culture. See The Broken Crucible of Assimilation: Forest Grove Indian
School and the Origins of Off-Reservation Boarding-School Education in the West, 101
OREGON HIST. QUARTERLY, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), pp. 466-507. It is clear,
however, that early on Indians valued their sovereignty and did not want either
citizenship or assimilation. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18.
260. Worscester v. Georgia, 31 U.S 515 (1832) (entitling Indians to local
governance authority as in Law of Nations); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18.
261. A 1909 Governmental report explained federal approaches tried to summarize
federal approaches to Indian marriage law between 1867-1906. It describes the
approach as treating Indian statutes like the marriage statutes of states, if that custom
could be proved by congressional standards and was not in conflict with federal law or
policy. If local custom could not be proved to satisfaction, then the court followed the
common law. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Special
Report, Marriage and Divorce 1867-1906, Summary Laws, Foreign Statistics (1909).
262. E.g., Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 1845 (1845) (showing that customary
marriage contracted among tribe in own territory should have been considered valid
under Alabama law); Weatherford v. Weatherford, 20 Ala. 548 (1852) (declining to
recognize marriage where no proof conducted according to custom); Compo v. Jackson
Iron Co., 50 Mich. 578 (1883) (stating at the time in question in lawsuit, Indian tribes
were sovereigns and absent US law to the contrary, “they have as complete power to
determine their own domestic relations as any other organized community would
have”); Buck v. Branson, 34 Okla. 807 (1912) (recognizing a long tradition of states
abiding by Indian marriage laws both between the Indians and in cases of
intermarriage); McBean v. McBean, 37 Ore. 195 (1900) (declaring that a marriage
valid in the place contracted is valid everywhere). There was also the view that the
matter was a federal, not state matter; e.g., Boyer v. Diveley, 58 Mo. 510 (1875)
(noting that an Indian marriage and inheritance subject to federal not state jurisdiction).
263. Regarding public policy see Boyer v. Diveley, 58 Mo. 510 (1875) (referencing
marriages as between “opposite sex” although that issue not specifically raised).
Despite the rule of local deference, “when an alleged marriage does not contain the
essential elements of a marriage as known to our laws, it ought not to be enforced as it
is “no marriage.” Wall, 8 Ala. at 48 (excepting incestuous or polygamous marriages
despite the rule of comity); Tower v. Towie, 368 P.2d 488 (Okla. 1961) (recognizing
marriage according to Cherokee custom, and noting strong policy in favor of
presuming legitimacy from the cohabitation); Henson v. Johnson, 246 P. 868 (Okla.
1926) (recognizing Arkansas law applicable by Act of Congress and that the same
would look to Indian law but refusing to recognize polygamous marriage as contrary to
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courts would find a way to accept the marriage if the context involved the
inheritance of or legitimacy of an Indian child.264
The federal treatment of Indian marriage (and even the Indians’ own
treatment of intermarriage with whites) also became intricately tied up with
white settlers’ quest for land and Indian attempts to preserve their unique
culture. Marriage to an Indian woman often conferred tribal membership and
property rights upon a white husband.265 To prevent the hemorrhaging of land
and culture and to discourage temporary marriages to Indian women merely for
the sake of obtaining land, the Indians themselves began to seek limits on
marriages between white men and Indian women. Some of these restrictions
came in the form of limitations on tribal rights flowing from female marriage
to one outside of the tribe.266 In 1897, the federal government reversed this
trend by declaring that Indian women who married “white” men would have
the same rights to property as any other member of the tribe.267 They did not
consistently offer the same rights to Indian women who married black men.268
In 1890, as part of the Oklahoma Organic Act, an act to establish a
temporary American government for what was to become the state of
Oklahoma, Congress specifically declared that all marriages then existing
pursuant to Indian custom were valid.269 It recognized as legitimate the
federal law and denying attendant inheritance rights); see also, James v. Adams, 155 P.
1121, 1122 (Okla 1915); Cyr v. Walker, 116 P. 931, 934 (Okla. 1911).
264. Earl v. Godley, 44 N.W. 254 (Minn. 1890) (focusing on Indians separate and
capable of managing own domestic relations and children are not illegitimate); Ortley
v. Ross, 110 N.W. 982 (Neb. 1907) (declaring that children of polygamous marriage
treated as legitimate); Kobogum v. The Jackson Iron Company, 43 N.W. 602 (Mich.
1889) (noting that absent federal law, Indian laws control their domestic relations).
265. Act of Aug. 9, 1888, 23 Stat. 392 and June 7, 1897, reprinted in 1 INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 38 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1902) (referencing tribal and
land rights gained through marriage).
266. See Compiled Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Article XV, §70 in 1 JOHN L.
ADAIR, COMPILED LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 246, 276 (1881) (noting the
importance of tribal cohesion and requiring a white man desiring to marry a Cherokee
bride to pay a fee, show evidence that he was not previously married, and be supported
by a group of other Cherokees); see also Act of Aug. 9, 1888, 23 Stat. 392 and June 7,
1897, reprinted in 1 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 38 (Charles J. Kappler ed.,
1902) (discussing a white man who married an American Indian woman outside of
“five civilized tribes” and who did not gain property rights of tribal members or rights
to her land; an American Indian woman who properly married a white man gained U.S.
citizenship and also the status of a married woman, but reserved her title in tribal
property).
267. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 90l; see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 4 (1942) (discussing the Act and effects upon children of mixed
marriages with whites or blacks).
268. COHEN at 4 (noting mixed precedents on effect of Indian woman marrying
black man).
269. Act of May 9, 1890, (Oklahoma Organic Act), ch. 182, §§ 1, 29, 26 Stat. 81, 93
(1890); see also Sperry Oil & Gas v. Chisolm, 264 U.S. 488 (1924) (discussing the
Oklahoma Organic Act which made Oklahoma territory); Bartlett v. Okla. Oil Co., 218
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children of prior marriages, however constituted, thus securing inheritance and
other rights for them under U.S. law. But at the same time, Congress, for the
future, adopted the state substantive law of Arkansas as the law for “Indian
Territory, insofar as those laws did not conflict with Congressional intent.”
The Act exempted that portion of land actually occupied by the “Five Civilized
Tribes” and certain others of the Indians.270 The Indians retained power to
punish Indians for violations of Indian laws. The laws also required that U.S.
citizens desiring to marry an Indian woman had to attend to the customary
preliminaries of such marriages as prescribed by the relevant tribe.271 The Act
purported not to change Indian rights; however, some argued that it did alter
existing treaties but that the tribes had little power to prevent it.272 In the
Curtis Act of 1898, Congress determined that state law should govern Indians
with respect to all matters, including marriage.273 But sometimes, courts held
these statutes to not apply when the cases only involved Indians.274
In a modern era, the United States has given greater respect to the Indians’
right to determine their own domestic relations.275 That deference is now
F. 380 (1914).
270. Oklahoma Organic Act, supra, note 269. “Five Civilized Tribes” was the name
whites used for Indians who joined in early treaties with Americans. See Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 282 (2001) (Souter, J. Concurring) (noting the Treaty with the
Cherokees, (1835), U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478. Treaty with the Choctaws and
Chickasaws, Art. 7, 11 Stat. 612 (1855), and Treaty with the Creeks and Seminoles,
Art. 15, 11 Stat. 703 (1856)). Under these treaties the Indians often ceded land and
local governance rights for peace; see, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 9, 1835,
U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478.
271. Act of May 2, 1890, § 38, c. 182, 26 Stat. 81, 98; see, e.g, Johnson v. Slate, 60
Ark. 308 (1895). Prior to 1890, Indian law applied. For a general discussion of
treatment of Indian marriage laws see DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SPECIAL REPORT, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1867-1906,
SUMMARY LAWS, FOREIGN STATISTICS, 215-17 (1909) [hereinafter COMMERCE
MARRIAGE REPORT] (discussing application of Arkansas law to Indian territory); 1-4
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, §4.01 (Inherent Indian Sovereignty).
272. 21 CONG. REC. 3712, 3715 (1889) (statement by Mr. Butler) (arguing
Oklahoma Organic bill breaches treaty, referencing mild letter from Cherokee
delegation that asked for only two changes though it also noted surprise that offer is not
worse and saying that the Indians are in the position of “powerless and helpless” people
and “are simply constrained from force of circumstances to accept this as a choice of
evils”).
273. Act of June 28, 1898; see also Marlin v. Lawallen, 276 U.S. 58 (1928).
274. See COMMERCE MARRIAGE REPORT, supra note 271, at 215-17 (discussing
federal control of Indian Territory, acknowledgement of customs and application of
state law); see also Barnett v. Prarie Oil & Gas, 19 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1927) recognizing
applicability of Oklahoma law but applying “exclusive and mandatory” local ordinance
of Creek Indians as well to determine inheritance).
275. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (“Indian tribes retain
their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations
among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.”); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978) (“Although no longer possessed of the
full attributes of sovereignty, they remain a separate people, with the power of
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being tested for shortly before it issued the Windsor opinion, the Supreme
Court issued a narrow interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act.276
While Congress had plenary power over the Indians, when Congress
deviated the reason was not the plenary power itself. The reason was a
determination that respecting Indian local rule conflicted with a perceived
federal interest. Very often that federal interest was the desire for land and
expansion. Deference to local custom with respect to Indian customary
marriages was also made easier by the fact that there was no fear that
recognition of Indian local customs would lead to alteration of state or federal
marriage customs.
As with the history of other minority groups that have faced broad scale
racial or cultural discrimination, an analysis of marriage that focuses solely on
the narrow lens of “marriage rights,” sells American Indian history far short,
dismissing racial and cultural discrimination as unrelated to marriage. Actions
that weakened the community as a whole—such as forcibly removing Indians
from lands they occupied and or requiring that they adhere to majority cultural
norms including marriage norms—likely posed as much or even more
difficulties for the security of Indian marriages, families, and communities,
than rules determining whether or not a particular marriage was valid or not.277
Such actions magnify the impact of unfair marriage rules and restrict the
ability of a targeted minority community to resist, modify or adjust to them. It
also must not be forgotten that those we call in retrospect the “Indians” were in
fact many tribes with distinctive domestic relations traditions and cultures.

regulating their internal and social relations and laws restricting rights of children born
to female tribal member when the mothers marry outside the tribe are valid.”); US v.
Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that marriage is consistent with
Navajo customs and therefore marital privilege shields a wife from testifying in a child
abuse case against the husband even though exception might apply in non-Indian case).
But see Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Evolving Indigenous Law: Navajo MarriageCultural Traditions and Modern Challenges, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 283, 292
(2000) (criticizing the government approaches to cultural norms in particular
polygamy).
276. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 12-399 (U.S. June 25, 2013) (holding that the
Act did not apply to bar a white couple’s adoption of a part Cherokee child when the
Cherokee father had declined to support the child, had not exercised parental rights
before adoption, and had never had custody of the child). In this case, the baby’s
mother requested that the father waive his parental rights to avoid child support but did
not inform the father of plans to put the child up for adoption to any willing couple.
Only the child’s father is a member of the Cherokee Nation.
277. See, e.g., The Indian Removal Act of 1830, 4 Stat 411 (1830) (authorizing
removal of Indians from lands in the Southeastern United States into Western US
territories). See generally John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Values In Transition: The Chiricahua
Apache From 1886-1914, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 39, 46-82 (2010) (discussing the
Removal Act and other actions that drove Indians off of lands).
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IV. SUMMARIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO MARRIAGE
A. Deference to Local Rule as the General Approach
The federal government has historically looked to local laws to determine
the validity of a marriage (not merely to state laws). It has done so even when
acting pursuant to its enumerated Constitutional powers and even when its
power was plenary. Of course, deference in the case of states does involve
unique questions of federalism, but federalism is not the sole reason for
deference. It should be noted that deference also might have resulted from a
kind of “practical federalism,” that is a concession that given the circumstances
and despite federal authority, it is simply easier to follow state law. That law is
already well developed; those who it would affect are familiar with it; adopting
state law may encourage the states to buy what the federal government is
peddling that week; and often there is simply no conflict with federal interests
even if deference results in variation in application of local laws among the
several states. The same practicalities can restrict federal action even when
there is a need for it. Such was the case, I would argue, in the early
termination of the Freedman’s Bureau work and the failed promises of
Reconstruction.
When acting pursuant to its enumerated powers, the federal government has
deviated from local deference when deference would conflict with an
important federal policy. In some cases, it has rejected the validity of the
marriage completely for all purposes, such as Utah polygamy laws and
immigration law barring entry of immigrant “spouses” engaged in fraudulent
marriages. These two instances involved assertions of plenary power, although
the matter of power over the local actions of territories was then debated.
Congress has also accepted marriages completely for all purposes, contrary
to state law. The ex-slave marriages conducted under the oversight of the
Freedmen’s Bureau and U.S. military are examples.278 That case involved War
Powers and, at the appropriate times, the authority of amendments to the
Constitution with respect to the ex-slaves.
When federal interests so dictated, Congress has also granted a narrow set of
incidental rights to marriages even when the state deemed those marriages
invalid. The recognition of “slave custom” marriages solely for pension
purposes when rebel states would not recognize them is such a case. In that
situation, the federal interest was recruiting for the U.S. military in the context
of the Civil War.279
Finally, Congress has also adopted different incidents for marriage than state
or local law would normally suggest, while still recognizing the marriages’
validity. Such was the case with Oregon Donation law and the settlement of

278. See discussion supra pp. 751-53.
279. This construction does not negate the possibility that some Congressmen voted

for the policy because they wanted to end slavery.
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conflict over the income taxation of marital property.280
It appears that Congress has deviated only to the extent necessary to
vindicate the perceived federal interest. History thus advises caution in federal
determinations relating to marriage and family. It also suggests that the central
question that Courts should consider in reviewing federal deviations from state
law is whether a legitimate federal purpose is served by the deviation, a
question that presumes an appropriate federal power.
B. Three Historical Justifications for Deviation
I would argue that we can classify the justifications for deviation that
emerge from history into three categories. In some cases, more than one has
applied to a given case.
1. Fulfilling a Constitutional Duty
Deviation has occurred when the federal government claimed that following
local law would conflict with a perceived constitutional duty. Here we can
place both instances of recognizing slave marriages, to the extent that they
vindicated a “duty” to save the union or were an execution of the promises of
the Civil War amendments.281 We can also place here the attack on polygamy
in Utah, but only to the extent that it was triggered by Supremacy Clause
concerns or Congress’ constitutional obligations to prepare the territories for
statehood. A third example is the rejection of state marital property rules for
income taxation, to the extent that Congress felt the deviation fulfilled a
constitutional duty to treat the states uniformly as part of its charge to protect
the general welfare. It is doubtful that DOMA is needed to fulfill a
constitutional duty.
2. Preserving a Purpose or Scheme in Existing Statutes, Rules, or Treaties
The second justification of deviation is that following local law would
undercut an existing statutory purpose or scheme, federal rule, or treaty. Here
we can place the decision to reject “fraudulent marriages” for immigration
purposes in vindication of the immigration statute.282 Here one can place the
deviation from local marital property rules in taxation, on the theory that
following local law would undercut the predetermined progressive taxation
scheme or run counter to the implicit statutory assumption in then-existing
income tax laws that only those who received a paycheck earned the marital
income.283 Here, too, belongs the Supreme Court’s rejection of David
Maynard’s second marriage in Maynard v. Hill, on the ground that Congress
did not intend a husband to apply for land while married to one wife, divorce
and marry a second wife, and still claim, as a “married” man, a double portion
280.
281.
282.
283.

See supra p. 753 (Oregon); supra p. 754 (taxes).
See discussion supra pp. 721-37.
See discussion supra pp. 750-51.
See discussion supra pp. 754-57.
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of territorial land.284 Those who argue that DOMA supports procreation are
essentially arguing that DOMA was intended to preserve a purpose or scheme
in existing statutes, rules, or treaties. As I will explain later, there is some
merit to the argument that procreation is linked to federal statutes affecting
marriage, although the broadest DOMA went beyond that which is required to
preserve that link.
3. Preserving a Federal Policy That is Neither Already Rooted in an Existing
Statute, Rule, or Treaty Nor Constitutionally Compelled
The third justification for deviation is that following local law would
jeopardize a federal policy that stands apart from any specific statute, rule, or
treaty and is not constitutionally compelled, but is argued to be authorized and
appropriate.285 This justification contains the potential for the most mischief
because the policies, by definition, have not been vetted by public processes, as
have Constitutional provisions or statutes. Specific historical examples in this
category include the attacks on polygamy, but only to the extent that they were
based upon an antipathy toward Mormonism or polygamy. We can place here
rejection of state community property characterizations, if based upon
conclusions that separate property regimes are better for society or even that
women, by gender, should not be afforded equal ownership in marital property.
In DOMA cases, Plaintiffs would claim that the federal policy is antihomosexual animus. Defendants would argue that DOMA was designed to
preserve the institution of traditional marriage. Claims that question the
appropriateness of same-sex parenting also belong here.
C. The Role of the “Majority of States,” Uniformity and of the Common Law
In times of interstate conflict that affected desired federal outcomes, the
federal government has tended to follow the approach of the majority of states
and/or the common law. At the start of the union, slaveholding states were in
the majority, but by the time that the federal government recognized slave
marriages during the Civil War,286 slaveholding states were in the minority.287
284. See discussion supra pp. 753-54.
285. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“[U]nless restricted by

some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil
government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social
life under its dominion.”).
286. See discussion supra p. 721-33.
287. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 230 (1860) (lamenting change in
union and noting slave states were seceding to “check” the “evil of overgrowth of the
free states.”). It is well known that until the decade prior to the Civil War, Congress
had taken pains through a number of compromises to keep the number of slave and free
states exactly equal as a measure to preserve the union. In 1852, slaveholding states
argued that the “general government” had abdicated its role as the “common agent.”
Confederate States of America – Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce
and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
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Courts have approved of the approach and have taken it themselves.288 Thus,
while the Supreme Court made history in Loving v. Virginia by striking down
such laws criminalizing the act of interracial marriage, by the time it did so, as
the Court specifically noted, “only” sixteen of the fifty states continued to have
such bans.289 At press time, thirteen states and the District of Columbia license
same-sex marriages.290

288. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (with reference to claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, finding that the fact that all fifty States and the District of Columbia
have recognized some form of psychotherapist privilege is relevant to the
appropriateness of federal embrace of that privilege); id. (policy decisions of the states
bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend
the coverage of an existing one); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 644 (1953)
(noting that Congress was entitled to rely upon the “common” definition of marriage in
rejecting fraudulent marriages intended to procure immigration benefits); Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (deciding whether to recognize a legislative divorce for
federal purposes, by looking at the common law and the approaches of several common
law states); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-65 (affirming Congressional rejection of
polygamy and noting that English common law and the laws of the several states found
polygamy “odious”). But see Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1, 30-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the notion of looking to the majority of states when the psychotherapistprivilege had no common law origins). In early DOMA cases, when it was defending
the statute rather than attacking it, the Justice Department made the argument that
DOMA followed the majority of states and was a fair and was a constitutionally
defensible approach until a national consensus developed. See Gill v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389-90 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
See also, supra p. 105, note 8 (Justice Department abandonment of defense of DOMA.)
289. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (noting by contrast that in
1955, a majority of states had such restrictions); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 753
(Va. 1955) (noting [m]ore than half of the States of the Union have miscegenation
statutes” and that “[w]ith only one exception they have been upheld in an unbroken line
of decisions in every State in which it has been charged that they violate the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
290. At press time, the licensing jurisdictions are California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington state, and the District of Columbia. See D.C.
CODE § 46-401 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit.19-A §§ 650-A, 650-B (2013), available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19-Ach23.pdf; MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. L. § 2-201 (West Supp. 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2010);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West
2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 415 (Conn. 2008); Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). The California story is complex and may not be over.
California recognized them for a time but then amended its Constitution by voter’s
referendum to define marriage as between one man and one woman with respect to
future couples. A California state court upheld the referendum as valid under the
state’s constitution. See Srauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (2009) (rejecting the
challenge solely under California constitution). Plaintiffs then filed in federal court
challenging the referendum change under the federal constitution. In the district court,
California’s governor and Attorney General at first defended the Constitutional change,
but later they reversed course and argued against it. Others intervened to defend the
referendum change. The district court held the change unconstitutional. The Ninth
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This approach of looking to the majority and to the common law seems
consistent with the founders’ vision of federal power. Alexander Hamilton
suggested a federal government was needed in times of conflict among the
states, to be an “umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending
parties.”291 Madison defended constitutional emphasis on federal sovereignty
by noting that states act as “partisans of their respective States, than of
impartial guardians of a common interest . . . .”292 This constitutional
obligation to “umpire” for the whole seems to be found in the obligation of
Congress to “provide for the general welfare” and the “common defense” of
the United States,293 and in specific obligations to create uniform laws.294 It
seems inherent in the obligation to “regulate commerce . . . among the several
states.”295 It is indicated in the very nature of a national or “general”
government in a federalist system.
At the same time, the powers reserved to the states in the Tenth
Amendment are local powers; it clearly is not the case that a given state’s
authority to decide what marriage is within its boundaries must be subject to a
majority vote of the other states. By its breadth, the “first” of the three
DOMAs places tension on these two types of powers over marriage, the power
of the federal government to decide policies incidentally affecting marriage for
the good of the country and the power of the states (and the people of a given
state) to determine what marriage means at the local level.
Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and the case was
argued on March 26, 2013, the same day Windsor was heard. On June 26, 2013, the
same day that Windsor was decided, the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction
to address the California question given that key authorities with responsibility to
defend the state’s Constution had refused to do so. Hollingsworth v. Perry, slip op. No.
12-144 (June 26, 2013).
See also 19-A § 650-A B (2013) available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19-Ach23.pdf; 19-A MAINE
REV. STAT., DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 19-A §650-A & B (2013); available at
mainelegislature.orghttp://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19Ach23.pdf; MD. D FAM. L. § 2-201 (2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney
2011); N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:1-a (2010); D.C. § 46-401 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 8 (2009). See also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 415 (Conn. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn.
2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). At
press time, Delaware, Rhode Island and Minnesota had recently approved of same-sex
marriages. Katharine Seelye, Rhode Island Joins States That Allow Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2013, at 15; Delaware, Continuing a Trend, Becomes Eleventh
State to Allow Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2013, at 14; Minnesota Clears
Way for Same-sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at 12.
291. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
292. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).
293. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also id. pmbl.
294. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“To establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States.”).
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
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V. DOMA’S PURPOSE AND AUTHORITY: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
UNDERLYING STATUTES
Despite the fact that same-sex marriage plaintiffs, including Windsor,
challenged DOMA on an “as applied” basis, courts have not considered the
underlying statutes at issue in each DOMA case.296 The notion that the
underlying statutes might be relevant to DOMA’s analysis was first referenced
at oral argument in Windsor—after this writer circulated an earlier draft of this
article to counsel for the parties and certain amici.297 There are in fact three
DOMAs. One DOMA bundles all marriage statutes together making them
impervious to same-sex couples. Another DOMA collapses into the
underlying statutes that it defines and thus must be judged in the context of
each statute. And a third DOMA is merely an exercise of Congress’ undisputed
right to issue definitions for its own statutes and, I would argue, affirm the
status quo. Under this DOMA, that status quo is the constitutional concern. I
address the validity of these three DOMAs in Part VII. In this Part, I look
more closely at the second incarnation of DOMA—the one that collapses into

296. E.g., Edith Schlaine Windsor, Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief, ¶1
(“Declare DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7, unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, Edith
Schlain Windsor.”); ¶85, p. 21 (supporting that DOMA “as applied by the IRS”
requires disparity of treatment of plaintiff and singles out her valid marriage); Gill
Complaint, ¶10, p. 5 (“It seeks a determination that DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7, as applied to
plaintiffs, violates the United States Constitution.”); Golinsky v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975-76, 980, 1002-03 (discussing “as applied to plaintiff”
circumstances and involving spousal health coverage).
297. The discussion is in the following colloquy:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But what gives the Federal Government the right to be
concerned at all at what the definition of marriage is?
MR. CLEMENT: Well, at least two—two responses to that, Justice Sotomayor. First is
that one interest that supports the Federal Government’s definition of this term is
whatever Federal interest justifies the underlying statute in which it appears. So, in
every one of these statutes that affected, by assumption, there’s some Article I Section
8 authority.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So they can create a class they don’t like—here,
homosexuals—or a class that they consider is suspect in the marriage category, and
they can create that class and decide benefits on that basis when they themselves have
no interest in the actual institution of marriage as married. The states control that.
MR. CLEMENT:—the Federal Government has sort of two sets of authorities that give
it sort of a legitimate interest to wade into this debate. Now, one is whatever authority
gives rise to the underlying statute.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 67-69, Windsor v. United States (No. 12-307) (U.S.
filed
March
27,
2012)
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=
12-307. See also supra note 10. In Massachusetts v. HHS, the state of Massachusetts
has made a general Spending Clause argument that DOMA is not germane to the
spending programs to which it applied.
Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee
Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 56-59, Mass, 682 F.3d at 1 (explaining that
DOMA is not germane to spending and Congress has made no attempt to investigate
application to each federal statute).
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its underlying statutes—to explain how the underlying statutes provide
DOMA’s authority if any and state its purposes, if any. In particular, I show
that some, though not all of these underlying statutes do indeed provide
evidence that procreation support is a key part of federal marriage policy.
A. DOMA’s Underlying Statutes as Evidence of Authority
One interpretation of DOMA is that it draws its authority, if any, from every
statute to which it applies. One must then ask whether or not DOMA was
within the authority supporting the original legislation and its purpose. That
question brings us back to the question of the purposes of DOMA’s underlying
statutes. Assuming those purposes to be valid, as we must, DOMA must be
tied to those purposes.298
B. DOMA’s Underlying Statutes as Evidence of Marital Procreation Support
Through Economic Policy
The argument that DOMA supports procreation has been variously stated:
that the federal government has an interest in children being raised by their
biological parents, that it wants to discourage out-of-wedlock pregnancies, that
the government has an interest in ensuring that children are raised by their
biological parents etc.299 Plaintiffs and supporting amici in same-sex marriage
cases have challenged the notion that procreation has any relationship to
federal statutes relating to marriage.300 As noted, the Obama Administration
has abandoned the argument that DOMA advances a federal interest in
encouraging responsible procreation.301 Courts have also rejected the theory
298. It may also be necessary to go further, however. For example, as to statutes
passed pursuant under an enumerated power plus the necessary and proper clause, a
challenge might be that DOMA was not a necessary and proper part of the statute.
Compare Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 Sup. Ct. 2566, 2591-2601 (2012)
(while noting the permissive nature of necessary and proper clause in rejecting the
argument that individual mandate is an integral part of a comprehensive scheme of
economic legislation that is the Affordable Care Act, but concluding individual
mandate can be defended as a tax). That inquiry brings us back to ascertaining
DOMA’s purpose and the purposes of federal statutes affecting marriage.
299. BLAG Windsor Merits Brief at 43-49.
300. See Brief of Amici Curiae Family and Child Welfare Law Professors
Addressing the Merits in Support of Respondents, 4-7 (asserting procreation not an
essential part of marriage); id. at 8-11 (maintaining that the right to marry and the right
to procreate are distinct); id. at 11- 16 (arguing that marriage serves other purposes, the
majority of which are not related to procreation, and the majority of which foster a
relationship between the couple); id. 16-25 (contending government does not favor
biological over other parenthood); id. at 25-29 (stating that the government favors all
families).
301. See supra pp. 709-10, notes 8 & 9 (abandoning the of defense of DOMA); see
also Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that
the government, for this litigation, has disavowed the House Report’s stated
justifications for DOMA including (1) encouraging responsible procreation and childbearing, (2) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage,
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sometimes reducing the argument to a claim that same-sex couples are not
acceptable parents.302 The Second Circuit conceded that procreation support
could, properly framed, be an acceptable reason for the government’s support
of traditional marriage but concluded that the parties had not shown that
DOMA advances it.303
In this section, I want to couch the procreation argument a bit differently. I
will argue that the statutes evidence an understanding that the heterosexual
couple is unique because of the biological imbalance between them and
because of a history of gender discrimination through marriage. Challenges to
DOMA have largely been treated as facial challenges. No one has put before
the courts evidence that procreation is a theme present in the design of
DOMA’s underlying statutes. I contend that if one looks at the underlying
statutes, for which DOMA supplies the definition, one does indeed see
persistent themes regarding procreation. On the other hand, these themes are
not prevalent in all of the statutes that DOMA affects. To illustrate the
procreation point, I discuss a few examples here: ERISA, Social Security
spousal provisions, marital income taxation, and the marital deduction at issue

(3) defending traditional notions of morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources); see
also The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on H. 3396 Before the House of Rep.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1996 WL 256695 (May 15, 1996) (offering justifications).
302. See Mass., 682 F.3d at 15 (noting controversy over whether same-sex couples
would make best parents, stating “DOMA cannot preclude same-sex couples in
Massachusetts from adopting children or prevent a woman partner from giving birth to
a child to be raised by both partners” and minimizing broader potential procreation
concerns); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 183, 185 (2d. Cir. 2012) (noting
that defenders of DOMA virtually conceded that the responsible procreation argument
“may not withstand intermediate scrutiny” but urge that “same-sex couples have a
diminished ability to discharge family roles in procreation and the raising of children”
and dismissing the notion that argument is broader).
Although all sides’ arguments underwent evolution, the BLAG defendants provided the
following justifications: (1) that DOMA was a placeholder and that Congress Acted
Cautiously in Facing the Unknown Consequences of a Novel redefinition of a
foundational social institution; (2) that Congress was protecting the public fisc and
preserving the balances struck by earlier Congresses; (3) that Congress was seeking to
maintain uniformity in eligibility for federal marital benefits; (4) that DOMA furthers
the government’s interest in encouraging responsible procreation; (5) that Congress
rationally desired to preserve the social link between marriage and children; (6) that
Congress rationally desired to encourage childrearing by parents of both sexes. See
Brief For Intervenor-Appellant The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United
States House of Representatives at 39-58, Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 102204/102207/10-2214). In Windsor, BLAG
added that Congress can rationally retain the definition of marriage for the same
reasons the states can. See Brief on the Merits for Respondent The Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the United States of Representatives at 25-49, Windsor v. United
States, 133 U.S. at 786, available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/windsorv-united-states/windsor-blag-brief-1-22-13.pdf.
303. E.g., Windsor, 699 F.3d at 188 (noting the “promotion of procreation can be an
important governmental objective”).
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in Windsor. These examples show that both procreation and historical gender
discrimination play significant roles in our federal statutes relating to marriage.
1. ERISA
Initially, ERISA had no spousal provisions and considered only a model of
employment uninterrupted by births and childcare. It took ten years of
lobbying for supporters of women to have the statute amended through the
Retirement Equity Act (“REA”). The REA added provisions that considered
women’s work, pregnancy and caretaking patterns, and the need for spousal
protections.304 The legislative history of those provisions is full of discussions
of (1) the effect of procreation and caretaking on women’s ability to qualify for
retirement benefits; (2) the imbalance between men and women (in
heterosexual relationships) that allow a husband to continue working and
obtain promotions, throughout his wife’s pregnancy and childcare while the
wife must defer some part of the same; and (3) a husband’s resulting ability to
control retirement assets, to the wife’s detriment. That legislative history
offers little doubt that the procreation concerns (and in particular, the
procreative imbalance existing in the heterosexual couple) played a significant
role in the design of the REA.305 The concern was not unwed pregnancies but
rather, if marriage was to be a primary means of procreation, the unique
imbalance in the heterosexual couple had to finally be addressed in a modern
time.
While ERISA gave women more protections, scholars have criticized the
ERISA structure as promoting sexism because the statute gave spouses only a
beneficiary right and rejected the notion of equal partnership with respect to
the earnings, even when state law did. As a result, before retirement or death
arrives, the wage earner (disproportionately the husband) has the right to

304. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 26 U.S.C. § 402, 98 Stat.

1448.
305. Retirement Equity Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 19 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong. 6 (1983); S. REP.
NO. 98-575 (1984). See 129 CONG. REC. 28,458-59 (1983) (statement of Sen. Robert
Dole) (observing that while men can do childcare, women bear a disproportionate
burden; a woman devoting time to childcare may find herself unable to access
husband’s retirement plan); 129 CONG. REC. 17,039 (1983) (statement of Sen. Peter
Domenici) (noticing that childbirth and childcare hinder women’s retirement access,
creating inequities); 129 CONG. REC. 30,369-70 (1983) (statement of Rep. Marge
Roukema) (“The jobs of childrearing and homemaking are now recognized as being of
equal importance to those jobs which require a woman to leave the home.” However
women are disproportionately at risk of old age poverty.); 129 CONG. REC. 34,359
(1983) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd); see also 129 CONG. REC. 28,465 (1983)
(statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan) (stating that existing pension, tax, and
retirement laws do not accommodate the special needs of women and homemakers);
129 CONG. REC. 28,467-68 (1983) (statement of Sen. Lincoln Chafee) (“Women often
have shorter job tenure than men, and they are more likely to leave their jobs to raise
children or take on other traditional family responsibilities.”).
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control retirement assets completely.306
ERISA’s provisions signal how carefully Congress has to be if it wishes to
maintain a procreation-through-marriage policy. ERISA is not merely a
benefit; it also poses a significant burden upon the higher wage-earning
spouse, one that some couples have sought to avoid through waivers and
prenuptial agreements. Congress has to be careful that it does not create a
regime that allows easier and cheaper cherry-picking of benefits such that an
overall scheme designed to offset the costs of child bearers and child rearers
ends up in fact placing them lower on the economic totem pole and even risks
a loss of protections because persons who have no need for it are positioned to
lobby against it.
2. Social Security
As with ERISA, spousal benefits were not a part of the original legislation
we now know as Social Security. They were added in 1939 along with
benefits for spouses, spouses with minor children, dependent single children,
and dependent single parents of a wage earner.307 The reasons for these
amendments were set forth in a memorandum from the Director of the Bureau
of Old Age and Survivor’s Insurance to Regional Directors and Field Office
Personnel:
Against what are we trying to make our society secure? We are trying
to make it secure against at least two tangible, concrete things;
namely,
1. A large proportion of the members of that society becoming
dependent on society for its support—without resources of its own;
2. Loss of the purchasing power of this same large proportion of the
American people.308
306. E.g., Paula A. Monopoli, Marriage, Property and [In]Equality: Remedying
ERISA’s Disparate Impact on Spousal Wealth, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 61, 63 (2009),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2009/11/4/monopoli.html (describing ways that ERISA
discriminates against women as childbearers, childrearers, and caretakers). Some gay
marriage advocates have argued that denial of same-sex marriage is, or is tied to,
gender discrimination but they have largely focused only on how heterosexual marriage
generally promotes male hegemony and on gender stereotyping. E.g., Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 249 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 231; see also Nancy
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage
Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L.
REV. 1535, 1549 (1993).
307. Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 37, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1634-36
(stating spousal, widow, and children’s benefits).
308. John J. Corson, Bureau of Old Age and Survivor’s Insurance, Director’s
Bulletin No. 35, Reasons for the 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act,
available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/reports/1939no3.html (reflecting
that Corson’s views “are a significant expression of the viewpoint of the Social Security
Board on the ‘39 law and his remarks should be understood as reflecting the views of
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Who were the people who would not have resources of their own about
which the Director spoke? They were understood to be overwhelmingly
women and children. Under the original law, a man could accrue Social
Security benefits, then draw them and use them for his family. But if he died
prematurely, his wife and children, and dependent parents were left with
nothing. At the same time, in 1939, married women were discouraged from
working outside the home, pregnant women even more so. When women
worked outside the home, as many did, they were not entitled to the same pay
as men.309 This discrimination hurt not only women, but also men and families
that needed two earners for economic stability. The Act reflects both the fact
that women were in fact the nation’s child bearers and child rearers and the
national government’s stamp on discrimination to ensure that women’s careers
remained disproportionately centered around children compared to men and
their economic futures remained tied to marriage.
Although the statute is now interpreted to apply to both male and female
spouses, the basic design of Social Security is still the same that was adopted
in 1939. Biology also has not changed. The spousal benefits design still
assumes that one person in a marriage will not have worked enough in a
paying job to have earned Social Security in his or her own right and thus must
rely upon a spousal work record. A spouse must be married to her eligible
spouse for ten years before she becomes eligible for spousal benefits. A
widow receiving Social Security benefits upon her deceased husband’s record
(or vice versa) loses those benefits if she remarries before age 60.310 In Bowen
v. Owens, the Supreme Court, applying a rational basis test, held that such
refusals to grant benefits to divorced spouses when they remarry do not
constitute gender discrimination.311 Indeed it stated that, “Congress was using
marital status as a general guide to dependency on the wage earner.” And it
drew the same conclusion with respect to the discontinuance of benefits upon
remarriage stating that the remarriage rule was based on the assumption that
remarriage altered the status of dependency on the wage earner.312 Also
applying a rational basis test, the Court has held that it does not violate Equal
Protection or Due Process for Social Security to deny an unmarried mother
separate mother’s or parental benefits based on the work record of her minor
child’s undisputed deceased father.313 In so holding, it stated that the relevant

the top administrative officials of his day”).
309. Not until 1965 was the right of a married couple to use birth control assured.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480, 485-86 (1965) (finding that preventing
married couples from accessing birth control violates Fourteenth Amendment).
Griswold, a director of a Planned Parenthood clinic, was criminally prosecuted for
providing birth control advice as an accessory.
310. 42 U.S.C. §402(e)(1)(A); id. (g). 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(H),
(c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(H) (2006).
311. Bowen v. Owens, 106 S. Ct. 1881 (1986).
312. Id. (emphasis added).
313. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
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provision was “intended to permit women to elect not to work and to devote
themselves to care of children.”314
If her work record is insufficient in her own right, a spouse does not draw
exactly what her husband draws. Nor does she receive what she would have
made had she not taken the economic hit of childbearing or, for older women
still living today, suffered extensive gender discrimination. Her benefits are
limited to not more than half of what her husband draws based on his record.
If she is a widow with minor children, she receives the independent parental
benefit but only so long as she has children who are under the age of sixteen.
The remarriage provision and the child age limitation for widow’s benefits
both reflect a pattern found in the early Civil War military pension provisions
discussed in Part III(A)(1).315 Race also played a role historically in this
benefit because if her husband suffered job discrimination, a wife received less
or nothing.
It is true that, except for older women, Social Security cannot today be
justified as a remedy for the effects of past broad-scale discrimination that
threatened to put women on the streets when their husbands died and
threatened to deny a heterosexually headed family of modest means a decent
quality of life. But it can still be explained as tied to procreation by its other
leg: that Congress wishes to make it possible for one parent (today, male or
female) to stay at home and that childbearing and childcare may affect the
ability of the female in the heterosexual family to earn sufficiently in her own
right. The first of these theories argues strongly in favor of giving same-sex
couples with children the right to receive spousal benefits, assuming
parenthood is established. The second is not generally applicable to same-sex
couples, although those with children could potentially face a similar situation
by mutual choice.
They too could suffer disproportionate childcare
responsibilities within the couple as so called gendered childcare models
reflect the reality of caretaking economics in our American system.
3. Marital Income Taxation
A federal interest in supporting procreation also plays a role in the income
taxation of marriages. Much has been made of the fact that some married
couples, if they file jointly, can receive a lower tax rate than singles. But this
so-called “marriage bonus” comes only to those spouses whose incomes are
disproportionate. Why would Congress structure benefits so? Such a structure
makes sense if one assumes that childbearing and childrearing will interrupt
one of the partner’s work patterns.316 It also makes sense in a context of
314. Id. at 288 (“The animating concern was the economic dislocation that occurs
when the wage earner dies and the surviving parent is left with the choice to stay home
and care for the children or to go to work, a hardship often exacerbated by years
outside the labor force. ‘Mother’s insurance benefits’ were intended to make the choice
to stay home easier.”).
315. See discussion supra p. 732.
316. Couples with middle to lower incomes are least likely to benefit from the
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gender discrimination that inhibits women’s economic opportunities.
4. The Estate/Gift Tax Marital Deduction in Windsor
The argument that procreation support lies at the heart of the marital
deduction is a harder sell. Our modern deduction arises directly out of the
debate between separate property and community property states discussed
earlier.317 Separate property states attribute all earnings to the spouse who
receives the paycheck. Under the theory, the nonpaid spouse is entitled to
“support” from the paid one, and during marriage does not own any part of the
income the paid spouse brings home. By contrast, community property states
consider the couple to be partners and attribute half of the marital property
ownership to each, no matter which received a paycheck. Consequently, in
community property states, only half of the marital property passes upon the
death of one spouse and thus, only half is subject to estate taxation at that
death. The other spouse controls the other half. But in separate property
states, when the spouses have disproportionate income, the higher paid spouse
owns the higher share of marital property. That person is usually the husband,
who is also likely to die first.318 Because of the drastically progressive nature
of estate and gift taxation, married men in separate property states tended to
pay more taxes at death, while those in community property states had, in
effect, the benefit of income splitting that placed them in lower tax brackets.
This held true even though many community property states that split
ownership of marital property still gave the husband the right to control all
marital property. While some men in separate property states gave property to
their wives, they risked that she might not give it back when desired, might not
concede control, or even worse that after death another man might ultimately
become its owner or controller.
Congress tried to remedy this perceived unfairness but it never adopted the
community property system of taxation. For example, in 1942, Congress tried
to attribute all of community property to the husband at his death, unless it
could be proven the wife earned it. This posed a “tracing” problem.319
Moreover, men in separate property states adopted the practice of giving the
wife only a life estate and then passing the remainder to children or others.

“bonus” because they are more likely to need two spouses working outside the home.
Disproportionately, these couples are black, another fact demonstrating the link
between racial prejudice which suppressed the ability of black males to support their
families in such a patriarchial system and marital benefits. Dorothy Brown, Racial
Equality In The Twenty-First Century: What’s Tax Policy Got To Do With It?, 21 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1999).
317. E.g., Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings on S. 395, S. 404, S. 574, and
S. 858 Before the Subcomm. on Estate and Gift Taxation of the S. Comm. on Finance,
97th Cong., pt. 1, at 11 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Sen. Marital Ded. Rept.]; see
discussion supra p. 754-57.
318. 1981 Sen. Marital Ded. Rept., supra note 317, at 11.
319. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 111 (1948).
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Because a life estate expired at death, there was no transfer tax on property
passing upon the wife’s demise. On the other hand, in community property
states a husband could not control the entire estate in this way at death because
he technically only owned half of it, even if he was the only wage earner.320
To address these concerns, at the same time that Congress allowed married
couples to elect to file jointly, Congress created the marital deduction at issue
in Windsor.321 In 1981, it removed all limits.322 Now spouses can leave an
unlimited amount to each other free of estate and gift taxes. But in the instance
of a couple of biologically imbalanced procreators, the law offers many
opportunities for the man, who, again, is likely to die first, to exercise power
over the entire marital assets.323
One could theorize that the purpose for not taxing property passing at death
between spouses is that the man will likely die first and the woman will need
support for herself and, more importantly from Congress’ viewpoint, their
children. Indeed, when Congress made the marital deduction unlimited in
1981, the rules required one to give an outright gift to a spouse in order to
qualify for the marital deduction. The surviving spouse had the right to use the
property as she wished. But that theory of leaving the spouse a nest egg for
children was shot to pieces when Congress decided to amend the terminable
gift restriction and adopt Qualified Terminable Interest Property (“QTIP”)
treatment. Under QTIP treatment, a husband can give a wife a life estate only
and still have the estate qualify for the marital deduction.324 Thus, a husband
could control property from the grave, passing it after his wife’s death to
children or others. While theoretically the QTIP approach is gender neutral, in
context it is far from it. As mentioned above, the use of spousal life estate gifts
for tax avoidance and retention of control dated back to before 1948.
The justification for allowing the QTIP approach was expressly stated to be
children. It was argued that without the QTIP, a man had to choose between
leaving property directly to his wife to get the deduction or leaving it to his

320. Id. at 27-28.
321. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1515, at 609 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (increasing

marital deduction amount for lower income couples).
322. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a)-(b), 95
Stat. 172, 301; see also 1981 Sen. Marital Ded. Rept., supra note 317, at 11.
323. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, at 510-11 (2009) (discussing the evolution of the “widow’s
election” whereby one spouse can force the other to place her assets in a joint trust by
denying her access to his half of the community property at his death).
324. 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (2006). See Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings on
S. 23, S. 395, S. 404, S. 557, S. 574, S. 858, and S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Estate
and Gift Taxation of the S. Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., pt. 2, at 179 (1981)
[hereinafter 1981 Sen. QTIP Rpt.]. For a discussion of the evolution of the QTIP see
Irene A. Vlissides, Estate of Clack v. Commissioner: An End to the Conflict Over
Contingent QTIP Elections?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 163 (1997) (discussing history
and subsequent efforts of taxpayers to diminish even further the control holders of the
life estate would have in QTIP Trust property).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

69

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

774

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:4

children but lose it.325 It was pointed out the arrangement helps persons who
may be in second marriages and want to ensure that children from a prior
marriage or relationship receive a legacy but still want to leave support for a
present spouse.326 But others argued that an overwhelmingly male Congress
had offered men a legal way to strip their wives of control over devises under
the guise of doing what is best for the children. Indeed, some have criticized
the QTIP arrangements as sexist and a return to “dower.”327
For better or worse, in fashioning the estate tax marital deduction and
related provisions, Congress was aware of the unique imbalance existing in a
great many heterosexual married couples. That imbalance was imposed both
by biology but also by a history of government supported employment
discrimination and gender stereotyping in work and family life. The marital
deduction does not seem to be rooted in any modern sense in the federal
government’s interest in supporting “procreation.” First, it kicks in only at
death, but when the large majority of parents die, their children are already
grown up. Indeed, in the case of the QTIP, the property only passes after the
surviving spouse’s death, further ensuring that the children will be well into
adulthood. Second, it cannot be said to offset childrearing costs because the
person who would allegedly have paid the costs is already dead when the
benefit is awarded. Third, the QTIP provisions do not restrict the passage of
the property only to children. Fourth, the by-product of the arrangement is not
procreation support but rather that a wife and mother who has assumed a
traditional family role at the government’s urging is then denied any control
over marital assets (and thus of the valuable opportunity to favor those
beneficiaries who she prefers), save by her husband’s consent. All of this
under the guise of saving taxes. Thus, the deduction cannot be said to be
designed to offset the effects of the unique history of gender discrimination
against women. And fifth, it benefits only a small amount of people, those
with estates of greater than the amount of the federal exemption, roughly five
million dollars.328 Finally, there is little evidence that well-off men benefitting
from it would not marry or financially support the children they create or the
mothers they impregnate without such a deduction.

325. 1981 Sen. QTIP Rpt., supra note 324, at 179.
326. Id.
327. Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited

Marital Deduction, 76 N.C.L. REV. 1729 (1988); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital
Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 301, 305-06 (1995); Mary Moers Wenig, “Taxing Marriage,” 6 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 561, 572-74 (1997) (arguing that the law of dower was reborn via
QTIP).
328. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, § 302(a), Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010).
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C. Summarizing Federal Procreation Support Through Federal Marriage
Policy
It is possible then to see in federal policies and benefits related to marriage,
a pattern of federal support for procreation. That these benefits or burdens are
not afforded to parents who do not marry indicates a preference for procreation
within marriage, the so-called “responsible procreation” position. Congress
does not ignore unmarried parents but provides benefits to children born to
them in a different way. Marriage statutes go beyond merely giving awards
(and indeed even the benefits have been grossly overstated). They also
regulate the relationship between uniquely biologically imbalanced
heterosexual couple. It is rarely recognized that the combination of biology
and family economic needs may drive what some refer to as gendered
caretaking patterns. Families may be deciding that it makes no sense to have
both parents lose valuable opportunities for advancement and promotion,
which could help the entire family. Moreover, if one has already taken time
off, purely financially speaking, that one is likely to be the best candidate to
take even more time off, except in rare cases in which the woman actually out
earns the man. Many couples may simply be making choices that answer to
their own economic realities.
Using marriage for supporting procreation, even within the context of
discrimination, dates back to the common law. It makes sense that, in an
earlier time, government required a married man to have fathered a child in
order to receive courtesy (the right to a life estate in his deceased wife’s
property). If he didn’t have a child to support and who could inherit her assets,
then he did not need that financial resource which presumably could be
returned to the man who provided it, her father.329
It is not through bouts of forgetfulness that the U.S. government has not
imposed a national system of paid maternity leave and has resisted the broad
social welfare systems found in European nations. Witness the cries of
“socialism” when the Affordable Health Care Act, a step toward a national
health care program, was being debated.330 By contrast, the countries that led
the way in adopting a legally recognized status for committed same-sex
couples are also characterized by extensive social welfare systems that do not
rely heavily upon “marriage” for supporting procreation but do rely on very

329. Under state law, “Curtesy” gave a man a life estate in all of his wife’s property,
real or personal, but only if he had a child. Grimball V. Patton, 70 Ala. 626 (Sup. Ct.
Ala 1881) (finding that the husband was not a tenant in curtesy because he had no
children, thus could not claim any part of wife’s estate covered by trust established by
her father’s will).
330. See, e.g., Affordable Care Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (2006); Michael
McAuliff & Sara Kenigsberg, Obamacare Is Socialism: Reps. Louie Gohmert, Steve
King Attack, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (March 27, 2012, 7:54 PM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/obamacare-socialism-louie-gohmert-steveking_n_1383973.html. See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 Sup. Ct. at 2566
(upholding provisions of Affordable Care Act against Constitutional challenge).
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high taxation. I would contend that the unvarnished truth is that governmental
support of marriage has long been used—and still is used—as a regime for the
private (rather than public) financing of childbearing and childrearing, so that
one man’s dependents do not end up being paid for by other men. That the
regime has not been totally successful given the number of failed marriages
and unmarried procreators does not make it unconstitutional with respect to
same-sex couples.
At home, it is noteworthy that the first U.S. state to adopt same-sex marriage
for gays and lesbians, Massachusetts, also thereafter became the first in the
nation to require health insurance for all of its citizens. In rejecting bans on
same-sex marriage, Massachusetts’ high court opined that supporting
procreation was not the purpose of marriage in that state.331 That choice
reflects a local perspective that is different from perspectives in other parts of
the country. Yet, the irony is that despite the embrace of “marriage equality”
for same-sex couples, Massachusetts continues to maintain a separate property
regime for marriage, it does not have a system of paid maternity leave for
pregnant employees, and does not offset the costs of pregnancy not covered by
insurance, except in the form of social services for the very poor. All this leads
one to conclude that it must intend that husbands support their wives during the
inefficiency of pregnancy, and that unmarried women eat the costs or go on
public assistance, since child support is not compensation for a mother’s lost
earning and earning power.332 The point is not that Massachusetts must now
become Europe, but rather that governmental support of marriage is often an
attempt (however successful or ill conceived) to ensure that procreation
burdens remain on identifiable, private shoulders. It is a way government
seeks to hold people accountable for their own. That this is not a good model
for community in some people’s eyes does not make the model
unconstitutional. And same-sex couples are not the only group that has been
excluded by the design of marriage. Working parents who need two incomes
also find that the design of many of marriages’ benefits filtered through the tax
system are available only to those who can afford to have one partner in the
couple stay at home, as in the case of spousal income tax treatment discussed
in Part III(C)(2).
In 2003, the General Accountability Office (“GAO”) identified “some 1100

331. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003)
(rejecting notion that in Massachusetts, marriage is for supporting procreation).
332. See Website of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination,
available at http://www.mass.gov/mcad/maternity1.html (last visited May 16, 2013)
(guaranteeing eight weeks of maternity leave to women for adoption or birth, but not
requiring paid leave; suggesting Massachusetts law may require men to receive
identical leave regardless of birth status of parents); see also Global NAPs, Inc. v.
Awiszus, 930 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 2010) (interpreting Massachusetts pregnancy leave
statute to find that a woman not covered by federal leave act who took leave more than
eight weeks could be terminated).
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laws in the United States Code in which marital status is a factor.333 What
GAO did not consider was the extent to which procreation in marriage—
though encouraged and supported by the government through these benefits—
contributes to the baseline costs of the parties receiving those benefits or
whether Congress was trying to offset that cost. Nor was GAO asked to
consider how other benefits available to those who are not married measure
against those given to the married. Consider, for example, that no one
compensates a birth mother (or her partner if she is part of a couple) for her
forbearance from economic opportunities in pursuit of having a healthy baby.
Stillbirths and miscarriages carry a huge cost as well, despite the tragic end.
Those who bring home a bundle of joy from a hospital often also bring home a
hefty portion of their bill that is not covered by insurance. On the other hand,
if one adopts there is a $13,000 federal tax credit to offset the expenses of
procuring the child (a credit available to same-sex couples who adopt).334
There may be good reasons to distinguish between heterosexual couples and
adoptive couples in funding the costs of procuring a child, but the point
remains that GAO was asked to consider marriage’s benefits in a vacuum.
Congress does not have that privilege. It must consider the benefits of the
married and unmarried, of those with children and those without, of the single
and the coupled and cohabitating with no children, and of single parents. Its
failure has not been that it has failed to establish marriage equality for gays and
lesbian couples, but rather that it has largely failed to consider the rights of
same-sex couples in marriage and family policy at all.
VI. USING CONFLICT OF LAWS THEORY TO RECONCILE A PROCREATIONBASED MARITAL BENEFITS REGIME AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
I have argued that procreation support is a key factor in the federal
government’s support of marriage. The broad scale attack on procreation that
has been launched in the same-sex marriage cases seems to assume that
procreation and same-sex marriage cannot exist in the same system. In this
section, I argue that courts should use conflicts of laws doctrines to reconcile
Congress’ authorized choice to use procreation as a key component of
marriage policy and the legal rights of same-sex couples.
From the start, it should be noted that this is not a proposal that seeks to
accomplish “marriage equality,” that is, all married persons receive exactly the
333. In 1997 the General Accountability Office identified “all those laws in the
United States Code in which marital status is a factor, even though some of these laws
may not directly create benefits, rights, or privileges.” U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
Defense of Marriage Act, GAO/OGC-97-16 at 1-2 (1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf. The number of instances was 1049.
Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel to Hon. Henry Hyde, Chairman S.
Judiciary Comm., Jan. 31, 1997. In a followup memorandum it updated that number to
1138 as of 2003. Letter from Danya K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel to Hon. Bill Frist,
Maj. Leader, U.S. Senate, Jan. 23, 2004.
334. 26 U.S.C. § 23.
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same rights. It is better described as a proposal for “marriage for all.” That is,
everyone should have the right to be married, but Congress has the right to
decide that marriages should receive different taxpayer funded economic
support based on rational criteria. This writer agrees with those who opine that
the only reason that the state should be involved in marriage policy is to
support procreation and its effects on earning power for the couple. If children
could be plucked from trees and came with buds attached to their bellybuttons
that bloomed into twenty-five-year “your baby only” support trust funds, no
woman or married couple would have to experience the economic inefficiency
of pregnancy, and heterosexual couples could have sex without worrying about
birth control and accidental pregnancies. Government would then have no need
to be involved in marriage support because only people who want and are
ready for children would have them, and parents would have more than enough
money to raise them. People don’t need government to form family
relationships. But children are part of the nation’s economic juggling act and
procreation (bearing and raising) is both inefficient and expensive. Marriage is
one major way that the government ensures that the larger portion of
procreation’s costs—birthing and raising—are borne by identifiable private
parties. While the government provides some initial carrots to sweeten the pot,
the truth is that, from the public’s point of view, marriage without a national
plan for maternity care is a relatively cheap way to finance the necessary work
of procreation as a capitalist system moves forward. And the government uses
heterosexuality as a marker because that marker identifies all of the people it
wishes to reach and pregnancy, even today, remains unpredictable. It’s an
unromantic system for sure.
The American model has funneled access to legal recognition of family
largely through marriage. Our repeated historical error has been that access to
those family rights often has been made to depend upon who was being
married, what kind of children they might produce or indeed whether they
would produce at all. Blacks procreated the wrong type of children; women
were too inefficient at procreation; the poor and the ummarried procreated at
the wrong time (when they were not rich or when they were not married); and
same-sex couples did not procreate at all. Thus, no legally recognized family
rights for you! All the while government continued to attach benefits for those
who were entitled by law to the legal recognition that is marriage. Thus, samesex marriage advocates are right that because marriage centered on procreation
and the right kind, marriage became the key to access to many incidents that
bore very little relationship to procreation.
Conflict of law rules help to resolve the dilemma over when a procreation
standard can be legitimate public policy and when it must bow to the rights of
individuals to form families as they choose.335 As discussed in Part II, under

335. While my focus is marriage, with adaptations, the proposal I offer here could
apply to state recognitions of marriages and also to government's treatment of nonmarital family benefits.
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state conflict of law rules, the law of the place where the marriage was
celebrated governed the validity of a marriage. On the other hand, the
incidents that flowed from that marriage were often governed by the state
where the couple lived. The logic makes sense. The incidents, especially if
they are economic in nature, are far more likely to affect the home
jurisdiction’s policy interests and coffers. If the marriage fails, it is the forum
state that must deal with the financial failures that may follow as well.
Similarly, considering federal conflict of law rules, it makes sense that while
recognizing marriages, Congress has, as discussed in Part III(C)(2), declined to
apply state community property rules to some federal benefits. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that reasonable restrictions may be imposed as
to the incidents of marriage.336
I suggest then that we categorize the federal rights related to state sanctioned
marriage along conflict of laws lines into two categories: the validity of the
marriage on the one hand, the incidents on the other. 337 Marriage confers the
legal right to call an unrelated other one’s most intimate family. The marital
bundle includes the right to be treated like spouses by government both in
private relations and in public ones, and for a whole host of reasons including
social, medical, and legal. I will call this bundle of rights that marriage confers
simply “family” rights. I suggest that we place the other benefits that
government attaches to marriage in the category of “incidents” or branch
rights. These branch rights are not core to the family relationship—indeed,
some are quite new—and they largely comprise economic benefits from the

336. While declaring unconstitutional a restriction on marriage by persons who are
behind in child support payments, the court stated “[W]e do not mean to suggest that
every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for
marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may legitimately be imposed.” Zablocki v. Redhall, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87
(1978).
337. Other scholars have proposed using incidents theory in the context of interstate
recognition of same-sex marriages. These theories generally propose that a marriage
would be deemed valid but only with respect to certain incidents. The downside of
such an approach of course is that the validity status of a marriage constantly changes,
tested as each incident arises. I propose to conceptually separate the notions of validity
and incidents, as a conflicts of law policy has traditionally done. E.g., Barbara J. Cox,
Using an Incidents of Marriage Analysis When Considering Interstate Recognition of
Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WID. L.J.
699, 718-58 (2003-2004); Barbara Cox, Same-Sex Marriage And Choice-Of-Law: If
We Marry In Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 1033 (1995). Yet another approach would provide all couples the economic
benefits of marriage but allow differences with respect to rights that could be replicated
by contract. See ERIN O’HARA & LARRY RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 164-65 (2009).
Domestic partnership statutes also reflect a different “incidents” approach. While those
statutes do not use the term "marriage" for committed same-sex relationships, they
provide a legal status to such relationships and some or all of the incidents traditionally
associated with marriage.
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public purse. Congress could take these rights away from all couples without
altering the traditional notions that a person is “married” to another.
A. “Family” Rights
Through the incidents that it attaches to marriage and family life, the federal
government can burden or facilitate family life. Think of granting one couple
a government-subsidized right to bring one’s spouse on an overseas trip while
denying another, granting one the right to live in a government-subsidized
home but not another, granting one a right to be buried next to each other in a
government-funded cemetery but not another, granting one federal marital
privilege but not another. Such denials burden the right to be a family,
elevating one party’s access to family rights granted by government over
another party’s rights.
1. State Law Should Control Who is “Married” for Purposes of Federal
Incidents that Affect a Couple’s Right To Be a Family.
State law should govern the question of whether a marriage is valid and who
is marital family. The approach is consistent with longstanding federal
conflicts of law policy. Some would argue it is constitutionally mandated.
Whatever its source, as I have shown, deviation from state or local custom is
an extraordinary path for Congress to take.
Courts must determine when Congress’ asserted reasons for deviating from
local law are valid and when they are not. In the context of same-sex
marriages, the holdings of Lawrence v. Texas and Windsor confirm that the
mere fact that a couple is of the same-sex should not alone constitute sufficient
public policy to reject marital family status at the federal level when states
recognize it.338 Moreover, though unnoticed by other legal scholars and
litigants, the several states now expressly recognize at a minimum the right of
intimate same-sex couples to contract with respect to family life: to enter into
cohabitation agreements, to designate each other as personal agents for making
health care decisions over otherwise legal next of kin and the like. That move
is huge. In an earlier era, a resounding majority would have considered such
relationships an abomination, so immoral that the state considered any
agreements to secure them void.339 Add those states to the thirteen that have

338. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence the court struck down a
Texas state sodomy statute criminalizing intimate relations between consenting adults
as unconstitutional. The sexual relationship that was at the heart of the felony charge in
Lawrence—and rejected as a basis for criminal sanctions—is also at the heart of
historical objections to marriage.
339. The states expressly stating that such contracts are valid are Georgia, Florida,
Pennsylvania, Indiana, Ohio, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. See, e.g.,
Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (upholding the contract); Posik v. Layton,
695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the contract); Swails v. Haberer,
No. 02-7095, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17727 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (upholding the contract
applying state law); Boyle v. King, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty, No. GD07-021569, Dec.
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adopted same-sex marriage and the seven or so that have adopted domestic
partnerships or civil unions, and one finds a firm majority of states that have
embraced some form of legally cognizable way to allow individuals to choose
relationships and families that they wish. This writer believes it likely that
many other states would also recognize same-sex cohabitation agreements and
other documents solidifying the relationship between same-sex couples.
Cohabitation agreements are not marriage, but the moral objections to the
underlying relationship in both cases are the same.
Consequently, there is no reason in the cases of same-sex marriage for the
federal government not to follow state or local law with respect to who is in a
marital family. These marital family relationships exist independent of
procreation. From state designations, the government can then decide how to
allocate the benefits it chooses to attach to those relationships.

2. For Equal Protection Purposes, Courts Should Apply Intermediate Scrutiny
to Denials of Federal Benefits that Affect Family Rights.
In the case of same-sex couples, courts should review refusals to provide
benefits that affect family rights under intermediate scrutiny. The reason is
that, as to these types of rights, same-sex couples constitute a quasi-suspect
class. They satisfy the traditional concerns that compel heightened scrutiny:
(1) they have historically endured persecution and discrimination in pursuing
their family rights both within and outside of marriage; (2) homosexuality has
no relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to society; (3) with respect to
these rights, the class remains a politically weakened minority; and (4) when
they exercise the right to form families they become visible and identifiable.340

LEXIS 313 (2010) (agreeing the contract would be enforceable but finding none and
applying other state law instead of divorce code to lesbian couple for property
separation on breakup of relationship); Cherkis v. Curzi, No. 1989-CE-6173 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. Aug. 30, 1991) (upholding the contract); Anderson v. Anderson, No. 43CO1-9105CP-269 (Kosciusko Cir. Cr., Indiana, 1992) (upholding the contract); Seward v.
Mentrup, 622 N.E.2d 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding that mere cohabitation would
not give rise to any benefits, but a written agreement might do so); N.C. CONST. ART.
XIV, §6 (banning same-sex marriage while upholding the contract); SC CONST. ART.
XVII, §15 (banning same-sex marriage while upholding the contract); Ross v.
Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App. 2006) (banning same-sex marriage while
upholding the contract).
340. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting
Supreme Court has applied these factors in determining whether heightened scrutiny is
needed and citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); id. at 440-41; id. at 442 n.10, 472 n.24.
By contrast, under Loving v. Virginia, heterosexual blacks are “suspect” with respect to
both family rights and incidents. Indeed, as a heterosexual couple, the Lovings met the
presumed ability to procreation requirement and were still denied access to marriage,
precisely because of their presumed ability to procreate.
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B.”Branch” Rights
1. Federal Law Should Control Who Receives the Federal Branch Rights That
Flow From State-Designated Marriages.
Branch rights are the benefits and burdens that government attaches to
marriage in order to effect specific governmental public policy objectives.
Most of them will be economic. Because of their significant impact upon the
federal purse and the state’s lack of power with respect to federal expenditures,
who receives branch rights in the federal context should be governed by
federal law.
2. For Equal Protection Purposes, Courts Should Apply Rational Basis
Scrutiny to Federal Denials of Branch Rights.
Generally, the denial of branch rights to same-sex married couples should be
subject to a rational basis level of scrutiny in an Equal Protection challenge.
The key inquiry will be whether or not the statute was intended to advance a
legitimate interest in supporting natural procreation through marriage or
address the unique imbalance in the married heterosexual couple with respect
to it. I submit that rational bases other than these will be few or nonexistant.
The rational basis test makes sense for branch rights. These rights have
never been considered at the core of the right to be married and conflict of laws
policy has never dictated that one sovereign should follow another sovereign’s
policies on them. Second, gay and lesbian Americans as a group are not a
suspect or a quasi-suspect class with respect to the branch rights that are
attached to marriage. Instead, regarding these rights, they are like many others
who are excluded from marriage’s economic benefits by Congressional
priorities. Third, such a standard allows the government the needed flexibility
to make the policy choices it has a right to make in spending federal tax
dollars. Fourth many of these incidents involve economic legislation as to
which the courts have long extended deference to Congress’ decisions.341
Fifth, branch rights by definition do not involve state power over the family or
other significant federalism issues. Sixth, a rational basis standard recognizes
that in making funding decisions Congress considers far more interests than
merely those of same-sex couples versus opposite sex couples.
An example using the Oregon Donation law discussed in Part III(C)(1) will
explain why suspect or quasi-suspect status for same-sex couples should not
apply to branch rights and why a rational basis standard makes sense. The
Oregon law allowed only white men, Indians who had white fathers and white
women married to white men to take a share of Oregon land.342 Despite the
fact that the law was linked to procreation and marriage, it did not
economically disadvantage gay white men; indeed, white males of all

341. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
342. See discussion supra at p. 753, notes 237-38.
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orientations were economically favored under law. They could get the
essentially free land grant and, unlike women, had the power to apply for it in
their own right. The “incidents” of marriage in that day which Justice Story
identified as discussed in Part II(A)(3)—the disability of the wife, the rights of
the husband—were of no aid to gay men because those disabilities hobbled one
of the parties economically without the offsetting responsibility or benefit of
procreation.343 Two (white) men could work and travel far more widely than
other groups. Each member of a gay white male couple could take a lot of land
with each partner controlling his share. They could live together and farm it
together. If “economic benefits” is the concern as has been emphasized in
media, why trade the economic situation of two white males for the economic
rights of a white heterosexual married man holding all power within his home
but aided by a legally hobbled wife and facing repeated accidental and
expensive pregnancies? Indeed, this sole option for marital arrangements in
earlier centuries—coupled with the fact that gay men could only have and
legally claim biological children through marriage and intimacy with women—
was likely a key reason we have so little evidence that gay men tried legally to
marry other gay men in that era. Even if there were no barriers on same-sex
relationships, legal marriage would have made no economic sense for gay men
in prior centuries because it was riddled with sexism that economically
crippled one of the partners. But marriage law did significantly disadvantage
gay men in terms of family rights. They could not publicly proclaim
themselves as in love, or “married” or as an intimate family. Consequently,
they could not secure their connection into old age and beyond. Even publicly
pursuing the relationship outside of marriage could, in some communities,
bring serious criminal penalty.
Women in contrast had no right to land, unless they were married to a white
man or, after 1853, unless they were once married to one and widowed.344
This requirement—to marry a white man—denied lesbian women family
rights. If they married white men (which only white women could do) they got
the economic benefit and likely children, but they lost out on the family benefit
that they very much desired. Black women in most jurisdictions, regardless of
orientation, could either not marry at all (due to slavery) or, if free, could often
not legally marry white men.
Two groups had no chance of getting Oregon land under any circumstances.
One was women of any orientation who never married, straight or lesbian. The
second was blacks. Male, female, straight, or gay, married or unmarried—all
343. Thus, Justice Story noted the incidents of marriage were the disabilities of a
wife and the rights of husband. See discussion supra p. 719. As the Oregon statute
demonstrates, marriage based economic benefits at the federal level essentially
followed this model. Indeed, arguably one goal of such a structure was to place the
married man on par with the single one and thus encourage marriage in a regime that
crippled the wife from making significant economic contributions.
344. In 1853, Congress allowed widows to claim through husbands who had applied
for the land, but died. Donation Land Claim Act of 1853, 10 Stat. 158, §8.
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blacks, not merely slaves—were disqualified from getting Oregon land by
statute on the basis of race.345 Poor people’s right to the land depended largely
upon their race and their gender, not upon their class or economic status.
Some land grant statutes did later allow white women to apply for less
desirable land,346 and the end of slavery helped ease racial restrictions and
improve black access. But the Oregon design (which, remember, was novel
for its time in allowing married women to have even a share of land)
demonstrates why the strictest standard of scrutiny should not be applied to the
denial of branch benefits relating to marriage of same-sex couples. The
example demonstrates the need to have standards of review that reflect and
remedy the discriminatory history in question. The outcome I suggest is also
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Loving. To discuss Loving as
merely about the right to marry is, to mix a metaphor, to whitewash the case
and then to neuter it. Loving was a case about the freedom to marry and form a
family as one chooses, but it was also a case about race discrimination and
about race procreational discrimination.347
Any approach that ignores this history reduces the “marriage-equality”
345. Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, §4, 9 Stat. at 496 (1850) (defining
racial and gender restrictions). At that time, blacks were, by far, the largest group of
those classified as non-whites. Given how many Spaniards and Mexicans occupied
these areas, many Latinos were considered “white” and, thereby, would have qualified
for land. Those considered non-white would not have qualified. This writer has found
no evidence yet of other groups being denied land or applying for it probably because
their numbers in the U.S. were quite small in 1850. On gays and lesbians, I do not
deny the possibility that they suffered discrimination uniquely as gays and as well as
whatever else they were (e.g., race, gender etc.). The notion is called intersectionality.
See, e.g, Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1991) (introducing
notion of intersectionality); Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure
of Recent Lesbian and Gay "Victories," 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83 (1994) (applying the
intersectionality theory to gay and lesbian experiences). Indeed, intersectionality
advances my argument that one needs to be careful in assuming that all experiences fit
into the same box.
346. The Advantage of Having an Administration that is Posted on Whisky—
Married Women May Now Buy Land, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 19, 1887, at 5. The
Secretary of Interior decided that women, including married women, may purchase
timber and stone lands in states of Mississippi, Louisiana, California, Oregon, Nevada,
and Washington Territory, provided that land is not suitable for agriculture.
347. The Virginia Supreme Court in Loving relied primarily upon its earlier holding
in Naim v. Naim. That case held that the policy behind the anti-miscegenation statute
was to prevent interracial procreation and the creation of a “mongrel breed of citizens.”
Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), overruled by Loving, 388 U.S. at 1. See
also Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966) (stating that Naim is controlling and
there is no need to reconsider it), rev’d by Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (referring to state’s
desire not to create a “mongrel breed of citizens” to and to preserve white supremacy).
Loving was but one brick in a large complex of race discrimination and indeed, but
considered out of context, the right to marry white people was among the least of black
people's historical racial hurdles. The case did not, of course, open marriages' doors for
either black or interracial same-sex couples.
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battle to a simple uncomfortable question: Which white men have the most
economic rights? Is it those who prefer the company of women? Or is it those
who prefer the company of men?348
One could argue that same-sex couples who are parents under state law
should have the benefit of intermediate scrutiny when procreation is the
claimed reason for the benefit. Under this view the denials of ERISA, Social
Security benefits and income tax benefits mentioned in Part V(B) should be
subject to the intermediate review standard for married same-sex couples who
are parents under state law. The issue requires more attention than this article
can provide. However, brief treatment can outline some of the issues.
Arguments in favor are that the federal government has traditionally
incorporated state law on parenting definitions, the federal government does
benefit when two parties rather than one commit to supporting a child as
parents. Moreover the economics of a family unit might still dictate that one
parent will need to disproportionately tend to the child’s needs for the entire
unit to move forward most efficiently, rather than each taking the economic hit
of parenting equally. Some same-sex parents do have natural births although
always involving third parties. Notably, benefits allegedly targeted for
procreation go to opposite sex parents who adopt and use reproductive
technologies toward parenthood as well as those who never have procreated
and cannot procreate. And finally, gays and lesbians have faced opposition as
parenting couples, not merely as individuals, even when they have taken the
traditional path of being adoptive parents.
On the other hand, there are also arguments against intermediate scrutiny as
the standard of review for marriage-related branch benefits relating to
parenting. Traditionally, married parents under law commit to supporting not
only the child but also each other. It might be argued that the presence of the
biological tie and the biological imbalance that normally exists in the
heterosexual couple—and even past gender discrimination within heterosexual
marriage—are key assumptions in statutes that provide or impose marital

348. Lesbian scholars have criticized the battle for “marriage” arguing that a
marriage-based regime for social support will not protect all families or meet the needs
of all gay and lesbian couples. See Paula L. Ettlebrick, Domestic Partnership, Civil
Unions, or Marriage: One Size Does Not Fit All, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 905 (2001) (noting
same-sex parenting always requires three people and arguing for recognition of broader
relationships other than marriage and questioning attempt to mainstream gay and
lesbian families); Paula L. Ettlebrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum eds., 1997); NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND STRAIGHT AND GAY MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) (arguing gay and lesbian couples are
no more disadvantaged by a marital regime for benefits than other non-married
groups).
Other authors have similarly criticized using marriage and "intimacy" as a basis for
affording family benefits. See e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTURED MOTHER: THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (asking why
marriage or intimacy should be the gateway to providing benefits).
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obligations or benefits tied to parenting through marriage (as opposed to
providing the benefits outside of marriage). Moreover, when the issue is
procreation-related benefits based on a Congressional assumption that having
biological children within a marriage is preferred, with respect to branch
benefits same-sex couples do not stand much differently than committed
unmarried couples or single parents. On the question of over-inclusion, some
heterosexuals who use surrogates or other reproductive technologies also have
children or might have them biologically. Notably, we are speaking here of the
standard of scrutiny, not of the ultimate decision on whether or not same-sex
couples should be treated exactly like opposite sex ones. I conclude that the
rational basis standard should be considered sufficient – for now.
Moreover, as I have discussed in Part V, even modern statutes appear to be
designed to cover the negative economic effects of a pregnancy as to which
both parties played a central biological role. When the biological imbalance
assumed by the statutes is not present, the parties have greater bargaining
power vis á vis each other with respect to procreation. With lesbians, if birth is
their choice, either can have the child. With gay men, because neither forgoes
economic activity to give birth, they have greater economic freedom to choose
who among them will be the primary caretaker. Moreover, as discussed in Part
V(B)(2), rational basis scrutiny has been applied to denials of benefits to
unmarried heterosexual biological parents under state law who without
question are biologically unbalanced vis á vis each other, may even be
cohabitating, and who may be committed to parenting. In those cases, the man
does not legally commit to financially supporting the mother though one
pregnancy or several that he may well have consented to. Courts generally
enforce a father’s commitment to supporting the child, not the mother. Surely,
using heterosexuality as a marker is over-inclusive. The over inclusion
however, could be said to be a function of a legal assumption as to the
unpredictability of procreation, a legal indulgence of the fertile octogenarian
fiction, the impracticality of testing for procreation given privacy interests, and
possibly a recognition of the long term financial impact of procreation. It is
not a conclusion that how one procreates or whether one procreates does not
matter.
It can reasonably be argued, especially given the newness of the issue, that
the federal government has a right to weigh in on how the federal tax dollars it
confers affect the third party rights that are regularly at issue in reproductive
technology cases for both same-sex couples and for heterosexual ones, the
trends in reproductive technologies themselves, and as on how federal funding
will affect the rights of the children or potential children at issue. Finally, one
could argue that parenting discrimination is a matter not specific to same-sex
couples or to marriage, and responses should, therefore, be handled outside of
it.
It is true that sexism has long been and continues to be perpetrated through
marriage policy. However, there is zero evidence that including same-sex
couples who did not suffer that history of marriage as a vehicle for gender
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discrimination as same-sex couples will alleviate gender discrimination within
and through marriage. Indeed, one could argue that policies that make the
gender discrimination imbalance less invisible also make it easier to
accomplish discrimination.
The author does not dispute that same-sex couples have been discriminated
against in parenting or that they can make wonderful parents. But other couples
excluded from procreation-related benefits (the unmarried, in particular) and
their children have also faced unique historical discrimination with respect to
asserting their parental rights. A rational basis standard for dispensing of
benefits through marriage would give Congress more freedom to consider the
rights of all couples excluded from marriage’s non-familial benefits.
Moreover the standard would not preclude a challenge that Congress should
have provided certain procreation-based benefits outside of marriage. So long
as the United States continues to use marriage as a primary means of
supporting natural procreation, I believe that Congress is entitled to use
heterosexual procreation as a lane marker for procreation-related benefits,
subject to a rational basis test. Indeed, the founders likely did not have in mind
many of the reproductive technologies that can result in parenthood under
some state laws.
C. The Plenary Power Exception
If the Constitution places exclusive or plenary power in the federal
government to make the relevant decision, even if the restriction directly
affects family rights, the test must, of course, be rational basis. Courts are
clear that in such cases a finger should be placed on the scale in favor of
federal decision-making even when suspect classes are otherwise involved.349
Three obvious instances of plenary power come to mind: immigration, the U.S.
military, and Congress’ power over American Indian Affairs.
D. The Difficulty of Line Drawing
Surely some cases of line drawing to identify whether the denied right
affects a marital family right or is a merely a branch right may be harder than
in others. Every federal marital benefit in some way affects the family. In
close cases, courts should employ a balancing test to decide the primary
operation of the right. A court could also decide that some rights should be
treated as affecting family rights for some purposes but not others, or that
government may not block all benefits, but it may offer a different level of
economic benefit based upon constitutionally defensible public priorities.
Another case of line drawing difficulty may arise in determining whether or

349. E.g., U.S. v. Mirza, 454 Fed. Appx. 249 (5th Cir. 2011), 132 S. Ct. 1725 (2012)
(discussing immigration); United States v. Llamas-Gonzalez, 414 F. Appx. 936 (9th
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3047 (2011) (discussing immigration); Delaware
Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 470 U.S. 73 (1977) (discussing Indian affairs);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (discussing Indian affairs).
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not a statute advances procreation—and how. This determination will often be
the tipping point on rational basis review. It may lead to exclusion of same-sex
couples that do not have children or the inclusion of those who do. The
question of who is a parent will also likely be one that will invite controversy,
especially in the case of reproductive technologies in which third party rights
are involved. Congress and the Courts will have to sort out when a statute is
merely advancing male hegemony and/or sexual orientation discrimination and
when it advances procreation or another legitimate state interest.
E. Is the Federal Government Required to Use The Word “Marriage?”
This analysis does not require that the government use the term marriage.
The federal government obviously has the right to define the terms to be used
in its own statutes. DOMA actually does not prevent the government from
using a neutral term for all intimate relationships simply for the purpose of
designating who gets federal benefits. Take for example, a term like “federally
recognized intimate partnerships.”350 However, if Congress used a single term,
if it wished to preserve a procreation-based regime, it would still have to create
subclasses. That could be done on a basis other than sexual orientation, but I
cannot see that the division with respect to branch rights is compelled.
Moreover, it is a fact that marriage is uniquely a state-created notion.
Employing that name at the federal level may help states that embrace samesex marriage, but it could also negatively affect the rights of those states that
have declined to do so, including those that use alternative names for the
relationships.
In fact, not being wed to the term “marriage” for same-sex couples will also
allow government to expand some benefits that are currently marriage related
to those couples in jurisdictions that do not recognize marriage. The general
principle of following state law in making federal policy on family matters,
could justify the federal government recognizing marriage substitutes that
some states have adopted in lieu of same-sex marriage such as civil unions and
domestic partnerships. Domestic partnerships run the gamut in the degree of
rights they allow, but they generally allow at least some rights that mirror
family rights, even if they deny branch incidents. The federal government
might even be able to base family-related benefits upon contracts creating ties
that states have agreed to recognize in lieu of marriage if such contracts are
350. At oral argument in Windsor, Justice Alito raised a similar question adding to
his hypothetical that the government defines the word to include same-sex couples.
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let me get to the question I asked Mr. Clement. It just
gets rid of the word “marriage,” takes it out of the U.S. Code completely.
Substitutes something else, and defines it as same-sex—to include same-sex
couples. Surely it could do that.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 99, Windsor v. United States (No. 12-307) (U.S. filed
Mar.
27,
2012)
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=
12-307.
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designed to create the types of legal relationships that are consistent with the
federal statutory purposes establishing the benefit.
VII. APPLYING THE STANDARDS TO THE THREE DOMAS
How does this scheme relate to the three DOMAs? One DOMA bundles all
marriage rights together, making them impervious to same-sex couples. This
is the DOMA that has dominated attention in same-sex marriage litigation.
The argument supporting this DOMA, if any, is that DOMA is an integral part
of a comprehensive legislative scheme supporting procreation by heterosexual
couples. The problem is that, as I have shown, not all federal statutes vindicate
the procreation goal, and this DOMA also burdens rights traditionally reserved
to the states while denying same-sex couples fundamental rights affecting the
family. Because it bundles family rights with other rights, this DOMA should
be subjected to heightened scrutiny and should fall under Equal Protection, as
it did in Windsor.
The second DOMA is a statute that collapses into each underlying statute
that it defines. The argument supporting this DOMA is that it is authorized by
and it is integral to each of those underlying statutes. More likely, this DOMA
would survive in some cases, but fail in others. Whether or not the second
DOMA stands—the one that collapses into the underlying statutes—depends
upon which federal policy is at issue.
Then there is the third DOMA. This DOMA is definitional. This DOMA
does not tell Congress how to allocate marital benefits. It simply limits how
Congress can use the term “marriage.” As applied to all statutes this DOMA,
should also fail because the definition cannot be sustained in all cases,
especially without an alternative regime. However, this DOMA may be valid
in some circumstances where Congress intended to uniquely address historical
gender discrimination through marriage or the procreational situation of the
heterosexual couple.
VIII. APPLYING THE STANDARDS TO THE WINDSOR CASE
How does the Windsor case come out under this proposal? The plaintiff
sought a refund of federal estate taxes paid because she was denied the estate
tax marital deduction after the death of her spouse. The Windsor case is
complicated by several facts. First, she was married in Canada and at the time
of her spouse’s death, her domicile of New York did not recognize same-sex
marriages either directly or under its conflict of law rules. Second, opinions
indicate that neither litigants nor the federal courts focused upon whether she
had already applied for a refund of state estate taxes or whether New York had
already determined that it would retroactively apply its own same-sex marriage
laws and grant the tax refund. The Second Circuit simply assumed that New
York law would control whether or not she was “married” and predicted New
York would conclude that she was based on New York precedent recognizing
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It may not be that

351. Below, BLAG challenged Windsor's Article III standing and lost, but seemed
to concede that state law controlled the question of whether her marriage was valid at
the relevant time. See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d. 394, 398 (2012),
aff'd 699 F.3d. 169, 176, 177-78, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); Brief in
Opposition at 18-19, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 786 (opposing the petition
to writ of certiorari before judgment and discussing state law as controlling). The
Second Circuit looked to New York law to determine whether or not New York would
retroactively consider them married at the time of the spouse's death, and it decided that
New York would. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176, 177-78 (2012). It did
not mention whether or not Windsor had filed an original claim or refund with respect
to her New York state estate taxes as “married” under New York law. Neither the
district court nor the Second Circuit considered that federal law might well determine
retroactivity e.g., the time as to which a requirement to be satisfied under state law is to
be met for purposes of federal law, even if state law would govern whether a same-sex
marriage is cognizable.
Windsor's complaint stated that New York "recognizes [the couple's] marriage" and
that it "provided them with the same status, responsibilities and protections, as other
married people.” Windsor Complt. at ¶4, p. 2. In her brief to the Supreme Court,
Windsor stated that the IRS denied her claim because both spouses were women and
the deduction did not apply due to DOMA. Brief on the Jurisdictional Questions for
Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, at 5, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 786. The brief also
asserted that New York denied her the state marital deduction because that "[a]t the
time, New York State for purposes of imposing its own estate, calculated the value of a
decedent's estate by reference to the estate's federal tax liablility" and that "[t]hus the
IRS's decision meant" that Windsor owed New York state estate taxes. Id. at 5, n.2. It
said that Windsor has filed a "protective" claim in New York. It did not indicate that a
copy of the claim was a part of the Appendix filed with the Supreme Court or part of
the record below and this author does not have access to all of those records.
While many states do choose to look to federal law with reference to their own estate
taxes, at the time, New York also still had the right to calculate her liability with
reference to whether New York considered her married or not. New York was not
required to follow federal law on that marriage determination. Thus it is important to
know whether New York denied the request to treat her as married when she filed her
return, or whether Windsor only asserted it at a later point. The question of
retroactivity for state estate tax purposes is a New York question. If state law governs
retroactivity, as the parties suggested to the Second Circuit and as it then opined, then
New York’s decision governs in both cases. Moreover, a state determination should
arguably be a prerequisite to a federal determination. Otherwise, a state could later say
“no retroactivity for purposes of state law” and then the very basis for a filer's win on
the merits would be ripped from under her—but the filer might already have been paid
the federal refund. A federal court has the means to certify the question to the state's
highest court or to require that a taxpayer ask the state tax authorities to rule. To
predict state law in that circumstance in such a political context, affects the ability of a
state to determine to the contrary later as it has a right to do. If federal law governs
retroactivity then the question is whether even if DOMA is unconstitutional, that ruling
should be retroactively applied in the tax context to a marriage that even a state itself
did not recognize at the relevant time. The timing of Windsor's claim with New York
state—how she filed at first and when she filed for a refund—may also matter to
standing.
The impact of a decision on retroactivity relates to more couples than those like
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Nevertheless, assuming one can validly reach the merits, claims like
Windsor’s Equal Protection claim should likely be reviewed under a rational
basis test. I concede some good arguments that taxation of inheritances
presents a “hybrid” case and should have the favor of a heightened standard.
Descent and distribution are traditionally state areas of interest. While the
actual passing of property is not hindered, the tax reduces the amount of
property that can pass at death and the government taxes some property that is
normally within the power of the state to control. Thus, a higher tax on
inheritances between same-sex spouses straddles the line between denying
family rights and denying economic rights. Moreover the tie to procreation
appears distant, at least as the deduction is presently designed. On the other
hand, the federal government has always had broad power to determine
taxation. It needs that flexibility; and, despite claims of some that the rational
basis standard is too watered down to be meaningful, absent a procreational
interest, a rational basis test should be sufficient to determine a case like
Windsor’s in her favor with respect to both state and federal property.
As I have argued, in Part V(B)(4), there is no demonstrable link between the
modern marital deduction and procreation and, I would argue, no rational basis
for denying the claim. Awarding the deduction is also otherwise not contrary
to federal public policy. Indeed, while the impact of the deduction for Windsor
is quite large, the impact on the federal purse will be relatively small because
so few married couples of any orientation have estates large enough to qualify
for it. Finally, while the deduction does not restrain the ability of the couple to
be a family, it touches upon inheritances within families, thereby burdening the
state’s attempt to have Windsor treated just like other families within the state.

Windsor who went ahead and married despite law. It is reasonable to ask why
retroactivity should not also be applied to those couples who wanted desperately to
marry but concluded the act of legal marriage would be legally fruitless or who could
not afford to travel to abroad or to another state to be married, or who entered into civil
unions or domestic partnerships, some prior to their state later adopting marriage in
fact. What of those who still cannot marry under state law? How far back should
retroactivity go? Both state and federal governments must also consider whether the
retroactivity principle is limited to estate taxes (and if so, why?) or whether it applies
more broadly to other areas of taxation.
Another approach to the question, considering conflict of laws theory and the
Constitution, is to consider whether the U.S. is required to retroactively recognize a
Canadian same-sex marriage—which is the place that recognized the marriage as a
valid marriage ceremony at the relevant time. If the answer is that the federal
government should have recognized the Canadian marriage as qualifying at the time of
death (e.g., the application of DOMA should be seen as violating Equal Protection at
the time), the retroactivity problem disappears because the marriage was current at time
of the spouse's death. But this case has the wrinkle that the state of domicile would not
have recognized the marriage at the time, federal tax laws do normally look to the state
of domicile for defining marriage in the tax context, and so the argument exists that the
federal government should recognize it for the purpose of branch rights only if the
several states would or if the state of domicile would have at the relevant time—unless,
of course, following state law would be deemed to be violating the federal Constitution.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

87

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1

792

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:4

Consequently, on the merits, if the home state would grant a marital deduction
refund based on retroactive recognition of a marriage, Windsor and those like
her should get the federal refund.
IX. CONCLUSION
The battle over same-sex marriage is, broadly viewed, not merely a battle
over marriage but a battle over families: Who can form them? Whose will be
most financially and socially successful? Whose receives the most publicly
funded benefits? But it is also a theoretical battle over what burdens we in the
United States believe should be publicly supported and which ones we think
should be privately borne. At the center of that latter battle is procreation.
Many different groups are competing for financial benefits out of the public
purse. Same-sex couples comprise only one such group. Beyond the treatment
of same-sex couples one can criticize our current procreation centered
approach for biases against the middle and lower classes, biases against
women, and biases against minority groups. Not all of these biases are illegal
under current law.
As I have argued, support of procreation has long been a part of federal
marriage policy. It remains so today. If a procreation policy is to survive,
Congress must be able to reserve lanes of legal space for the funding of
differently situated families within that regime. Heterosexual married couples
are marked generally by the risk of accidental pregnancies, a history of gender
discrimination through marriage, and an imbalance in procreational position
between them. The more that parties who do not share the same interests or
concerns are added to the procreation lane, the more rapidly legal precedent
will erase or dramatically transform any protection or benefits intended to deal
with that unique situation. While current federal marriage policy continues to
discriminate against procreating women, abandoning a procreation based
marriage regime will not resolve those problems. Indeed, it may make the
situation worse.
So long as the United States continues to use marriage as a primary means
of supporting natural procreation, I believe that Congress is entitled to use
heterosexuality as a lane marker for procreation-related benefits, subject to a
rational basis test. Congress has a right to design a scheme that does not make
heterosexual marriage less favored by those it wishes to encourage to
undertake because the financial benefits measured against the financial costs of
procreation within marriage are not compelling in a larger market. Congress is
also entitled to address gender inequality in heterosexual marriage uniquely
given the long history of the same and its distinction from sexual orientation
discrimination. It is constitutionally defensible, if not wise, for Congress to
create zones of interest in family policy in order to give voice to the different
interest groups, remedy the ills of concern, and in order to give voice the very
procreation-related concerns that are, this writer believes, the only legitimate
reason for state or federal governments to be involved in financing marriage.
Overinclusiveness of heterosexual couples who do not procreate or have not
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shown they can is not desirable, but may be unavoidable. The issue here is not
who will receive financial benefits (which may be dispersed within or without
marriage), but rather who will receive those benefits through financial policies
that are tied to marriage. The arrangement disadvantages the children of samesex couples, but no more so than the children of unmarried heterosexual
couples, the latter of whom definitely procreate naturally but do not receive for
their children benefits related to marital procreation.
It is not correct to suggest, as some have, that adding new couples to an
economic benefit does not diminish the rights of those already enjoying the
benefit.352 Economic benefits operate in a larger marketplace, and a benefit
given to one group repositions the actors in that marketplace vis-à-vis others.
Indeed, that repositioning in the economic marketplace is the very point of the
benefit.
The history of marriage in the United States has been both a history of using
marriage to support procreation and using marriage to promote discrimination.
Both strands are present in DOMA and the Court wisely struck its broadest
variation down. But as discussion of what Congress can do now moves
forward, the courts should strive hard to respect Congress’ right to set the
priorities for public funding that “the people” favor, while still requiring
Congress to adhere to the principles of federalism and Equal Protection in the
Constitution. Congress’ failure is not that it has not given exactly the same
benefits to same-sex couples and opposite sex couples but rather, that in
marital and family funding policy, it has not considered the rights of same-sex
couples at all. The courts should require it to do so, but also give Congress the
leeway to consider not just the narrow theater of litigation where those with
time and resources contend, but also the entire landscape of families and
individuals, all of whom should be considered as Congress makes family
funding decisions.

352. See, e.g., Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 2012) (suggesting that DOMA does not increase benefits for heterosexual couples
nor do its defenders show how denying same-sex couples benefits would encourage
heterosexual ones to marry).
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